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Abstract
It has frequently been said that works on the Arab-Israeli conflict are 
biased to a large degree, but so far there has never been a serious 
study carried out analyzing the issue of bias and objectivity. This is 
the purpose of this thesis.
To assist in this task, a methodology is introduced to work as a 
tool for examining bias. The methodology is focused on themes (e.g. 
events or interpretations) present in the analyzed sources and aims at 
categorizing the sources used as being pro-Israeli or pro-Arab in 
relation to the individual themes. The time frame looked upon is the 
time from 1967 to roughly 1974, and the works analyzed are all 
written in English with a presumably Western audience in mind.
The main results of this thesis are that bias occurs in the majority 
of sources in the majority of instances. A number of various 
classifications for bias have been established and are discussed in the 
concluding section of the thesis. In most cases, the established bias is 
more to be construed as being differences of opinion rather than 
instances of propaganda. The last major result of this thesis is that 
although the majority of sources analyzed are biased in the majority 
of cases, there are not as many clearly pro-Arab or pro-Israeli sources 
as could be assumed. What this means is that there is a large gray 
area between the clearly discernibly pro-Israeli and pro-Arab sources, 
and that there is a great variety in how the various authors present 
the subject area at hand. Due to the at least perceived ideological and 
emotional lines drawn in the sand regarding the writing on the 
history of the conflict, this is perhaps a surprising result.
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A note on transliteration
Both Arabic and Hebrew use alphabets different from the Latin 
script, and as most of the persons referred to in this thesis are either 
Arabs or Israelis there may seem to be a need for transliteration. In 
Arabic, this task seems easy enough as there are a few more or less 
universally accepted models: namely the methods used in
Encyclopaedia Islamica or the International Journal o f Middle East 
Studies. When it comes to Hebrew, however, there is no such 
universally accepted method. The problem that arises both regarding 
Arabic and Hebrew is that the great majority of persons referred to in 
this thesis are (or were) public figures who already have more or less 
official names in the Latin alphabet. These Anglicized names are 
almost entirely used in the sources analyzed, and not the properly 
transliterated names. The former President of Egypt, for instance, is 
referred to as Gamal Abdel Nasser—which would also be the form 
you would find it if you were to look him up in an encyclopedia for 
example—and not Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir. As there is the risk of actually 
confusing the reader (or at least those not familiar with Arabic or 
Hebrew), instead of assisting him or her, I have decided not to use 
transliteration in this thesis, but instead use the spelling employed in 
the sources.
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l. Introduction
Introduction
Sometimes when discussing with people (friends, family, etc.) that I 
am studying the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I am told 
that what I am doing is very current. This may be true, but the Arab- 
Israeli conflict has at least since the founding of Israel in 1948 been a 
persistent conflict that has received a great deal of attention in the 
media of the world. There are most likely not many weeks in the last 
50 years that have not seen at least one reference to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in any given leading Western newspaper. Studying the Arab- 
Israeli conflict has probably been current ever since 1948. 
Increasingly, however, the conflict has begun to be referred to as the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or a derivative thereof, but in this thesis 
the term Arab-Israeli conflict is preferred. The reason for this is that 
the conflict has historically not only existed between Israelis and 
Palestinians, but also between Israel, on the one hand, and other 
Arab nationalities, groups and states on the other.
People with no particular background in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
also sometimes ask me which of the two sides I believe to be more 
morally right. The assumption here is probably that I—who 
presumably have a better knowledge of the conflict—have a better 
idea of who is to blame for why there is still bloodshed and no peace. 
This question (of who is to blame) has been and continues to be dealt 
with in a great number of debate articles and television programs 
dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict; where the commentators tend 
to try to determine or argue who is responsible for the violence or
10
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lack of peace. This is obviously nothing unique to the situation in the 
Middle East, but can also be seen with regard to other conflicts. The 
situation in Northern Ireland (another persistent conflict) has for 
instance at various times and by various commentators been blamed 
on the Irish Republican Army (the IRA), the Protestants of Northern 
Ireland and on the British government. Indeed, it is the working 
assumption of this thesis that the public in the West has a desire to 
try to determine who is to blame for any given conflict.
One can easily remember how the Serbs were assigned most of 
the blame for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early and mid- 
1990s, although the situation probably was more complex than that. 
It is also a working assumption that Western public opinion generally 
does not approve of aggression: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was 
almost universally condemned in Europe and North America as 
unjust and plain wrong. On the other hand, the attack on Iraq by the 
US and its allies six months later with the goal of expelling the Iraqi 
army from Kuwait was generally not seen as aggression in the West, 
although it was in some circles. The actions undertaken by the United 
States and its coalition, it was said, were not an instance of 
aggression, as they were just a response to the initial Iraqi 
aggression. Of course, the United States and its allies also acted in 
accordance with resolutions passed by the UN Security Council, 
which authorized the use of force in order to free Kuwait from Iraqi 
occupation.
Likewise with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it seems as if a 
great deal of energy has been devoted to determining or arguing 
which side has been the aggressor and which side has merely 
responded to aggression. Which side is good and which side is bad? 
Although there are of course variations and also voices that disagree 
with the popular outlook, the assignment of blame is arguably more 
predictable in the areas directly involved in the conflict (i.e. the Arab 
world and Israel). Examining how bias works in written material 
produced in the area and languages directly involved most certainly
11
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would be an interesting undertaking, but the focus in this thesis is on 
an area where the interest and allegiances with regard to the conflict 
are not as obvious. It is the West that is the focus of this thesis and in 
particular the English-speaking world.
English has been selected as it could be argued that it is the major 
Western language, and in some ways the language through which the 
West mostly manifests itself (at least in the latter part of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first). Some of the 
works used are translations from other Western languages and some 
are written by Arabs and Israelis, but the target audience is the 
English-speaking West.
In a relatively recent review article in an academic journal 
specializing on the Middle East, the author poses the question in the 
title to what degree works on the Arab-Israeli conflict are to be 
considered scholarship or propaganda.1 What the author, Neill 
Lochery, seems to have done in his article is to deem the works he 
agrees with as scholarship, and those he disagrees with as 
propaganda. The term scholarship is in this context thought of as 
being objective and true, while the term propaganda is thought of as 
being the opposite. Lochery is not the first (see below), nor probably 
the last writer to choose this manner in which to deal with the 
question of bias with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, 
the question the author poses—whether the literature on the Arab- 
Israeli conflict should be considered scholarship or propaganda—is 
somewhat at the core of this thesis.
That there is a fair amount of bias in the literature and debate 
surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict is something probably most 
students, or even casual observers, of the conflict would agree with. 
The conflict is very politicized and also very much alive, so to say that 
there would be a high degree of bias surrounding it is certainly not an
1 Neill Lochery, “Scholarship or Propaganda: Works on Israel and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 2001,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37 No. 4 (2001), pp. 219-36.
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absolutely preposterous assumption. Yet it is not enough to simply 
say that a great deal of material written on the conflict is biased and 
then leave it at that. First of all, the concept of bias is not easily 
defined and needs to be analyzed further. Secondly, it is important to 
establish, or at least problematize, the nature of bias in relation to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict if it indeed does play such a large role in the 
written material on the conflict. Analyzing the issue of bias and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict—especially considering how very much alive and 
heavily contested it is—is an important undertaking in that it in some 
sense determines how one should look upon the historiography being 
produced.
So what is bias and how does it materialize itself when it comes to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict? In the 1994 motion picture Reality Bites, 
the main character is asked at a job interview to define irony. “I can't 
define it,” she says, “but I know it when I see it.”2 The same could be 
said of bias; that it is something you sometimes notice, but cannot 
always put your finger on. There are of course definitions of both 
irony and bias, but part of the problem is that not everyone would 
agree whether or not a statement is ironic or biased. In this thesis, 
the goal is to problematize the question of bias: primarily in relation 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but to some degree also in more general 
terms. As a part of this, a certain methodology is presented that, it is 
argued, makes the task at hand easier to undertake and the results 
more reliable. To evaluate the usefulness of this methodology is an 
important aspect of this thesis. Furthermore, the question at hand is 
first to try to determine what bias means and, secondly, what its 
nature is with regard to works on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The third 
question is how frequent bias is in relation to individual aspects of 
the conflict and to what degree the sources used also can be said to be 
biased. The fourth question is simply whether it is indeed possible to
2 This is probably somewhat of a tongue in cheek reference to former US Supreme 
Court Justice Potter Stewart who once said that “I can't define pornography, but I 
know it when I see it.”
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write works on such a politicized conflict without passing judgment 
on the principal actors. These are the major questions of this thesis.
The first question, on the nature of bias, is in some ways too large 
to be properly explored without devoting the whole thesis to it. 
Historians have problematized the question of bias in histoiy ever 
since the rise of German historian Leopold von Ranke in the 
nineteenth century and his theories regarding how history properly 
should be studied, or even before. The rise of the so-called 
postmodern approach to the study of history in the 1980s further 
increased the debate and awareness amongst historians. This debate 
is further discussed below in the section on theory. First, however, 
the attention is shifted to the question of what has previously been 
written on the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Works on the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict
The Arab-Israeli conflict has generated a great number of books, 
articles, conferences, etc. For instance, historian Kenneth Stein has 
counted 1,800 entries in Historical Abstracts dealing with some 
aspect of the conflict. This is more than a third of all entries dealing 
with Middle Eastern history in general.3 Political scientists and 
scholars of international relations and international law have also 
written on the conflict and, besides strictly academic material, the 
conflict has also generated a large amount of accounts written by 
diplomats, journalists, different kinds of activists and so forth. There 
is also a relatively large amount of published diaries, memoirs and 
other kinds of accounts written by individuals who have played a 
significant (or not so significant) role in the conflict.
3 Kenneth W. Stein, “A Historiographic Review of Literature on the Origins of the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict,” American Historical Review, Vol. 96 No. 5 (1991), p. 1451.
14
Introduction
With such a large amount of published work one could assume 
that there would be quite a few studies that deal with the 
historiography of the conflict, or at least how the debate has taken 
place. But so far, this has not been the case. There are in fact only a 
handful of works that touch upon the historiography of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. In this section, these works are discussed in order to 
see what kind of research has been done. It has been decided to 
divide this section into three sub-sections: studies on the general 
historiography of the conflict, studies on Israeli historiography and 
studies on Palestinian and/or Arab historiography.
General historiography
The above-mentioned Kenneth Stein has written an article where he 
discusses the literature regarding the origins of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Stein defines this period as being from the late nineteenth 
century to 1950 and he has periodized his study into three parts: up 
to 1950, 1950 (with special reference to the period after 1967) to the 
mid-1980s and from the mid-1980s to present (the article was 
published in 1991). In the first period, according to Stein, most of the 
works dealing with Zionism and Palestine/Israel were ideologically 
motivated and their authors did not for the most part rely on primary 
material. The historiography became more complex after 1950 as 
historians gained an increasing perspective of the history of the 
conflict. During this period, distinct Israeli and Palestinian 
historiographies began to appear and, in particular after 1967, more 
and more work was done on the Palestinian component of the
conflict.4
In another article on the historiography of the conflict, Stein 
argues that the reason why the Palestinian component became more 
important after 1967 is both due to the increased attention given to 
the conflict after the war of that year and because the Palestinian
4 Ibid., pp. 1450-65,
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movement (i.e. the PLO) became more influential and publicized. So, 
in other words, the Arab-Israeli conflict was no longer viewed as 
mostly being a conflict between Israel and its neighbors, but also 
between Israel and the Palestinians. In the third phase of Stein’s 
study, the causes of the conflict are examined with even greater care. 
There is also a shift away from the traditional emphasis on high 
politics, diplomacy and military issues towards an increased stress on 
the social, economic and cultural aspects of the time period. Israeli 
historian Ilan Pappe also brings forward this increased emphasis on 
factors other than the traditional political and military perspectives 
in a book where he shows examples of new currents in the 
historiography of the Arab-Israeli c.onflict.5
Edward Said, Palestinian and author of the exceedingly influential 
Orientalism, has written a piece where he claims that although the 
prevailing view in the West has been to view the conflict through a 
Zionist (or pro-Israeli) prism, there have been changes. He also uses 
1967 as a starting point and argues that there have been more and 
more works written from a pro-Palestinian point of view since that 
time. However, the Zionist view is still dominant, especially in the 
United States. Norman Finkelstein, who has looked into the 
reception of Joan Peters’ From Time Immemorial (1984), also shares 
this perception. The theme of Peters’ book, briefly, is that the 
majority of Palestinians today are not originally from the area of 
Palestine, and that their ancestors immigrated to Palestine due to the 
increasing economic progress brought forward by the Jewish 
immigrants in the Mandate period. Needless to say, this book is not 
particularly sympathetic toward the Palestinians. When From Time 
Immemorial was reviewed in the US, where it was first published, it 
received overall good or even very good reviews according to
5 Ibid.; Kenneth W. Stein, “A general historiographic and bibliographic review of 
literature on Palestine and the Palestinian Arabs,” Orient, Vol. 22 No. 1 (1981), pp. 
100-12; Ilan Pappe, “Introduction: new historiographical orientations in the 
research on the Palestine Question,” in Ilan Pappe (ed.), The Israel/Palestine 
Question (London & New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1-7.
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Finkelstein. In Britain and Israel, however, the book received a more 
cool and critical response. Finkelstein argues that this example shows 
the dominant Zionist views held in at least the American debate.6
That the view of the conflict has changed is something that Efr aim 
Karsh brings forward in the preface of the second edition of his book 
where he sets out to refute the findings of Israel’s new historians (see 
below). According to Karsh, the field of Middle Eastern studies has 
increasingly been taken over by Arabs and Arabists: scholars who 
focus on the Arab world and are largely apologetic of how Arab states 
and movements act. The Arabists are also, according to Karsh, 
inherently anti-Israeli.7 Speaking of the view held by these Arabists 
regarding Israel, Karsh says that:
The image of a young and brave David fighting for his life against 
an uncompromising enemy has ceased to exist; instead it has been 
transformed into a Goliath, subjugating another people and 
denying them the right of self-determination.8
Both Said and Karsh, as well as Finkelstein, are writing from what is 
essentially a partisan perspective, and I believe that it is therefore 
difficult to establish whether the general debate is pro-Palestinian or 
whether it is pro-Israeli. In other words, it would seem as if both 
sides want to argue from the position of the “underdog,” i.e. that their 
“side” is not treated fairly and that there is a need to rectify that 
situation. It is of course, on the other hand, possible that the debate 
actually did change in a significant way during the 12 years that 
elapsed between Said’s book (1988) and Karsh’s (2000).
6 Edward W. Said, “Introduction,” in Edward W. Said & Christopher Hitchens 
(eds.), Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question 
(London & New York: Verso, 1988), pp. 1-19; Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and 
Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, 2nd ed. (London & New York: Verso, 2003), 
Ch. 2. This chapter is also present in the volume edited by Said and Hitchens above, 
but in an older version. It should be pointed out that Finkelstein in the bulk of this 
chapter sets out to argue against the central theme of From Time Immemorial, as 
well as to argue that Peters has not only made mistakes, but actually also has tried 
to deceive her readers.
7 Efraim Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The ‘New Historians', 2nd ed. (London 
& Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. xv-xxxix.
8 Ibid., p. xxiii.
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Israeli historiography
Writing about Israeli historiography, Israel Kolatt argues that it is 
only since the early 1960’s that there has been an academic interest in 
the recent history of Israel. Prior to this, historical accounts were not 
investigative in a scholarly sense and they were also largely colored 
by bias. Kolatt believes that the reason why more serious historical 
research began to be carried out in the 1960’s is because of 
institutional improvements in Israel, as well as an increased interest 
in history amongst the younger generation and Israelis in general. 
There were also factors external to Israel that led to the increasing 
scholarly interest in histoiy and Kolatt especially mentions the war of 
1967. According to Kolatt, the younger generation tends to have a 
more critical approach regarding Israeli history than the generation 
of the “Founding Fathers” and he claims that critical historical 
research is essential in democratic societies like Israel.9
Kolatt’s article was published in 1981, which was a few years 
before the advent of the school of Israeli historians who have been 
referred to as the new historians. This group of historians has so far 
mostly concentrated on the last years of the British Mandate, the 
creation of the state of Israel and the following few years. All in all, 
these new historians have been critical of what they deem as an old 
Zionist historiography in addition to being largely critical of how the 
leadership of Israel and of the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish 
community in Palestine) acted during the time period under scrutiny. 
The new historians have been the subject of quite a large number of 
articles, essays, conferences and so forth, but there have been very 
few works dealing with them in a more analytical manner. In the 
majority of works regarding this school of history, in other words, 
their results and arguments are the main focus. Some of the new
9 Israel Kolatt, “Reflections on the Historiography of Zionism and the Yishuv,” in 
Lee I. Levine (ed.), The Jerusalem Cathedra: Studies in the History, Archaeology, 
Geography and Ethnography of the Land of Israel Vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak 
Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981), pp. 314-27.
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historians themselves have brought forward five or six different 
aspects of what it is that is new as compared with the old 
historiography, whereas others have identified three features as being 
the most clear breaks from the traditional Israeli accounts.10
It has been argued by at least two of the new historians that the 
reason why they started to write in a critical manner about the 
founding years was their disillusionment over Israel’s war in 
Lebanon, 1982-85. Two other scholars, unconnected with the new 
historians, have argued that it was the rise of the Israeli far right in 
the 1980s that led the new historians to view Israel’s history in a 
more unfavorable light.11 One of these new historians has also argued 
that the reason why they have had the impact they have is because 
they have had access to material that was previously classified. Under 
Israeli law, most governmental documents are declassified after 30 
years. When I studied the new historians in another context, I 
identified three possible reasons for their impact in Israel: the Israeli 
far right, the peace process and post-Zionism. This is not the place to 
go into the particular points of my arguments, but it was argued that 
the causes for the influence of the new historians in Israel are not 
limited to academia. The new historians are an example of where 
academics have become part of a more general debate in a society 
and where society in general has influenced the way academic 
discourse has been conducted.12
10 Avi Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948,” International Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 27 No. 3 (1995), pp. 287-304; Benny Morris, 1948 and After: Israel 
and the Palestinians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), Ch. 1; Rikard Ehnsio, The 
New Historians of Israel: An Appraisal of their Novelty and the Reasons for their 
Impact (MA thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), 
1999).
11 Shlaim 1995, p. 290; Simcha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities 
(London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 5f.; Franklin Vivekananda & Nur 
Masalha, “Israeli Revisionist Historiography of the 1948 War and its Palestinian 
Exodus,” Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives, Vol. 9 No. 1 (1990), 
pp. 71-7 9 .
12 Shlaim 1995, p. 289L; Ehnsio 1999, pp. 15-20.
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Palestinian and Arab historiography
Israeli historian Yehoshua Porath has written an article on 
Palestinian historians writing on the Mandate period. Porath begins 
by describing Palestinian historiography in the following way:
Palestinian historiography of all types is expostulatoiy: it uses 
events to illustrate the virtues of pious adherence to the Cause 
rather than relating what actually happened. This form of 
apologetics is characteristic of Muslim Arab historiography, where 
no attempt is made to differentiate between reality and i d e a l . «
In this article, Porath speaks of Palestinian historiography in quite 
general terms, although the main bulk of the article provides 
examples of Palestinian works of history that confirm Porath’s views. 
Porath furthermore argues that Palestinian historians almost never 
seem to verify facts, and that they are seen as participants in the 
national struggle of the Palestinian people. It is reasonable, Porath 
argues, to believe that Palestinian historiography will continue to be 
of poor quality until the Palestinians have reached their national 
goals and the concept of Palestinian identity has m a t u r e d . l4
In an article that can be seen as a response of sorts to the article 
described above, Palestinian historian Tarif Khalidi argues that 
Palestinian historians during the period of 1900-48 worked hard to 
establish Palestinians as a national entity with valid claims to the 
land. Khalidi agrees with Porath in the sense that Palestinian 
historiography was passionate, but he disagrees with his Israeli 
colleague that Palestinian historiography at the time only was 
polemics. Instead of just viewing the history written at the time as 
polemics, one must look at the historiography in its cultural and 
social context in order more accurately to understand it. The years 
during Khalidi’s period of study, he argues, posed a fundamental
*3 Yehoshua Porath, “Palestinian Historiography,” Jemsalem Quarterly, No. 5 
Ci977)j P. 96. 
h Ibid., pp. 95-104.
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danger to the Palestinian community and it is only in light of this that 
the passionate works of history written can be understood.^
Avraham Sela is an Israeli historian who has studied the Arab 
historiography of the 1948 war, with a special focus on the 
Palestinian historiography, Sela argues that most Arab 
historiography written today is mostly ideological and not based on 
critical historical research. This is due to two different reasons: that 
the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict has fueled an ideological or biased 
historiography, and that none of the Arab states that participated in 
the war (i.e. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq) have as of yet 
declassified their official sources regarding the war. Sela then 
continues to argue that some Arab studies that are more critical have 
recently appeared, but even they usually rely on established myths 
and perceptions.16 In his concluding remarks, Sela puts Arab 
historiography of the 1948 war in a larger context:
Arab historical writings on the 1948 war have been shaped by an 
ongoing concern with the fateful issues confronting the Arab 
world in our time: how to effect a break with centuries of political 
and cultural decline, and most of all, how to deal with the painful 
impact of the West on Arab society and culture. Accordingly, it is 
particularly difficult for Arab historians to treat the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in purely academic terms. Not only were the Arabs 
defeated in the crucial 1948 war, but the Palestinian-Jewish 
conflict prevents the wounds from healing. . .  In short, the history 
of the 1948 war is an essential part of the “unfinished business” of 
Arab nationalism.1?
Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim, who have edited a volume on the War 
of 1948, agree with the view presented by Sela above that the Arab 
historiography of the war is generally quite ideologically motivated 
and that various myths frequently appear. This was previously also
« Tarif Khalidi, “Palestinian Historiography: 1900-1948,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. 10 No. 3 (1981), pp. 59-76.
16 Avraham Sela, “Arab Historiography of the 1948 War: The Quest for Legitimacy,” 
in Laurence J. Silberstein (ed.), New Perspectives on Ist'aeli History: The Early 
Years of the State (New York & London: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 124- 
154-
^ Sela 1991, p. 146.
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the case with regard to Israeli historiography, Rogan and Shlaim 
argue, but the rise of the so-called new historians with their more 
critical approach to Israeli historiography has led to more balanced 
accounts. This development has so far not taken place in the Arab 
states or among the Palestinians, and Rogan and Shlaim are quite 
clear in their view that they would like to see the old myths shattered 
just like they have been to a large degree in the Israeli context.18
Concluding remarks
From the above account, one can see that although a great deal has 
been written about the Arab-Israeli conflict, a relatively small amount 
of works are devoted to the study of the historiography of the conflict. 
And, of the works that exist there is not a single monograph. There 
are only articles. It is also apparent that with a few exceptions 
(mainly Stein’s two articles), most of the works described above are 
quite polemical or argumentative in nature and, it would seem, 
motivated by political and/or ideological beliefs. The views that do 
not correspond with one’s own are deemed as being biased or just 
incorrect. Of course, this is almost to be expected given the charged 
debate surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict in general.
Another aspect of the above literature is that most of the works 
are at least ten years old or more, and the majority of the newer 
works deal with the new historians of Israel. This is not surprising 
considering that the new historians have only been a school of 
historiography since the end of the 1980s. I would however argue 
that it is rather curious that there have been no comprehensive 
studies on the general historiography of the conflict written since the 
peace process started after the Gulf War of 1991, and particularly 
after the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and 
the PLO in 1993. The last decade has seen a great deal of changes in
18 Eugene L. Rogan & Avi Shlaim, “Introduction,” in Eugene L. Rogan & Avi Shlaim 
(eds.) The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 1-11.
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the Middle East, and with regard to Israeli-Palestinian relations in 
particular, if one is to consider both the peace process and its 
subsequent breakdown in the year 2000 and the beginning of the so- 
called second Intifada
The most important aspect, however, of the works discussed 
above is that there is no attempt made to delve into the question of 
bias from a more analytical point of view. There is no particular 
method that is employed, and the question of what is bias or 
propaganda and what are merely differences of opinion is not 
problematized. Instead, it mostly seems to be the “I know it when I 
see it”-approach that is used. This is where this thesis is an important 
and significant step beyond previous studies of the historiography of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the next section, the question of the 
nature of bias and objectivity from a theoretical point of view is 
discussed.
Theory: bias and objectivity in the field of history
In this section, the question of the historian’s objectivity is discussed. 
This question has been the subject of a substantial debate in recent 
years due to the rise of the so-called postmodern approach to history. 
Before tackling the question of postmodernism and history, two 
books, which were published prior to this whole debate, are discussed 
in order to show what the debate looked like in the 1960s. The 
postmodern approach is then discussed, as well as some current 
arguments against it. It should be noted at this point that the account 
below is not a definite description of the debate regarding history and 
objectivity—as that would probably require a dissertation by itself—
^ Although Finkelstein’s book was published in 2003, it was as the second edition 
of a book originally published in 1995. There is some new material in this book that 
deals with the newer developments of the conflict, but the bulk of the book was 
originally published in 1995 and has not since been revised. See Finkelstein 2003.
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but it is rather included to illustrate to some degree what the debate 
has looked like. In the conclusion of this section, the implications 
regarding the questions analyzed are discussed in light of the topic of 
this thesis.
Elton and Carr
E.H. Carr’s What is History? and G.R. Elton’s The Practice o f  
History20 have come to be regarded as classic, and it is easy to see 
why. Both books are written in an easily accessible language even 
though the authors attempt to go into the difficult questions of what 
history is, how it is and should be practiced, what kind of limits there 
are for achieving historical knowledge, and so on. Although the two 
authors agree on a number of points, they do offer differing opinions 
regarding objectivity in the discipline of history.
Although Elton’s book was published eight years after Carr’s, 
Elton offers a more traditional, or positivist, approach to objectivity. 
According to Elton, the best way to achieve historical truth is for the 
historian to approach his or her sources with an open mind and then 
to engage in both listening and asking questions to the sources. It is 
the proper use of historical method that will bring the historian closer 
to the truth. Nevertheless, even with a sound approach regarding the 
sources, mistakes can—and most likely will—be made. Elton however 
points out that even if mistakes are made, the joint efforts of 
historians would in theory be able to reach the level of truth on most 
topics; except for those where there just are not enough sources 
available in order to be able to answer the questions posed to them 
definitely. On the specific question of bias, Elton is of the opinion 
that it is something most, if not all, historians have. Bias does not 
affect the historical work in most cases, and it can in fact have a 
positive effect in some instances when a particular historian’s bias
aoE.H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin Books, 1990); and G.R. Elton, The 
Practice of History (London: Fontana Press, 1987). The two books were originally 
published in 1961 and 1969 respectively.
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leads him or her to approach his or her topic in a new way. If a 
historian’s bias does more than just give a different initial 
perspective, his or her work is coming closer to propaganda.21
Carr, as compared with Elton, presents a more relativist view on 
the whole question of objectivity. He believes that the facts of histoiy 
are not just there for everyone to use, but that the historian chooses 
which facts to use in his or her work and this is where interpretation 
comes in.22 The following quote shows Carr’s line of argumentation:
The facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmonger’s slab. 
They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes 
inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend, 
partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses 
to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use -  these two factors 
being, off course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch. 
By and large, the historian will get the kind of facts he wants. 
Histoiy means interpretation.^
The above quote would seem to indicate that any historical work is 
more or less a reflection of its author rather than the sources used, 
but Carr does in fact retract somewhat from the previous quote when 
he argues that there are in all actuality no instances where a historian 
totally controls the interpretation of the facts he or she uses. There 
are, on the other hand, no instances where the facts are in absolute 
control of the way a historical work ends up: there is rather a type of 
interaction between the facts and the historian’s interpretation.^
So what about the question of objectivity? First of all, Carr refutes 
the hyper-relativistic notion that all interpretations are equally valid 
and true in their own context. The reason for this is due to the fact 
that not all historical facts are equally significant or relevant. In order 
for the historian to determine which facts are significant and hence 
being more objective, Carr points out the need to rise above the
21Elton 1987, pp. 83ff, 97,107-13,13iff.
22Carr 1990, pp. 12-23.
23lbid., p. 23.
24lbid., p. 2 9 f.
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historian’s own time and society, as well as to realize that there is no 
easy correlation between fact and interpretation. In other words, the 
historian who is the most objective is the one who has come to the 
conclusion that there is no total objectivity or truth.2s
It is interesting to note that both authors, contrary to the 
postmodern theorists discussed below, only pay attention to the more 
intellectual pursuit of finding facts and interpreting these and not to 
the more literary process of writing history or to the language used in 
historical sources. This is where we will now turn as we discuss the 
postmodern approach to history.
The postmodern approach
As indicated above, something that the postmodernists have brought 
to the debate regarding objectivity in history is how historical works 
are written, and Hayden White is someone who has devoted a large 
part of his writings to this problem. White identifies three major 
devices used by historians in order to explain the data (or facts) used 
in their works: emplotment, formal argument and ideology. He then 
identifies four approaches belonging to each of these three 
explanatory devices and in order to simplify White’s argument, I have 
organized these below.26
Emplotment
Romance
Tragedy
Comedy
Satire
Formal
argument
Formism
Organicism
Mechanism
Contextualism
Ideology
Anarchism
Conservatism
Radicalism
Liberalism
25fbid., pp. 120-25,130-32.
26Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. ix-xii, 1-38.
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In White’s scheme, emplotment refers to the way in which the 
historian chooses the major plot line in his or her work. Emplotment, 
in other words, does not refer to style per se, but rather to the 
perspective held by the historian regarding the events he or she 
describes. Formal argument is the theoiy and/or methodology that 
the historian uses in his or her work, either explicitly or implicitly, 
and what the ideological explanatory device consists of should be 
more or less self-explanatory. White’s definitions of the different 
approaches of each explanatory device listed above are quite 
elaborate, and there is no need to delve into these in the present 
context, but the interested reader can easily find out for him- or 
herself in the preface and introduction to White’s book Metahistory.^
The last part of White’s theory of the writing of history is the 
concept of tropes. According to White, the historian when first faced 
with historical data has to prefigure these in order to use the 
explanatory devices described above. And, due to the literaiy nature 
of the writing of histoiy, the mode in which historians prefigure their 
material is through the use of the four literary tropes. These tropes 
(or figures of speech), according to White, are the linguistic tools 
used by the historian when “making sense” of his or her data, and 
they are metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony.28
So, in essence, the historian plays a much larger role in the 
writing of history according to White as compared with Elton and 
Carr above, and this is mainly due to the fact that there is always 
more than one manner in which to prefigure a certain historical event 
through the use of the four literary tropes. The tropical (i.e. by using 
tropes) prefiguration of the historical data, where the historian 
inevitably will choose a main trope, determines the way in which he 
or she applies the devices of explanations described above. White 
points out that the fact that history does not have a technical 
language, such as that of physics, means that no tropological
27lbid.
28Ibid.
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approach can be said to be better than another. This means that a 
historian who uses a particular trope which leads him or her to 
emplot an event in a tragic manner is no more right than the 
historian who, by using a different trope, emplots the same event in a 
comic mode. However, White does point out that some events 
intrinsically rule out certain ways of emplotment (he uses the 
example of the life of John F Kennedy which probably no one would 
emplot as a comedy).29 White has also argued against charges that his 
relativistic literary approach supports the ideas of the so-called 
revisionists who claim that the Holocaust never took place. In light of 
this problem, White argues that, “an interpretation falls into the 
category of a lie when it denies the reality of the events of which it 
treats, and into the category of an untruth when it draws false 
conclusions from reflection on events whose reality remains 
attestable on the level o f‘positive’ historical inquiry.’^
Another philosopher of history, F.R. Ankersmit, has also developed a 
literary approach to history. A historical work is the same as a 
narratio, which he defines as a “historiographical, narrative 
representation of the past.’’31 Ankersmit then proceeds to argue that 
the past does not have a narrative structure in itself and that the 
historian, through the narratio, gives the narrative structure of the 
past. A narratio is made up of one or more narrative substances, 
which in turn are made up by individual statements (i.e. facts or data 
as written down by the historian). According to Ankersmit, a 
narrative substance is something of an interpretative or classifying 
tool as it gives order to the individual statements, but it must not be
29lbid., pp. 426-34; Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural 
Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), Ch. 3. Exactly why 
the life of the late American president would not be emploted as a comedy is 
actually not further evaluated upon by White.
3°Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 78.
31F.R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's 
Language (The Hague, Boston & London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), p. 
19.
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confused with the concept of theory in its traditional meaning. 
Narrative substances are purely linguistic devices.32
Narrative substances, and also narratios, do not reflect the past 
directly, but only indirectly through their use of individual 
statements. By this line of argument, there could in theory exist an 
innumerable amount of narratios dealing with the same subject 
matter. And, Ankersmit argues, the only way of telling which narratio 
is better is to determine which one has the highest degree of narrative 
consistency and not how well it reflects the past it describes: the most 
objective narratio is the one which has the largest scope in its 
narrative substance(s) and where the individual statements agree 
with an actual historical reality. So, in other words, the historian’s 
objectivity is not determined by how he or she uses the sources (facts, 
data), but rather on the scope of the historian’s interpretation and 
categorization of these sources.33
In addition to literary considerations being present in the writing 
of history, it has also been argued by some postmodernists that the 
sources historians use, which are in the majority of cases texts, do not 
reflect the past itself. Rather, the language used in the sources only, 
or mostly, reflects itself and only secondarily, and in a rather 
distorted manner, the past it describes. There are of course 
differences of opinions to what degree historical sources reflect a past 
reality, but the fact that sources are in most cases texts, which can be 
analyzed linguistically just like any other texts, nevertheless makes 
the more traditional view of historical sources more problematic. The 
implication of this view, in conjunction with the theories of the 
literary process of writing history described above, is to make the 
concept of truth and objectivity in history even less plausible from a
32Ibid., pp. 53ff, 8 6 -9 5 ,112,134-3 9 - 
33lbid., pp. I73ff, 2o6ff, 238-52.
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postmodern perspective, as the practice of history is thought of as a 
language based process and not one primarily based on s o u r c e s . 3 4  
Another postmodern approach to the question of objectivity is 
less concerned with linguistics, but rather with the concept of truth 
and bias in general. This approach is somewhat similar to that of Carr 
described above: that histoiy is largely interpretation and that there 
are no absolute truths or totally objective historical accounts. Where 
Carr and the postmodern approach differ, however, is with regard to 
if all interpretations are equally valid. Keith Jenkins, who has argued 
from a postmodern perspective, seems to be of the opinion that all 
interpretations are equally valid, since the whole question of truth 
and objectivity is only part of a power structure and is no longer 
relevant in the postmodern society. This means that the question of 
bias is irrelevant because there is no objective center in any d e b a t e . 3 5
Arguments against a postmodern approach
American historian Gertrude Himmelfarb has argued that the 
problems of objectivity in the study of history are not new to the field 
and have been discussed extensively for at least a century. The 
difference between previous admissions of the limits of historical 
truths and objectivity and the postmodern attacks on these concepts 
is that historians before the rise of postmodernism have tried to 
tackle these issues by attempting to achieve as great degrees of 
objectivity and truth in their works as possible. Postmodernists, on 
the other hand, have gladly embraced the concept that there are no 
truths, Himmelfarb argues. She is also critical of the postmodern 
concept, exemplified by Jenkins above, that all interpretations are 
equally valid in the sense that history loses its meaning if everyone is
34Beverley Southgate, Histoiy: What & Why: Ancient, Modem and Postmodern 
Perspectives (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 70-75; Linda Hutcheon, 
The Politics of Postmodernism (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 78-92. 
35Reith Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London & New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 
24 ff, 3 2 -3 9 .
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allowed to have their own interpretations. History in this way is not 
something that we all share, but rather something divisive.3&
Appleby, Hunt and Jacob are three historians who have jointly 
written a book tracing the concept of objectivity in science and of 
history as a subject, and they believe that the best approach to the 
question of objectivity is to focus on the object of study itself. This 
means that when you study an object (in this case the past), you will 
most likely not be able to mirror that object as it is (or was) but you 
will rather give your interpretation of it. In a sense, this sounds much 
like the postmodernists discussed above, but the three authors argue 
that individual interpretations need to be viewed as such, as 
interpretations that is, and not as definitive representations of the 
object in question (i.e. to claim that this is my history and it is as 
valid as yours). It should be pointed out that the authors do not hold 
the view that every object can attract innumerable interpretations 
and, conversely, argue that the kind of interpretations that can be 
drawn from an object depends on the nature of the object itself. So, in 
other words, instead of Jenkins’ idea that all interpretations are 
equally valid, these three authors claim that individual 
interpretations need to take other interpretations into account in 
order to bring the study of histoiy forward.37 A quote from their book 
illustrates what the authors have in mind:
Let’s imagine witnesses to a violent argument arrayed around the 
room where it took place. The sum of their vantage points would 
give a fuller picture, but the action they were witnessing would 
not be changed because there were many people watching it. 
Unless they were standing in each other’s way, the perspectives 
would not be mutually exclusive; nor could the multiplication of 
perspectives affect the viewers.a8
36Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely Thoughts on
Culture and Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), Ch. 7.
37Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt & Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History 
(London & New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), pp. 254-69, 283ff.
38Appleby, Hunt & Jacob 1994, p. 256L
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In his book on the postmodern approach to history, Richard Evans 
has attacked the view held by White regarding the historian’s 
emplotment by stating that “it is possible to describe the same thing 
accurately in a number of different styles, just as it is possible to give 
a full and fair account of, say, Gibbon’s argument about the causes of 
the rise of Christianity without making a misguided attempt to 
imitate the literary style in which he put it.”39 He also points out that 
the whole postmodern concept of the fluidity of language is 
unreasonable in the sense that we would not even know that there 
was a past if language did not refer to something outside itself. 
Furthermore, Evans points out that the postmodern relativistic view 
of truth cannot be applied to postmodernism itself without falling 
apart. First of all, he argues that the writings of postmodernists, 
which as historical texts according to the postmodernists themselves 
have no fixed meaning, are written in a way as to transmit their 
opinions clearly and convincingly. Second, Evans shows that if the 
postmodern concept of multiple truths is applied to itself, the whole 
postmodern approach loses a great deal of its consistency. In other 
words, why argue for a postmodern approach to history when your 
writings cannot reflect your ideas accurately due to the fluidity of 
language and when, for instance, a positivist or Marxist approach to 
history is just as true?4°
Even though Evans is quite critical of a postmodern approach to 
histoiy in general, he does point out that postmodernism has had 
some positive effects on the study of history. For instance, the 
postmodern concept of the fluidity of language has led historians to 
be more careful in their reading of sources, just as the postmodern 
idea that there are no objective truths has made historians more self- 
reflective about their own biases. Objectivity, in its traditional 
meaning, is not possible according to Evans, but it should be aimed 
for and the historian should attempt to detach him- or herself from
39Richard Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta, 1997), p. 113.
4°Ibid., p p . i i 2 f f ,  2 ig f f ,  2 3 if f .
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his or her subject matter in order to see other perspectives and points 
of view.41
Conclusion
The most difficult thing when faced with different views on the 
question of objectivity is how to determine their validity. Due to the 
more or less philosophical nature of the issue, the various approaches 
are more difficult to assess than more “normal” problems in history 
and in a way, I guess, the approach you choose has more to do with 
you personally than with the way the different theorists present their 
views.
What the different perspectives have in common, however, is that 
there are a number of ways in which you can look upon an object (in 
this case, for example, a historical event). I do not believe many 
historians today would agree with Elton’s view that the sources only 
speak through the historian and hence reflect the one and only 
historical truth. First of all, there are rarely enough sources available 
to the historian to paint a complete picture of the past. And secondly, 
historians in most cases have more ambitious goals with their works 
than to merely recreate the past. If you, for instance, want to explain 
the causes of the Russian Revolution, it is most likely inevitable that 
you use some kind of interpretations or analysis, because the sources 
probably will not tell you in so many words the precise reasons for 
why the revolution took place. Whenever a certain interpretation is 
used, it is no longer a direct recreation of the historical past, but 
rather one perspective of this historical past.
Whether or not all perspectives are equally valid, as some authors 
above believe, is not important in the context of this thesis. That 
question is more or less philosophical in nature and although it is 
interesting in itself, its implications are not particularly important in 
the framework of this thesis. What is important, however, is the
4ilbid., pp. 248-253.
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concept of holding different perspectives with regard to a single 
object; whether you refer to it as bias or not. Going back to the 
example of the Russian Revolution, it is possible to say that it took 
place either as the Bolsheviks essentially hijacking the revolution of 
Februaiy earlier that same year (1917) and staging a coup d'etat or to 
say that the Russian Revolution was a genuine revolution of the 
people, where the Bolsheviks acted merely as the people’s tool. These 
two perspectives are interpretations of the same historical reality (the 
revolution) and as long as there is no kind of proof as to either one 
not corresponding with a historical reality, they are in a sense equally 
valid. Back in the days of the Cold War—when this question probably 
was felt as being more important—one would of course have found 
proponents and opponents of each view who would have argued 
vigorously for the truthfulness of their particular point of view, and 
called the other perspective biased, propaganda or plainly wrong.
This is the basic theoretical premise of this thesis: that there are 
often more than one way of describing a particular historical event or 
problem. Needless to say, this is for most historians self-evident, but 
a major question in this thesis is whether these different perspectives 
are to be considered biased opinions or just scholarly differences of 
opinion. Or, putting it differently, are the different perspectives only 
biased in the sense that they argue in favor of a certain side—but still 
using scholarly criteria for choosing their perspectives—or are they in 
fact instances of propaganda? Propaganda in this sense of the word 
would then be to knowingly mislead the reader by not mentioning 
certain aspects that present one’s side in an unfavorable light. Going 
back to the example of the Soviet Union, writing a biography of Stalin 
without mentioning or downplaying the purges of the 1930s or the 
forced collectivization of the agriculture that led to millions dying 
from starvation could probably be said to teeter the line of being 
nothing but propaganda or bias in the conventional sense of the 
word.
34
Inti'oduction
In this thesis, the term bias is used more freely, as it is used to 
indicate differences of opinion rather than what is not objective. 
When there are two differing views of a certain historical event— 
which do have some basis in the historical reality they set out to 
describe, or the historical reality is ambiguous enough to make it 
impossible to draw any precise conclusions—these are deemed to be 
biased. But only when the different perspectives are clear as to which 
side they assign blame. Otherwise, they are more or less just scholarly 
differences.
The following example from the more recent history of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict will illustrate what I have in mind: In the autumn of 
2000, after the failed final settlement talks that took place that 
summer, the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians that 
was launched through the Oslo Accords of 1993 went from bad to 
worse, as violence erupted in both the West Bank and in Gaza. 
Looking at what has been said in general about these events, it is 
clear that there are two distinct ways of looking at why the peace 
process came to grind to a halt. One is to say that the violence 
erupted because of Palestinian frustration of not being offered a fair 
final solution regarding borders, the status of Jerusalem, the issue of 
the Palestinian refugees, etc. The other view upon the problem is to 
say that Israel offered more than a fair settlement, and that the 
violence that broke out was due to a Palestinian inability, in all 
actuality, to be willing to live in peace with their Israeli neighbors. At 
this point in time, it is not possible to determine which of these views 
is more correct (indeed it could of course be that they both are, as 
they are in some ways not absolutely exclusive to each other).42 But, 
and this is how the concept of bias is used in this thesis, they are both 
biased in the sense that they assign blame to either one of the parties 
for why the peace process at least temporarily came to a complete
42 It could of course be the case that the Palestinians were offered an unfair deal 
and that they are unwilling to live in peace with Israel. In that case, both sides of 
the conflict could be blamed for why the peace process was brought to a standstill.
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halt. They are not biased because they deviate from a supposedly 
objective center or truth, as it is not possible to establish, at this point 
in time at least, such a center.
Using this looser concept of bias, one of the main undertakings in 
this thesis is to see how prevalent bias is, and how the different sides 
of the conflict are portrayed. The question then arises how you go 
about approaching this inquiry. This is of course a methodological 
problem, but there are some theoretical issues that need to be dealt 
with before an adequate methodology can be formed. A more 
traditional way of establishing bias would of course be to look at the 
sources used by a particular historian in his or her work and then to 
determine whether he or she has accurately represented these and 
drawn the right conclusions. There are two problems with this 
approach: (l) it would be necessary not only to look at more or less all 
the sources used, but also those not used that could have been in 
order to determine whether the historian you are investigating has 
given an accurate representation; and (2) there is of course the 
obvious risk that your assessment in the end will be more telling of 
your own biases than those of the historian you set out to examine, 
since you have both looked at the same sources. Because of these 
problems, I think that a language (or content) based methodology is 
better suited when it comes to examining the topic of bias. And, this 
is where the theories of writing histoiy as a literary process put 
forward by Ankersmit and White come in. These theories, as they are 
described briefly above, are probably somewhat extreme in the sense 
that almost all interpretations are deemed as being equally valid. 
That is not true, as there always has to be a correlation between what 
the historian writes and the historical past he or she sets out to 
describe. White and Ankersmit are somewhat extreme in this sense. 
But, and this is where their theories come in, it is probably the case 
that the historian has more control of what the end product will look 
like because of the literary process of writing history than has 
previously perhaps been acknowledged. How the historian presents
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his or her subject matter is in all probability a more fruitful way of 
approaching the subject than to concentrate on the primary sources 
used by the historian, and then determining whether or not he or she 
presents these accurately.
To briefly conclude this section, it has been determined that in 
most instances there are more than one way of describing or 
interpreting a historical event. The concept of bias is central in this 
thesis, and although it has already been discussed above a more 
succinct definition is perhaps advisable. Bias is in the framework of 
this work defined as differences of opinion that have a particular view 
upon either one of the actors involved in the investigation at hand. 
(In this context Israel on the one hand or, for example, Egypt or the 
PLO on the other.) Differences of opinion that do not paint either 
party in either a positive or negative light are not said to be biased, 
but rather just plain scholarly differences of opinion.
The difference between bias, as it is defined above, and 
propaganda, which of course also involves a predisposition towards 
one of the parties, is that the latter arguably also involves the act of 
actually trying to deceive or mislead your reader. Hence, not 
informing the reader of a particular event could be argued to teeter 
the line of being propaganda if that event portrays one of the actors 
involved in a negative light. Just stating what took place as a matter 
of fact, even if there indeed is controversy surrounding the event, is 
however not said to be propaganda in the context of this thesis. The 
same goes for just giving one interpretation as being the only one, 
even if there in fact are more interpretations present in the debate. 
Doing this would certainly be deemed as being biased -  as it involves 
a value judgment -  but not as propaganda. For something to be 
deemed to be propaganda it has to involve the active act of deception 
of sorts.
Misrepresenting an attestable historical past is therefore said to 
be propaganda, whereas giving your view on this past -  even if it is 
done in a very matter-of-fact kind of manner -  is to be deemed bias.
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Determining whether or not the different perspectives held in the 
sources are to be considered propaganda or bias is something that is 
to be problematized in this thesis in relation to the subject matter at 
hand: the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has also been decided to primarily 
look at the content of the different works analyzed, and only 
secondarily the historical past they rely on. In the section below, the 
task of finding a methodology for looking upon these issues is 
discussed.
Methodology
Faced with the prospect of analyzing texts, one is given the choice 
between two different approaches: a quantitative and a qualitative 
approach. The most commonly used quantitative approach is 
sometimes referred to as content analysis and this method has been 
used in a variety of ways .43 What the different approaches have in 
common, however, is that they all employ a method for quantifying 
certain words or themes and then make whatever inferences from the 
results. For example, one could measure the quantity of attention 
given to Nazi Germany, on the one hand, and Imperial Japan, on the 
other, in American newspapers during 1935-45 to evaluate which 
state was perceived as the largest threat to the United States. One 
could here employ a variety of manners in which to quantify the 
attention given: quantity of column centimeters (or inches), 
frequency of occurrences of either state on the front pages of the 
newspapers under investigation, etc.
43 For an introduction to content analysis, see for example: Ole R. Holsti, Content 
Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing, 1969); Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its 
Methodology (Beverly Hills, CA & London: Sage Publications, 1980); and Robert 
Philip Weber, Basic Content Analysis, Quantitative Applications in the Social 
Sciences, no. 49 (Newbury Park, CA & London: Sage Publications, 1990).
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A more ambitious way in which to use content analysis in relation 
to the example above would be to quantify and evaluate certain words 
used in relation to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Here, the 
person employing content analysis would most likely develop some 
kind of dictionary in which certain words are given certain values: for 
instance, the words expansionist and scheming would be counted as 
having a negative connotation, whereas the words stabilizing and 
reasonable would be defined as positive attributes. Needless to say, 
this approach tends to be much more time-intensive than the 
somewhat cruder approach referred to in the above paragraph. The 
results, however, are probably more interesting if one is to employ 
this approach.
It is easy to see that a quantitative methodology such as content 
analysis is much easier to use now with all advances having been 
made in computer hardware and software. The problem, however, is 
that the results, regardless of how accurate or scientific they are, can 
be somewhat disappointing. Even if it is interesting and important to 
establish that, for example, 62% of the works analyzed linguistically 
are more positive vis-a-vis Israel as compared to the Arab states, a 
result like that does not tell us the nature of the established bias. 
There are advances being made both in the field of regular computer 
software, as well as in the field of artificial intelligence, with regard to 
the use of language. As computer software will become increasingly 
advanced, the possible results one could achieve through the use of 
content analysis probably will become more and more interesting. 
But for the time being, there will still be some time before we can 
trust our computers to accurately decipher the more intricate details 
of human language.
The other approach to text analysis, apart from a quantitative 
approach, is a qualitative methodology. Qualitative analysis is the 
most prevalent approach amongst students of historiography, as the 
focus tends to be more not only on the language employed, but also
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on the actual content of the texts under scrutiny. The most common 
approach in historiography seems to be to question how historians X, 
Z, et al describe and write about event A, time period B, personality 
C, etc. Often in the field of historiography, the methods used are in all 
actuality quite commonsensical and are not problematized to a large 
degree. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as the subject matter in a 
great deal of instances eludes clear-cut methodologies as employed in 
other disciplines or indeed by other historians. Analyzing texts from a 
qualitative perspective, in other words, is harder to do if one wants a 
precise and straightforward methodology.
For the question at hand in this thesis—the nature of bias in 
relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict—there is however the need for a 
more forthright methodology. As a quantitative approach is rejected 
because of the inability to adequately answer what the characteristics 
of the supposed bias is, one is forced to consider the use of a more 
qualitative approach. The question of bias implies that there are 
differences in the various accounts and these differences are the focus 
of the methodology employed in this thesis.
If one is simply to look at a small number of works, one can fairly 
easily just briefly recount what they say and where the works differ, 
but this approach does not work when one is faced with a larger 
number of sources. On the one hand, it would be very easy to lose 
focus of what really is different, as the sources naturally are different 
in the first place. They are all unique works although they deal with 
the same subject matter. And, on the other hand, a simple qualitative 
approach like the one described above would most likely lead to a 
somewhat confusing and possibly a quite boring final product (the 
thesis).
Instead the methodological approach used in this thesis is theme 
based. What this means is that the material is sampled and the 
samples are analyzed for differences between them. When there are 
significant differences (i.e. not just regarding style, emphasis and so 
on) the object of the different views is referred to as a main theme.
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These main themes are then analyzed and evaluated upon in order to 
see what their implications are and what the different views mean. In 
other words, which differences are to be considered pro-Israeli and 
which are to be considered pro-Arab? A number of general works 
have been sampled44 and below follows in table form the different 
main themes for the different time periods, as well as the different 
views regarding these themes.
War of 1967
Main Theme
Israeli threats 
against Syria prior 
to the conflict.
View I
The threats are 
not mentioned
View II
There were Israeli 
threats issued against 
Syria prior to the 
beginning of the 
conflict.
Egypt initially only 
sought a limited 
withdrawal of UNEF. 
removal of the whole of UNEF.
United Nations 
Emergency Force 
(UNEF).
The nature of 
Egypt’s initial 
request for the
Egypt initially 
sought the 
removal of the
44 Ahron Bregman & Jihan El-Tahri, The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs 
(London: Penguin Books & BBC Books, 1998); Ian J. Bickerton & Carla L. Klausner, 
A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1991); Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, 3rd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1985); Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the 
Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); Conor Cruise 
O’Brien, The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1986); Rinna Samuel, A Histoiy of Israel: The Birth, Growth and Development of 
Today’s Jewish State (London: Weidenfeld 8c Nicolson, 1989); and Avi Shlaim, The 
Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London 8c New York: Allen Lane 8c Penguin 
Press, 2000).
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Egyptian President 
Nasser’s intentions 
for asking for 
UNEF’s removal.
The request upon 
Israel to place 
UNEF on its 
territory.
Nasser’s intentions 
for closing the 
Straits of Tiran.
The implications of 
the Egyptian- 
Jordanian defense 
treaty signed at the 
end of May 1967.
The situation of 
Israel prior to the 
outbreak of the 
war.
Nasser asked 
UNEF to leave 
because he 
wanted Egypt to 
engage in 
hostilities with 
Israel.
The reason why 
Nasser asked UNEF 
to leave was due to 
pressure from other 
Arab leaders and 
public opinion. In 
other words, Nasser 
was reluctant about 
this and did not want 
war.
This concept is 
not mentioned.
The closing of the 
Straits of Tiran 
was an Egyptian 
act of war and 
Nasser must have 
known that Israel 
would respond.
The defense treaty 
seriously 
worsened Israel’s 
military position.
On the eve of the 
war, Israel was 
surrounded by 
hostile forces, 
which were bent 
on Israel’s 
destruction. The 
following war was 
hence not a 
normal war, but a 
fight for Israel’s 
existence.
Israel declined the 
request to place 
UNEF on its side of 
the border.
It is also due to Arab 
pressure that Nasser 
decides to declare the 
Straits of Tiran closed 
to Israeli shipping. 
Nasser did not either 
at this point want 
war.
The Jordanian- 
Egyptian treaty was 
merely political in 
nature and did not 
have any tangible 
military implications.
There was no Arab 
master plan to attack 
and invade Israel; 
only limited plans 
what to do in the 
event of an Israeli 
attack.
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The reasons for 
Israel’s victory in 
the war.
Israel won the war 
primarily due to 
the Israeli 
surprise air strikes 
against all its 
three opponents 
on the first day of 
the war. Other 
factors also 
include the high 
quality and level 
of dedication of 
Israeli soldiers 
and officers, and 
the ideological 
motivation of 
fighting for one’s 
existence. Israel, 
in other words, 
won despite being 
the weaker party 
to the conflict.
Israel was able to win 
due to a number of 
reasons, which all 
comes down to Israel 
being the strongest 
party at the outset. 
This was the case 
even if the air strikes 
had not taken place.
The time period between 1967-73
Main Theme
Israeli cabinet 
decision shortly 
after the war,
View I
On June 19,1967 
(i.e. a little over a 
week after the end 
of the war), the 
Israeli cabinet 
makes a secret 
decision to return 
the Sinai and the 
Golan Heights in 
return for full 
peace with Egypt 
and Syria 
respectively. This 
plan is abandoned 
later during the 
summer. This is in 
reaction to the 
three noes at 
Khartoum (see 
below).
View II
No mention of this 
decision.
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The nature of the 
Arab Summit 
meeting in 
Khartoum 1967 
and the meaning of 
the three noes (no 
peace with Israel; 
no negotiation with 
Israel; and no 
recognition of 
Israel).
Nasser’s intentions 
for starting the 
War of Attrition in
1969.
The question of the 
peace initiative of 
UN mediator 
Gunnar Jarring in
1971 .
The three noes 
indicated that 
there was no Arab 
willingness to 
settle the conflict 
peacefully.
Nasser starting 
the Egypt-Israeli 
War of Attrition in 
March 1969 was 
just another 
instance of Arab 
aggression and 
unwillingness to 
solve the conflict 
peacefully.
Either Egypt’s 
demands are 
portrayed as too 
far-reaching, or 
Jarring’s initiative 
is downplayed or 
essentially 
ignored on the 
grounds that it 
was not a viable 
plan.
The three noes 
should be viewed as a 
concession to the 
more extreme forces 
in the Arab world. In 
fact, the Summit was 
a victory for more 
moderate Arab 
currents due to the 
fact that the Summit 
did not call for any 
military actions or 
the need to destroy 
Israel. For Arab 
moderates such as 
Nasser and King 
Hussein, who had 
attempted to win 
support for seeking a 
political solution, this 
was still a victory.
Nasser decided to 
start the War of 
Attrition in order to 
break the stalemate 
over the future of the 
Egyptian territories 
in Israeli hands. 
Nasser, in other 
words, sought to 
prevent the situation 
into developing into a 
situation of status 
quo.
Jarring’s initiative— 
which Israel 
rejected—could have 
led to peace between 
Egypt and Israel.
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The question of 
Egyptian President 
Sadat’s initiative 
for an interim 
settlement with 
Israel of 1971.
Sadat’s plan is 
downplayed or 
more or less 
ignored.
War of 1973
Main Theme View I
Nature of Egyptian 
and Syrian war 
aims in 1973.
Both states 
planned a more 
comprehensive 
war in order to 
capture as much 
territory as 
possible and, if 
possible, break 
into Israel proper.
The question of 
who broke the 
cease-fire on 
October 22.
It was both sides 
that broke the 
cease-fire on 
October 22.
Ultimate 
responsibility for 
the war.
The war was just 
another instance 
of Arab aggression 
aimed at 
destroying Israel,
Sadat’s plan was 
more or less rejected 
by Israel, as it could 
not make the 
necessary
concessions. Sadat’s 
initiative, although 
only aiming at an 
interim settlement, 
could have led to 
peace between Egypt 
and Israel further 
down the road.
View II
Egypt and Syria 
planned the war as a 
means to break the 
status quo and also to 
capture some of the 
occupied territories 
in order to achieve a 
better bargaining 
position in the 
negotiations that 
were likely to follow 
the war.
Israel broke the 
cease-fire on October 
22 in order to further 
improve its positions 
on the western bank 
of the canal, and to 
completely trap the 
Egyptian Third Army.
Israel was ultimately 
responsible for the 
war due to its 
intransigence 
regarding coming to 
terms with its Arab 
neighbors.
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The rise of the PLO
Main Theme
The nature of the 
PLO policy calling 
for Israel to be 
replaced with a 
“democratic, 
secular state for all 
its citizens.”
The nature of 
Israel’s military 
failure at the 
Jordanian town of 
Karameh in March 
1968.
The question of 
who was
responsible for the 
plane hijackings 
and other terrorist 
attacks carried out 
in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.
Reasons for 
Jordan’s King 
Hussein’s 
crackdown on the 
PLO in September
1970.
The nature of the 
Black September 
organization.
View I
The policy is just a 
euphemism for 
the destruction of 
Israel.
View II
The policy is not a 
euphemism for the 
destruction of Israel; 
it only rejects the idea 
of Zionism.
The Israeli 
military failure at 
Karameh was 
mostly due to 
Fatah. The defeat 
of the Israelis 
came to be a great 
publicity boost for 
Fatah and the 
PLO.
The Israeli military 
failure was mostly 
due to Jordanian 
intervention on the 
side of Fatah.
PLO as a whole 
was responsible 
for the terrorist 
attacks in the late 
1960s and early 
1970s.
Jordan’s King 
Hussein’s 
crackdown on the 
PLO in September 
1970 was due to 
the PLO 
challenging the 
Jordanian state.
The Black 
September 
organization was 
an arm of Fatah.
It was fringe 
extremist groups, like 
the PFLP and the 
DFLP, who were 
responsible for the 
terrorist attacks in 
the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.
It was only extremist 
groups like the PFLP 
that challenged the 
Jordanian state. 
When Hussein chose 
to act, he did not 
distinguish between 
these and moderate 
groups like Fatah.
The Black September, 
which did have some 
former or present 
members of Fatah, 
was not associated 
with the latter.
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As one looks at these themes and their corresponding different views, 
it is in some instances clear which side of the debate holds what view 
and which side holds the other. In other cases, this is most likely not 
as clear. The meaning of the different views with regard to the main 
themes is farther analyzed in the following chapters. It has in these 
chapters been decided to refer to the different views as being pro- 
Israeli or pro-Arab, based on the evaluation of which side is mostly to 
blame. The binary designation of pro-Arab/pro-Israeli could be 
viewed as misleading or, perhaps, even incorrect. Labeling some 
sources as being pro-Israeli is not particularly problematic, but the 
designation of pro-Arab poses some problems. Not only did the 
conflict during the time period under investigation directly involve 
three Arab states (Egypt, Jordan and Syria), each presumably with 
their own agendas and policies, but also the Palestinians; mostly as 
represented by the PLO. Nevertheless, I have chosen to use the term 
pro-Arab in the sense that it signifies views that are opposed to the 
pro-Israeli views. One could of course also use the terms pro-Israeli 
and anti-Israeli, but that could be misleading in the sense that there 
are works that are critical of Israel's conduct in various instances 
without being critical of Israel in general. In conclusion, the 
designation of a view as being pro-Israeli in short means that this 
view paints Israel in a more favorable light than the corresponding 
pro-Arab view on the same main theme.
Research parameters: sources and time-frame
The Arab-Israeli conflict is quickly becoming one of those fields of 
study where it is impossible for any individual to hope to read 
everything written in his or her lifetime. Or, perhaps it is possible to 
read everything written in a lifetime, but certainly not for a PhD
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thesis. It is in other words necessaiy to limit the scope of this thesis. 
First of all, the time frame needs to be limited to a feasible one. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict has been ongoing ever since the end of the 
nineteenth centuiy, or at least since the beginning of last century, 
and has gone through a number of phases with various principal 
actors and different levels of hostility.
A time period that is of great importance in the whole scheme of 
things is the time from 1967 to the mid-1970s. Prior to the war of 
1967, the conflict was largely one between Israel and its neighboring 
Arab states; while after the war of 1973, in conjunction with the rise 
of the PLO, the focus of the conflict had begun to move from 
principally being an inter-state conflict to a conflict between Israel 
and the PLO. This is the time period that is under investigation in 
this thesis, and it is for simplicity divided into four sub-sections: (1) 
the War of 1967; (2) the time from 1967 to 1973; (3) the War of 1973; 
and (4) the rise of the PLO from 1967 to roughly 1974. The year 1974 
has been selected as a cut-off point for the history of the PLO, as this 
was the year when the organization was both given the status of being 
the formal representative of the Palestinian people by the Arab 
League, as well as being afforded observation status in the United 
Nations. It was also in this year that the PLO made it official policy 
that it sought to achieve Palestinian rule on any Palestinian land 
liberated from the Israelis. The significance and meaning of this 
policy initiative has been discussed back and forth to a large degree, 
and this discussion is not to be examined here. It is sufficient to say 
that 1974 was a significant year in the histoiy of the PLO and a good 
cut-off point for the investigation at hand.
In almost eveiy work on history, there are two primary aspects 
that have to be decided upon: what time period to look at and which 
sources to use. So, now that the time period to be analyzed has been 
decided, what sources are to be used? In addition to the more or less 
specific works on certain processes or periods (monographs), there 
are also more general works that deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict as
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a whole. There are also a great number of more personal accounts, 
written both by outsiders (such as journalists) and by insiders (for 
example autobiographies written by people who participated in the 
conflict to a large or not so large degree). Furthermore, there are 
shorter works on the Arab-Israeli conflict, although usually regarding 
only some aspects of it, in the form of articles in academic journals, 
newspapers and magazines. And, due to the great attention given to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in the media, there is most likely also a 
wealth of material in the form of television and radio programs: both 
in the form of more in-depth documentaries, but also briefer news 
and debate programs. The final possible form of source is that of 
fictionalized accounts. The novel Exodus by Leon Uris, for instance, 
has probably shaped the perception of the time around 1948 for 
many of its readers. To sum up, the possible sources are:
■ Specific works
■ General works
■ Personal accounts
■ Various articles and shorter accounts
■ Television and radio
■ Fiction
The question then is which of these disparate sources to use for the 
present investigation. First of all, if the task is to examine the issue of 
bias in material on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is much more 
important as well as interesting to examine those works that are not 
clearly biased already from the outset. As the methodology described 
above is focused on comparison, it is important that the material 
used is as similar as possible. The focus in the methodology above is 
furthermore more on the narrative aspect of the writing of history 
and less on the analytical. Lastly, the sources used need to be as 
comprehensive as possible for reasons of comparison. In other 
words, they need to include as many of the themes described as
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possible. To sum up then: the sources used for this analysis are (1) to 
be perceived to be free of bias at least initially; (2) to be as similar as 
possible; (3) to be written more in a narrative style than focusing on 
analysis; and finally (4) to be as comprehensive as possible.
Probably the most obvious class of sources that fulfill the above 
criteria is that of the specific works; the works in the form of books 
that deal with specific topics related to the time period of 1967-74 
(e.g. works specifically on the War of 1973 or the rise of the PLO). 
They are hereafter referred to as specific works, and not monographs, 
as some of them are in fact anthologies made up by shorter articles.
The second class of sources used in this thesis is that of the 
general works. These are the works that set out to tell the story of the 
whole of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or at least since Israel’s creation in 
1948. They are referred to as general because they deal with a greater 
time span and with a greater number of events than the specific 
works. As such, the general works devote a smaller amount of space 
to the same topics as those dealt with in the specific works.
Because it has been decided against using works that can be 
construed as being biased from the outset, personal accounts are not 
used as sources because they are just that: personal accounts. These 
kinds of works, almost needless to say, are traditionally veiy biased, 
as writers of personal accounts tend to indulge in their own opinions 
on various topics (this is of course their big selling-point). In this 
context, however, it has been decided not to include these personal 
accounts in favor of exploring the bias of more generic and 
supposedly detached writers.
As discussed above, there is a need for the sources used to be as 
comprehensive as possible for comparative reasons. Hence, the 
shorter articles of magazines, newspapers and academic journals are 
not used in the present analysis, because they for natural reasons 
tend to deal only with very specific issues, processes, individuals, etc. 
It is of course—especially if one considers the newspaper articles—a
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vast amount of material which would most likely have to be further 
limited if one were to use it. This is also the reason why television and 
radio programs are not used as sources here: there is potentially too 
great of an amount of material. There is also the issue of breadth 
when it comes to television and radio, as there are most likely not 
many that can be as comprehensive as a book; be it a monograph or 
more general survey.45
Lastly, I have decided not to use fiction in this thesis. Although 
some fictionalized accounts, like Exodus mentioned above, give a 
quite clear view of how the author wants his or her readers to look 
upon the conflict and are to some degree historiography of sorts, they 
are after all works of fiction. The author is in other words not forced 
to the same degree as someone writing a “regular” historical work to 
delve into every aspect of the conflict. An author of a novel taking 
place during the war of 1967, for instance, can as part of the creative 
process completely disregard the diplomatic and political 
developments which took place prior to the actual outbreak of the 
war.
There are in other words two principal categories of sources used in 
this thesis: specific and general works, and these are the terms used 
from this point onwards. As the specific works relate to the different 
sub-sections described above, they are discussed in the relevant 
chapters below. The general works, as they are used throughout this 
thesis, are here discussed.
First of all, due to the thematic approach of the present analysis, 
where the focus is more on the narrative, I have been forced to 
disregard quite a few general works as they are more analytical and 
less storytelling in nature. What this means is that there are some 
works where the approach is more to analyze the different actors and
45 One of the sources used, however, is based on a documentary series on the Arab- 
Israeli conflict broadcast on the BBC. See Ahron Bregman & Jihan El-Tahri, The 
Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs (London: Penguin Books & BBC Books, 
1998).
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issues in the conflict, and less to tell the stoiy of how it has 
developed. If one is to use the kind of methodology described above, 
it is important that the sources used are quite similar in nature.
Secondly, in addition to works on the history of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, it has also been decided to include works on the history of 
Israel. The reason for this is because these works tend to devote a 
substantial amount of attention to the conflict. I have not used works 
on the history of, say, modern Syria for the simple reason that 
although such works would include material on the War of 1967, they 
would not include more than just a few references to the rise of the 
PLO or the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations of the early 1970s.
Thirdly, it has also been decided not to use works written by 
principal actors in the conflict that are not memoirs. For instance, 
former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban has written quite 
extensively on the history of Israel but as a main actor, his works 
should perhaps not be regarded so much as history p er se, but rather 
as Abba Eban’s version of the history of Israel as shaped by, among 
others, himself. The focus in this dissertation, as stated above, is 
mainly to focus on more generic works, where there is no obvious 
bias from the outset.
Lastly, it has also been decided to only use works written prior to 
the year 2000. This was the year when this project was begun, and 
also when the so-called second Intifada, or uprising, began in the 
Israeli controlled areas. This spiral of violence, it can be argued, has 
at least for the time being brought the peace process to a complete 
halt, and it is unclear what the long-term repercussions will be. 
Nevertheless, it is probably the case that the historiography being 
produced now is different from that written prior to 200o. As this is 
still an ongoing process, however, it is probably not advisable to 
analyze this aspect of the historiography of the conflict quite yet.
Most of the general works are academic in nature, as a large 
number of these works are written by scholars with positions at 
universities in the United States and Great Britain. There are,
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however, some exceptions worth mentioning: a clinical psychologist 
whose interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict was awakened through his 
studies of group conflicts from a psychological point of view has 
written one of the works a n a l y z e d .4 6  A former Irish diplomat has 
written another study, and he claims that his interest in the conflict 
was stirred when he served as the Irish representative to the UN and 
found himself seated between the Iraqi and Israeli delegates; who 
both seemed exceedingly relieved to have someone sitting between 
them.47 There are all in all about 25 works that fit the criteria for 
inclusion described above, and are hence included in this study.
Some brief concluding remarks and the framing of 
questions
After the preceding sections it is clear that there has not been any 
serious attempt at studying the question of bias surrounding the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Most of the works dealing with the 
historiography of the conflict tend to be written from an essentially 
partisan perspective. This thesis is in fact the first work where bias in 
relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict is at all problematized and looked 
upon from a more analytical point of view.
Furthermore, it has also been argued in favor of basing the 
analysis regarding bias on the content of the works under 
investigation, instead of attempting to establish whether or not the 
certain views are “true” in the positivist sense of the word. I have also 
rejected a quantitative methodology in favor of a qualitative, as the 
latter approach is more likely to deliver interesting results. The
46 Baylis Thomas, How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999).
47 Conor Cruise O’Brien, The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 13.
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method used in this thesis is theme based and binary in the sense 
that each identified main theme is supposed to consist of a pro-Arab 
and a pro-Israeli view.
It has been decided to use two different kinds of sources: those 
that are called specific works—which deal more or less entirely with 
the different topics of the time period under investigation—and those 
that are referred to as general works which deal with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the history of Israel in more general terms. The time 
frame for this study is from 1967 to roughly 1974, and it is divided up 
into four chapters below: (l) the War of 1967; (2) the time between 
1967-73; (3) the War of 1973; and (4) the rise of the PLO. In order to 
give the reader a sense of what the different sources look like and also 
to show how different the outcome can be depending on how the 
authors position themselves in relation to the themes used 
throughout, a chapter has been included where four sources are 
analyzed at greater length. The last chapter, quite naturally, is a 
conclusion.
What then are the major questions of this thesis? First of all, the 
method employed is to be put under scrutiny. Is it reliable, by using 
the technique of sampling, to identify differences of opinion in a 
larger number of sources?
The second main problem investigated in this thesis is with 
regards to the nature of the established bias. In other words, how 
frequently do standard pro-Arab or pro-Israeli narratives appear, and 
what are the possible classifications one can make from the main 
themes? Are the works analyzed in general mostly biased, or are they 
only biased with regards to the individual themes? Are the lines, so to 
say, mostly drawn in the sand with the result of most works clearly 
being either pro-Arab or vice versa, or is the picture more complex 
than that?
Thirdly, which themes, in light of the possible classifications, are 
to be considered propaganda of sorts, and which are to be considered
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simply as differences of opinion (or bias as the term is used 
throughout this thesis)? This question leads into the fourth main 
question: is it actually possible to write works on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict (or at least dealing with the time period at hand) that indeed 
are free of bias? All questions but the last are dealt with in the 
concluding sections of the following chapters, while the last question 
is dealt with in the final and concluding chapter of this thesis.
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Introduction
The War of 1967, also known as the Six Day War or the June War, 
was the third Arab-Israeli war (the earlier wars having been fought in 
1948-9 and 1956).1 It was a complete victory for Israel and came to 
dramatically change the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. 
After the war, Israel was in possession of the remaining parts of the 
old Palestine Mandate: the Gaza Strip (seized from Egypt2) and the 
West Bank (seized from Jordan), with their large populations of 
Palestinians. The Sinai Peninsula, in addition, was captured from 
Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria. Due to the great impact this 
war has had on the region and on the Arab-Israeli conflict, a 
relatively large amount of works have been written in English on the 
crisis leading up to the war and the war itself.
Although the authors of the sources used have different ideas as to 
when one should begin an account of the War of 1967—some go back 
a few years before 1967, whereas others go back to the creation of 
Israel in 1948 or even further—I have decided to start my analysis in 
May 1967. It has been pointed out that Arab-Israeli relations had 
remained at an antagonistic level ever since 1948, and that the
1 It should be pointed out here that I use the term the War of 1967, or the 1967 War, 
for the simple reason that it seems that the Six Day War is mostly used by authors 
who are more friendly to Israel, whereas the June War is mostly used by authors 
who are more pro-Arab. The explanation for this is probably that the former name 
emphasizes and shows the extent of the Israeli victory, while the latter name could 
be seen as a way to de-emphasize the Arab defeat.
2 Although Egypt at this time was referred to as the United Arab Republic (UAR), 
the name Egypt is used throughout this thesis to avoid confusion.
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preceding years had seen a further deterioration; making the War of 
1967 more or less inevitable. That may very well be, but it does seem 
fairly clear that it was the events of May 1967 that led directly to the 
war. The analogy with World War I could illustrate what I mean: it 
could be argued in hindsight that the development into two camps of 
Europe’s great powers and the increased hostility between the 
members of these two camps may in the long run have made a large 
European war inevitable. But, nevertheless, it was the events in the 
late summer of 1914 that acted as the catalyst that actually brought 
the war about. Besides, since the different sources have different 
starting points, it would be hard to determine a way in which to 
accurately compare the sources. It should also be pointed out that 
since some of the sources go back a couple of decades or more, the 
focus of this chapter could easily shift towards the controversies 
surrounding the Israeli-Egyptian war of 1956, the establishment of 
Israel in 1948 and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem or 
indeed to the birth of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Ottoman 
and British Mandate times.
Sources
In the introductory chapter it was decided to use two kinds of 
sources: general and specific works. The general works were 
described in the previous chapter. With regard to the specific works 
analyzed, the majority of these were published either in 1967 or in the 
next five years: 8 in 1967, 7 in 1968,1 in 1969, 2 in 1970 and finally 2 
in 1972. After this time period, the number of works on the War of 
1967 trickles down quite dramatically, and the last specific work
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dealing with the War of 1967 was published in 1992.3 The vast 
majority of the specific works are also journalistic in style, with nine 
works being more academic in nature or written in a mixture of 
styles.4 Furthermore, one book used in this analysis is actually a 
textbook written for students between the ages of 12-16.5
Most of the writers of these sources are either British or 
American. There are, however, four works written by Israelis , 6 and 
four by Arabs,7 As for the remaining British and American writers, I 
have not tried to determine any additional ethno/religious ties to the 
conflict (i.e. which of the writers are Jewish, but not Israeli), for the 
simple reason that establishing that could prove to be very difficult or 
even impossible. Going by name alone is of course not a certain way 
of establishing this, and if one is to use the classification of 
Jewish/Gentile when it comes to the British and American writers it
3 Eric Hammel, Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992). Other post-1972 works published were 
published in 1982,1987 (two works) and 1990.
4 Michael Howard & Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis 0/1967, 
Adelphi Papers, no. 41 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967); Peter Young, 
The Israeli Campaign 1967 (London: William Kimber, 1967); Walter Laqueur, The 
Road to Jerusalem: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1968); Theodore Draper, Israel and World Politics: Roots o f the Third 
Arab-Israeli War (New York: The Viking Press, 1968); Majdia D. Khadduri (ed.), 
The Arab-Israeli Impasse: Expressions of Moderate Viewpoints on the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict by Well Known Western Writers (Washington, D.C.: Robert B. 
Luce, 1968); David Kimche & Dan Bawly, The Sandstorm: The Arab-Israeli war of 
June 1967: prelude and aftermath (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1968); Michael 
Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues Behind the Six-Day 
War (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (ed.), The 
Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970); and Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
5 Heather Bleaney & Richard Lawless, The First Day of the Six Day War (London: 
Dryad Press, 1990).
6 David Dayan, Strike First!: A Battle Histoiy of Isr'ael’s Six-Day War (Jerusalem: 
Massadah Press, 1967); Raphael Bashan, The Victory: The Six-Day War 0/1967  
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967); Eli Landau, Jerusalem the Eternal: The 
Paratroopers' Battle for the City of David (Tel Aviv: Otpaz, 1968); and Bar-Zohar 
1970.
7 Khadduri 1968; Abu-Lughod 1970; and Mutawi 1987. The fourth book is arguably 
not written by an Arab—it is in fact written by an American Jew who converted to 
Islam, moved to Jerusalem, married a Palestinian woman and was at the time of 
the of the war working for an East Jerusalem newspaper—but the author conveys a 
very strong sense of affinity to the Palestinian people in his book: Abdullah 
Schleifer, The Fall of Jerusalem (London & New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1972).
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is needless to say imperative that all authors indeed can be 
categorized in this way.
Among the writers, the vast majority are journalists in both the 
writing and broadcasting genres, and the rest academics or students. 
Besides Abdullah Schleifer (see footnote 7), there are some people 
amongst the writers who deserve mention. Peter Young, who at the 
time of writing his book was a reader in military histoiy at the British 
Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, had previously been an officer 
in the Jordanian Arab Legion. Randolph and Winston Churchill were 
the son and grandson respectively of the late British Prime Minister. 
Michael Bar-Zohar was later to become a member of the Israeli 
parliament (the Knesset) and Edward Said8 was later to become a 
world-renowned scholar, if maybe somewhat controversial, with his 
book Orientalism. Elie Wiesel, the French-American author who won 
a Nobel peace prize in 1986, has written an introduction? to one of 
the books, and Sir John Glubb, the former British commander of the 
Jordanian Arab Legion has a lecture reproduced in one of the 
anthologies.10
Timeline of events
May 13: The Soviet Union officially informs Egypt, both through its 
embassy in Cairo and to a visiting Egyptian delegation, of Israeli 
troop concentrations close to the Syrian border. These troops 
were said to be preparing for an attack on Syria and consist of
8 Said has an article written in Abu-Lughod 1970; where he does not write on the 
War of 1967 per se, but rather on Western prejudices against Arabs and the Arab 
world. This article could be seen as a precursor to Orientalism. (Edward W. Said, 
"The Arab Portrayed,” in Abu-Lughod 1970, pp. 1-9)
9 See Menachem Z. Rosensaft, Not Backward to Belligerency: A Study of Events 
Surrounding the “Six-Day War” of June, 1967 (London & Cranbury, NJ: Thomas 
Yoseloff, 1969).
10 Sir John Bagot Glubb, “The Middle East Situation,” in Khadduri 1968, pp. 21-39.
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between ten and twelve brigades. It is the universal consensus 
among the sources that this report was false, but it is not clear 
whether the Soviets or, for that matter, the Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser were aware of this at the time.
May 14: Egypt deploys troops from across the Suez Canal into the 
Sinai. Egypt and Syria had a mutual defense treaty since 
November of the previous year.
May 16-18: Egypt requests the 3,400 man strong United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF), which was positioned in the Gaza 
Strip, along the rest of the Egyptian/Israeli border and in Sharm 
el-Sheikh to withdraw. U Thant, the secretary-general of the 
United Nations agrees, and UNEF is removed from its forward 
deployments.11
May 20: Israel declares a full mobilization of its armed forces. There 
had been, however, mobilization of various reserve units going on 
for the last week.
May 22: Nasser announces the closure of the Straits of Tiran to 
Israeli ships and neutral ships bound for Israel carrying strategic 
goods (i.e. oil). The Straits of Tiran is the passage between the 
Gulf of Aqaba, where Israel’s only non-Mediterranean port Eilat is 
situated, and the Red Sea.
May 22-June 4: There are various efforts to defuse the crisis and to 
gain superpower support undertaken by the parties of the 
escalating conflict. The Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain 
and France are also trying to exert pressure on the parties to 
refrain from violence and the settle the dispute peacefully.
May 30: Jordan’s King Hussein travels to Egypt, where he signs a 
mutual defense treaty and places his armed forces under the 
command of an Egyptian general.
June 1: Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol caves into domestic 
pressure and creates a national unity coalition, which includes
11 S e e  b e lo w  for  a  d escr ip tio n  o f  th e  co n tro v ers ie s  su rrou n d in g  th is  ev en t.
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members of opposition parties. Eshkol also relinquishes his 
position as minister of defense to the former Israeli chief of staff, 
Moshe Dayan.
June 3: Egypt and Iraq sign a mutual defense treaty, and an Iraqi 
brigade begins to move from western Iraq into Jordan.
June 4: The Israeli cabinet meets and decides unanimously that 
Israel should attack first, and that the precise time is to be 
decided by Dayan and Eshkol; who later decide to have Israel 
strike the next day.
June 5: The war begins in the morning with an Israeli surprise aerial 
attack on the Egyptian air force and its air bases; where the 
Egyptian air force is more or less completely destroyed. Later in 
the day, the Israeli air force destroys the majority of the Syrian 
and Jordanian air forces on the ground, and also attacks an Iraqi 
air base in western Iraq. The Israeli army moves into the Sinai 
and the Gaza Strip and, after some initial skirmishes, moves into 
Jordanian-held East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank.
June 5-7: Israeli advances strongly on both the Egyptian and 
Jordanian fronts and, by June 7, the whole of the West Bank is in 
Israeli hands, including East Jerusalem.
June 8: Israeli troops reach the Suez Canal, meaning that the whole 
of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip is under Israeli control.
June 9-10: Israel launches a ground attack against the Syrian Golan 
Heights. Prior to June 9, the fighting between Syria and Israel had 
been limited to artillery duels and aerial battles. The Israeli army 
has by June 10 driven the Syrian army back to a point east of the 
town of Kuneitra, and in effect captured the whole of the area 
known as the Golan Heights.
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Main themes
The major part of this chapter, and indeed of the thesis as a whole, 
revolves around the concept of bias and the main themes, as was 
described in the previous chapter. As described in the previous 
chapter, a number of sources have been sampled, and from these a 
number of themes have been identified. The classification as a main 
theme is based on whether or not there are various views regarding 
the certain event or explanation discussed in the theme, and whether 
it is possible to discern a certain pro-Israeli/pro-Arab bias or 
preference. Eight main themes regarding the War of 1967 have been 
identified and they are dealt with below:
(1) Israeli threats against Syria at the outset of the conflict;
(2) The nature of Egypt’s request for the removal of UNEF;
(3) Nasser’s intentions for requesting UNEF to be removed;
(4) Israeli refusal to accept UNEF on its territory;
(5) Nasser’s intentions regarding the closing of the Straits of 
Tiran;
(6) The implications of the Egyptian-Jordanian defense treaty;
(7) Israel’s position prior to the outbreak of the war;
(8) The reasons for Israel’s military victory.
Israeli threats against Syria
Of all the relations between Israel and its neighbors prior to the 
crisis, those between Israel and Syria were the most tense. There 
were three main bones of contention between the two states: the 
issue of the tributaries to the Jordan River (a low-level conflict 
between Israel, on the one hand, and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, on 
the other), the problem with farming-rights in the Syrian-Israeli 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Syrian support of Palestinian groups 
(primarily Yasser Arafat’s Fatah) that were conducting raids into 
Israel. The problem regarding the tributaries to the Jordan River had
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more or less been put on the backburner by 1967, as the Arab states 
were unable or unwilling to dispute Israel’s unilateral actions. As for 
the farming rights in the Syrian-Israeli DMZ, this was a problem that 
had been ongoing ever since the Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement 
in 1949. Basically, Israel charged Syria with interfering with its right 
to cultivate the land on its side of the DMZ, whereas Syria charged 
Israel with in fact cultivating Syrian land in order to create facts on 
the ground. This dispute quite often developed into skirmishes 
between Israeli and Syrian forces, and a large clash took place on 
April 7, 1967, when a small skirmish developed into an artillery and 
mortar duel, as well as an aerial battle in which the Israelis shot down 
six Syrian fighters.
With regard to the Palestinian groups conducting raids against 
Israel, these groups in all actuality did not usually initiate their raids 
from Syrian territory, but more often from Jordan or Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, Israel regarded Syria as the instigator and made several 
complaints to the UN Security Council. Probably because of the heavy 
Syrian military fortifications and the unattractive option of scaling 
the Golan Heights, Israel chose to retaliate in reaction to raids 
against mostly Jordanian, but also Lebanese, targets. A large Israeli 
raid took place on November 13, 1966, when a considerable Israeli 
army contingent crossed the border and entered the Jordanian 
village of al-Samu in the southern part of the West Bank, demolished 
a number of houses and ambushed a Jordanian army column.
When it comes to the identification of main themes, there is mention 
of Israeli threats of military action against Syria issued in the early 
part of May 1967 in some sources (see footnote below), whereas these 
threats are not mentioned in other sources. In none of the sources 
where these threats are mentioned are they given a large degree of 
attention—the threats are usually described in a few sentences or a 
paragraph or two—so one has to use a number of these sources to get
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a more clear picture of what kind of threats were issued and who 
issued them.
First of all, Israel on May 11 informed the UN Security Council 
that unless Syria ended its provocations, Israel would feel itself 
entitled to act in self-defense. Prime Minster Eshkol warned in an 
interview that same day that there was a possibility that Israel would 
undertake actions no less dramatic than those of April 7 (see above). 
The next day, another threat was issued in an interview with the 
Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, where he hinted to the possibility 
of action against Syria with the aim of overthrowing the Syrian 
government. United Press International (UPI) also wrote on May 12 
that a high Israeli official had stated that Israel would embark on a 
limited military campaign with the aim of removing the Syrian 
government. And, finally, on May 13 the New York Times wrote that 
Israeli leaders had decided that using force against Syria might be the 
only way to curtail terrorism.12
As mentioned above, the sources analyzed do not devote a great 
deal of space to these threats, and not all of them mention the same 
threats. They do not generally go into great detail as to whether these 
threats were serious or not, as events soon came to overshadow 
whatever plans for action the Israelis may have had.
The reason why these Israeli threats have been identified as a 
theme is because they assign Israel some of the blame for the crisis 
that was about to begin. Whether the threats were only meant to 
influence Syria to decrease or end support for Fatah and the other 
Palestinian groups, or whether they were in fact an indication of 
future Israeli actions is of course very hard to determine, and this is 
something which most authors seem to acknowledge. In the instances
12 S e e  fo r  ex a m p le  F red  J . K houri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, 3 rd ed . (S yracu se , 
NY: S yracu se  U n iv ers ity  P ress, 1 9 8 5 ), p . 2 4 4 ; J o h n  Q uigley , Palestine and Israel: A 
Challenge to Justice (D u rh am , N C  & L ond on: D u k e U n iv ersity  P ress , 1 9 9 0 ) , p . 158; 
B en n y  M orris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881- 
1999 (N e w  York: A lfred  A. K nopf, 1 9 9 9 ), p . 3 0 4 ;  A vi S h la im , The Iron Wall: Israel 
and the Arab World (L o n d o n  & N e w  York: A llen  L ane & P en g u in  P ress , 2 0 0 0 ) ,  p . 
2 3 6 f; T h o m a s 1 9 9 9 , p . 155; a n d  H ow ard  M . Sachar, A History of Israel: From the 
Rise of Zionism to our Time, 2 nd ed . (N e w  York: A lfred  A . K nopf, 1 9 9 6 ), p . 6 2 2 .
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where the threats are mentioned, they are used more to illustrate 
Israeli responsibility for the escalation of hostility—as it would seem 
as if the threats did raise concern in both Syria and Egypt—rather 
than to illustrate actual Israeli intentions. The following quote 
demonstrates how American political scientist Mark Tessler looks 
upon the threats:
In sum, analysts will continue to disagree about Israel’s intentions 
during the early and middle part of May 1967, It is clear that 
Israel was indeed considering and talking about an attack on 
Syria. It is not clear, however, that this was to be any more than a 
sharp and punishing raid, similar to past retaliatoiy strikes. And it 
is at least reasonably likely that in mid-May Jerusalem was still 
hoping to restrain Syria by threats and had not yet definitively 
decided to exercise the military option for which it was preparing. 
Be this as it may, it is beyond dispute both that the Arabs 
genuinely believed an attack on Syria would be forthcoming 
shortly, and that Jerusalem’s own rhetoric did much to foster this 
Arab belief. Encouraged as well by the erroneous information 
supplied to him by the USSR, Nasser thus responded to the 
situation as he saw it and made a move that pushed the region 
much closer to all-out war.^
In the sources where the threats are not mentioned, more of the 
blame for the creation of the crisis is placed on Nasser for acting on 
the Soviet report; which it is doubtful he even believed himself. So, 
mentioning these threats could be seen as being pro-Arab—as some 
of the blame for the crisis that would evolve into war is placed on 
Israel’s shoulders—whereas not mentioning them could be seen as 
pro-Israeli.
Partial removal of UNEF
The United Nations Emergency Force, which was to be the first UN 
peacekeeping force, was originally set up as part of the withdrawal of 
French and British troops from the area of the Suez Canal following 
the Suez War of October/November 1956. In this war—where Israel,
*3 M ark T ess ler , A History o f the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (B lo o m in g to n , IN : 
In d ia n a  U n iv ers ity  P ress, 1 9 9 4 ), p . 3 8 7 .
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France and Great Britain acted jointly—Israel overran the whole of 
the Sinai in addition to the Gaza Strip. Due to immense pressure 
from both the Soviet Union and the United States, Israel withdrew 
from the areas captured in March the next year and UNEF was placed 
with Egyptian consent as a buffer on the Egyptian side of the border 
between the two states, as well as in Sharm el-Sheikh. In 1967 UNEF 
consisted of about 3,400 men with contingents from India, Brazil, 
Yugoslavia, Canada, Norway, Denmark and Sweden.
This main theme is in some ways the most confusing dealing with 
the War of 1967 in the sense that it does not seem clear what actually 
took place. The question is whether or not Egypt initially requested 
the whole of UNEF to be withdrawn or not. What is interesting here 
is that the absolute majority of the sources examined do not 
acknowledge that there is in fact a controversy regarding Egypt’s 
initial wishes, but rather just state either that Egypt sought the 
withdrawal of the whole of UNEF or that Egypt only wanted a partial 
withdrawal. Below follows an attempt to show the extent of the 
controversy as it is discussed in the sources.
On May 16, the Indian commander of UNEF, General Indar Jit 
Rikhye, received a telegram brought to him by a courier from the 
chief of staff of the Egyptian Army, General Mohamed Fawzi, asking 
for the removal of UNEF from observation points along Egypt’s 
border with Israel. Rikhye replied that he could only comply with the 
request if he was ordered to do so by the secretary-general of the UN, 
but promised to notify UN headquarters. U Thant, the Burmese 
secretary-general of the United Nations, received Rikhye’s report in 
the early evening of May 16 (New York time) and a little over an hour 
later he told the Egyptian ambassador to the UN, Mohamed Awad El 
Kony, that any request for the withdrawal of UNEF must be 
addressed directly by the Egyptian government to the secretary- 
general. Thant also told the Egyptian ambassador that any request 
for a redeployment of UNEF would in essence be unacceptable and
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amount to the termination of the UNEF mission. Two days later, on 
May 18, Thant received a formal request for the termination of UNEF 
from Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad of Egypt. The secretary- 
general complied with the request and UNEF began to evacuate its 
positions. It is also stated in one account that Riad initially requested 
the withdrawal of UNEF only from the international Egyptian-Israeli 
border (i.e. not from Sharm el-Sheikh or the Gaza Strip), but that 
Thant rejected this position.^
The controversy regarding whether Egypt wanted UNEF to be 
removed in total or only partially redeployed is to some extent 
dependent of how one interprets Fawzi’s original telegram to the 
commander of UNEF. In his book, Sydney Bailey quotes Thant as 
describing the letter as “cryptic . . .  both unclear and unacceptable . . .  
”*5 This is something that the other writers who discuss the 
controversy also acknowledge: that Fawzi’s message was unclear as to 
whether all or only some UNEF positions should be abandoned. To 
add to the confusion, it seems as if the Egyptian officer who delivered 
the telegram to Rikhye verbally emphasized the need for UNEF to be 
evacuated from in particular Sharm el-Sheikh.16 Mark Tessler, in 
addition, brings forward the argument that there may have been a 
discrepancy in policy between the militaiy and civilian branches of 
the Egyptian government on the question of the removal of UNEF. ^
It is not the purpose here to try to determine whether or not Egypt 
sought a complete withdrawal of UNEF or not—although it seems 
clear that there is a need for additional research on this topic—but 
rather to illustrate that there is a limited debate on this issue. As
h  S y d n ey  D . B a iley , Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process (N e w  York: St. 
M artin ’s  P ress, 1 9 9 0 ) , p p . 191-5; Q u ig ley  1 9 9 0 , p. 159; an d  T ess ler  1 9 9 4 , p. 3 9 o f .  
T essler  q u o te s  F o re ig n  M in ister  R iad  a s sa y in g  th a t h e  in itia lly  r e q u e ste d  a  
w ith d ra w a l o f  U N E F  from  th e  Israe li-E gyp tian  in tern a tio n a l b o rd er  ( i .e . n o t  fro m  
th e  G aza Strip  o r  S h arm  e l-S h e ik h ), b u t th a t  T h an t refu sed  to  a g ree  to  th is . R iad  
w a s th e n  fo rced  to  req u est th e  rem ova l o f  th e  w h o le  o f  U N E F .
B a iley  1 9 9 0 , p . 193 . B a iley  d o es  n o t  g iv e  a  re feren ce  to  th is  q u o te .
16 Ib id ., p . 193 .
T ess ler  1 9 9 4 , p . 3 9 o f .
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stated above, the majority of sources studied do not delve into this 
controversy. They rather state their views on the issue as a matter of 
fact:
On the following day, May 16, Egypt acted to raise the 
temperature in the region still further and to threaten Israel. That 
day, at ten in the evening, Nasser ordered the United Nations to 
remove its forces from Sinai. Since 1956 a United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) of 3,400 men had been stationed in the 
Gaza Strip and at Sharm el-Sheikh, at the southern tip of the Sinai 
Peninsula, with the internationally approved task of monitoring 
the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire.18
On May 16, Egypt insisted that some UNEF units leave their 
positions along certain parts of the demarcation lines so that 
Egyptian soldiers could take over. UN Secretary-General U Thant 
maintained that UNEF had to be withdrawn completely or be 
allowed to patrol the entire length of the borders as in the past. 
Consequently, on May 18, Egypt formally requested that UNEF be 
fully withdrawn.^
In the works that bring forward Egypt’s initial request for a partial 
withdrawal of UNEF, the ones that give details as to which areas were 
to be evacuated generally mention that Egypt wanted UNEF to stay in 
the Gaza Strip and in Sharm el-Sheikh and to withdraw from all or 
some of its positions on the international Egyptian-Israeli border.20 
This is of significance because of the reasons Israel quoted for going 
to war against Egypt in 1956: terrorist raids originating in the Gaza 
Strip and the closure, at Sharm el-Sheikh, of the Straits of Tiran to 
Israeli shipping to and from Eilat. So, in other words, a partial 
removal of UNEF can be seen as an Egyptian move which would be 
less threatening to Israel than a full withdrawal (the pro-Arab view).
18 M artin  G ilbert, Israel: A History (N e w  York: W illia m  M orrow , 1 9 9 8 ), p . 3 6 6 .
*9 K h ou ri 19 8 5 , p . 2 4 6 .
20 S e e  fo r  ex a m p le  W . B y fo rd -J o n es , The Lightning War (L on d on : R ob ert H a le , 
1 9 6 7 ), p p . i8 f f .;  K im ch e  & B aw ly  1 9 6 8 , p . 9 3 ; B ar-Z ohar 1970 , p p . 32 ff .; S ch le ifer  
1972, p p . I07 ff.; H a m m e l 1992 , p . 3 o f.;  Q u ig ley  1 9 9 0 , p . 159; T.G. F raser, The Arab- 
Israeli Conflict (B a sin g sto k e: M acm illan , 1 9 9 5 ), p . 82 f.; S ach ar  1 9 9 6 , p . 6 2 3 ;  
T h o m a s 1 9 9 9 , p . 159; K irsten  E. S ch u lze , The Arab-Israeli Conflict (L o n d o n  & N e w  
York: L o n g m a n  1 9 9 9 ), p . 36 ; a n d  A h ro n  B regm an , Israel’s W ars, 1947-93 (L o n d o n  
& N e w  York: R o u tled g e , 2 0 0 0 ) ,  p . 4 6 .
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An emphasis on full withdrawal indicates a more belligerent Egypt 
and is hence labeled the pro-Israeli view.21
Reasons for the removal of UNEF
If the previous two main themes described deal with whether or not 
something is mentioned (threats against Syria) or how something is 
interpreted (partial removal of UNEF), this theme actually deals 
mostly with the intentions of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. 
Because whether or not a partial withdrawal of UNEF was initially 
intended, at the end of the day Nasser decided to have the whole of 
UNEF removed and in essence its whole mission terminated. It 
should be pointed out here that the sources analyzed assume that 
Nasser made all the pertinent decisions during this crisis and, hence, 
any analysis of why Egypt decided to order the complete withdrawal 
of UNEF needs to focus on his intentions.22
In some of the sources, albeit a minority, Nasser’s intentions for 
ordering the removal of UNEF are clear in the sense that he must 
have wanted to engage in a war with Israelis By asking for the 
removal of UNEF, “Egypt acted to raise the temperature in the region 
still further and to threaten Israel.”24 Or, as another writer puts it:
All that stood between the frenzied Arabs and the doomed 
Israelis, so Nasser seems to have thought, was the presence of the 
United Nations Emergency Force at Sharm el-Sheikh and the
21 F or ex a m p le s  o f  p ro -Isra e li v iew s  in  th is  in s ta n ce , se e  B a sh a n  1967 , p . 9 ! ;  
H o w a rd  & H u n ter  1967 , p . 18; H a l K osut, Israel & the Arabs: The June 1967 War 
(N e w  York: F acts o n  F ile , 1 9 6 8 ), p . 4 s f .;  J . R obert M osk in , Among Lions: The 
Battle for Jeivsalem June 5-7,1967 (N ew  York: A rbor H o u se , 1 9 8 2 ), p . 3 2 ; O ’B rien  
1 9 8 6 , p . 4 0 9 ! .;  S a m u e l 1 9 8 9 , p . 121; G ilbert 1 9 9 8 , p. 3 66 ; a n d  M itch e ll G. B ard, The 
Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict (In d ian ap o lis: A lp h a  B ook s, 1 9 9 9 ),  
p . 2 2 5 .
22 In  th e  so u rces  an a lyzed , th ere  is  n o  a ttem p t to  d ec id e  to  w h a t d eg ree  N a sse r  in  a ll 
actu a lity  w a s  in  to ta l co n tro l o f  E gyp tian  p o licy .
23 S e e  fo r  ex a m p le  B ash an  1967 , p p . gff.; R uth  G ruber, Israel on the Seventh Day 
(N e w  York: H ill & W an g , 1 9 6 8 ), p . 47; R o sen sa ft 1969 , p . 26 f.; L eon ard  J . D a v is  & 
M o sh e  D ecter , Myths and Facts 1982: A Concise Report of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict (W a sh in g to n , DC: N ea r  E ast R ep ort, 1 9 8 2 ), p . 31; D av id  D o la n , Holy War 
for the Promised Land: Isj'ael’s Stinggle to Survive (N a sh v ille , T N : T h o m a s  
N e lso n , 1991), p . 129; a n d  G ilbert 1 9 9 8 , p . 3 6 6 .
24 G ilbert 1 9 9 8 , p . 3 6 6 .
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Gaza Strip; remove that and victory was his; so he asked the UN 
to remove it, a request with which the Secretary-General of that 
organization at once, and inexplicably, complied.
The above quote, besides illustrating the view that Nasser wanted to 
go to war against Israel, also shows to some extent the emotional 
language employed in some of the sources. The logic behind this 
argument that Nasser's action indicated a willingness to wage war is 
of course relatively simple, although it is actually only implicit in the 
sources where this argument is presented: by removing a UN 
peacekeeping force, or buffer, Nasser could only want one thing.
In the majority of sources, where Nasser’s intentions are evaluated, 
the case is made that Nasser was not interested in attacking Israel by 
the time he had UNEF removed.26 That is not to say that he did not 
change his mind later throughout the crisis according to some of the 
sources (see below). There are a number of reasons given for why 
Nasser chose this course of action: (1) the need to have UNEF 
removed in order to effectively deter Israel from attacking Syria; (2) 
pressure from other Arab regimes; (3) internal Egyptian pressure; (4) 
a desire to improve his position as the preeminent leader of the Arab 
world; and (5) a desire to score a political victory over Israel without 
having to go to war. The last reason given for Nasser’s decision is 
evaluated upon further below in the section dealing with Egypt’s 
closing of the Straits of Tiran.
Although UNEF was a relatively small force stretched along a long 
border, its removal was of importance if Nasser wanted to deter 
Israeli actions against Syria. Whether or not Egypt actually would 
have come to Syria’s assistance in the case of an Israeli attack is of
25 R in n a  S am u el, A History of Israel: The Birth, Growth and Development of 
Today's Jewish State (L on d on : W eid en fe ld  & N ic o lso n , 1 9 8 9 ), p . 121.
26 S e e  fo r  e x a m p le  B y fo rd -J o n es 1967 , p p . i8 ff .;  C hurch ill & C h u rch ill 1 9 6 7 , p . 29; 
K im ch e & B aw ly  1967; Y ou n g  1967 , p . 77; A b rah am  R ab in ov ich , The Battle for  
Jerusalem: June 5 - 7 ,1 9 6 7 ,  2 nd ed . (P h ila d e lp h ia , N e w  Y ork & J eru sa lem : J e w ish  
P u b lica tio n  S o c ie ty , 1 9 8 7 ), p . 25; K houri 1 9 8 5 , 245f.; T essler  1 9 9 4 , p . 3 8 9 f .;  F raser  
1 9 9 5 , p . 8 2 ; B regm an  & E l-T ahri 1 9 9 8 , 6 6 ; an d  M orris 19 9 9 , p . 3 0 5 b
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course difficult to determine, and none of the authors who discuss 
the removal of UNEF as a deterrent move actually try to. What is 
important here is that Nasser’s move is described as defensive and 
not belligerent. As for pressure from other Arab regimes, Nasser had 
been described as merely posturing by moving troops into the Sinai 
and, in the words of two authors, in order “[t]o free himself from 
criticism by Arab radio -  especially in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria 
-  that he was hiding behind the skirts of the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF), he decided to remove UNEF from Sinai 
and tackle the Israelis.”2? Although some authors mention that 
domestic pressure also led to Nasser’s decision, details about this 
pressure is left out and it is therefore not clear as to whether it was 
exerted mostly by other high Egyptian officials or by “the man on the 
street.” That Nasser held a desire to improve his stature in the Arab 
world and (once again?) assume its leadership has been named as 
another aspect of why Nasser ordered UNEF to be withdrawn. This 
point is naturally connected with the deterrent aspect of the removal 
(assisting another Arab state in danger) but also with responding to 
criticism from some of the other Arab states.
In the sources where Nasser is said not to have wanted a war with 
Israel by having UNEF removed, whether only some or all the aspects 
above are discussed, Nasser’s action is described as a political move. 
This is of course in contrast to the sources where it is argued that 
Nasser acted the way he did because he desired a militaiy conflict 
with Israel. The difference between the two groups of sources is in 
this case quite clear: in the majority of sources, where Nasser’s 
decision is described as a political move (the pro-Arab view), Egypt is 
presented in a much less belligerent light than in the sources where it 
is spelled out that Nasser sought a military confrontation with Israel 
(the pro-Israeli view). It should be pointed out that quite a few of the 
authors who emphasize the political nature of Nasser’s decision also
27 B regm an  & E l-T ah ri 1 9 9 8 , p . 6 6 .
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point out that it may not have been a particularly clever decision in 
hindsight, as it invariably did escalate the conflict.
UNEF on Israeli territory
After Egypt stated on May 18 that it no longer wished to keep UNEF 
on its territory, Israel, according to some sources, was approached by 
Great Britain, the United States, Canada and by Secretary-General U 
Thant to accept UNEF on its side of the Egyptian-Israeli border. 
These suggestions, according to the sources where this is mentioned, 
were given to Israel either on May 18 or during the following few 
days. Israel declined this offer.
The fact that Israel refused to accept UNEF on its territory is only 
mentioned very briefly in some accounts, whereas it has been further 
evaluated upon in others. There have been different reasons given for 
Israel’s refusal, and one of the explanations given is that the Israeli 
move was motivated by Israel’s aggressive leanings:
[I]f the Israeli leaders had really believed that an invasion was 
immanent and Israel’s survival was at stake, they could easily 
have precluded any Arab attack by accepting U Thant’s urgent 
suggestion that UNEF be allowed to take up positions in their 
territory. This could have been arranged very quickly by a transfer 
of men and equipment over an extremely short distance. . . .  By 
firmly and unhesitatingly rejecting U Thant’s proposals, Israel 
indicated that she was less interested in thwarting an Egyptian 
attack than she was in making sure that a UN presence did not 
frustrate her own ability to strike at the UAR at the time of her 
own choosing.28
Israel, in other words, was not particularly worried, at this point at 
least, with an Egyptian invasion, and was more concerned with 
leaving its options open.2^ Another explanation that has been given 
for Israel’s refusal is that accepting UNEF on its side of the border 
would not solve the problem of the Straits of Tiran. As the reader may 
recall, one of the positions in Egypt from where UNEF had
28 K h ou ri 1 9 8 5 , p . 2 8 2 .
29 S ee , in  a d d it io n  to  K houri ab ove, M u taw i 1987 , p . 99 ; an d  Q u ig ley  1 9 9 0 , p . 1 6 0 .
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withdrawn was from Sharm el-Sheikh, and with Egyptian troops 
about to take over the position, if they had not already, an Egyptian 
blockade of the Straits of Tiran was something that the Israelis most 
likely viewed as a realistic possibility. By accepting UNEF on its side 
of the border, so this argument goes, Israel would have curtailed its 
ability to act if Egypt were to close the Straits to Israeli sh ipp ings 
Israeli writer Michael Bar-Zohar brings forward a third 
explanation for Israel’s decision as he describes a meeting between 
Nasser and Secretary-General Thant. This meeting took place in 
Cairo on May 24 (i.e. after Egypt had closed the Straits of Tiran to 
Israeli shipping), and Bar-Zohar gives this account of what took 
place:
Candidly Nasser also proposed a solution for the problem of the 
U.N. troops—why not station them in Israeli territory?
U Thant fell into the trap. Deeply impressed by Nasser’s 
restraint and sincerity, he failed to recognize that all the Egyptian 
President’s “concessions” merely restated in different terms the 
official policy of Egypt. The U.N. force was not to return to 
Egyptian soil, and essential materials like oil, the principal 
product that Israel imported through the strait, would never reach 
Elat. On the Israeli sire [sic] of the frontier, the U.N. force would 
be proof of Nasser’s total trium phs
Besides alluding to Nasser’s cunning personality, Bar-Zohar also 
hints to the fact that Israel’s decision not to accept UNEF on its 
territory was of a political, and not military, nature. By accepting 
UNEF, Israel would have given Nasser an unacceptable political 
victory; as Nasser would have been viewed as the one in total control 
of events.
It is interesting to notice that there are three different views of 
Israel’s decision, and that these three views have different 
implications. The implication of the first view, that the Israeli refusal 
can be viewed as an example of Israel’s possibly aggressive motives, is
30 S ch u lze  1 9 9 9 , p. 3 6 .
31 B ar-Z oh ar 1 9 7 0 , p . 102 .
73
War o f 1967
quite clear as it is spelled out more or less directly. As for the 
implication of the second view, that Israel’s rejection can be 
explained in view of the fact that a blockade of the Straits of Tiran 
was likely, Israel’s move comes across as less antagonistic. This is 
because Israel’s action is described in more of a defensive manner: 
Israel could not accept UNEF on its territory if it was to be able to 
strike at Egypt in the case of a closure of the Straits. The prospect of 
Israeli military action is determined whether or not Egypt announces 
a blockade. Bar-Zohar’s view, that Israel’s decision was political and 
not military in nature, is the view that depicts Israel in the least 
belligerent way. First of all, Israel’s decision to not accept UNEF was 
not made out of military considerations. And, secondly, Israel’s 
decision was made to counter an already belligerent move made by 
Nasser (having UNEF removed from his territory).
The most interesting aspect of this theme, however, is that there are a 
great number of instances where Israel’s refusal is not mentioned. In 
the works that deal more or less exclusively with the War of 1967, 
only seven mention the Israeli decisions When it comes to the 
general books, there is more mention of this theme, but still less than 
half of the works bring it up. That the offer to accept UNEF on its 
territory and Israel’s subsequent rejection of this offer is only 
mentioned in a minority of sources is indeed interesting, and two 
writers actually charge Western press with either failing to mention 
this or actively burying the offer and the refusal.33 Be that as it may, 
but the fact that Israel’s rejection of UNEF—regardless of how Israel’s
a2 C harles W . Y o st, “H o w  it B egan ,” in  M ajd ia  D . K hadduri (e d .) , The Arab-Israeli 
Impasse: Expressions of Moderate Viewpoints on the Arab-Israeli Conflict by 
Well Known Western Writers (W a sh in g to n , DC: R obert B. L uce, 1 9 6 8 ) , p . 81; 
K osu t 1 9 6 8 , p . 4 6 ; B ar-Z ohar 1970 , p. 102; E dgar O ’B a llan ce , The Third Arab- 
Israeli War (H a m d en , CT: A rch on  B ook s, 1972), p . 25; S ch le ifer  1972 , p . 113; 
M u ta w i 1987 , p . 9 9 ; an d  B lea n ey  & L aw less 1 9 9 0 , p . 4 4 .
33 S ch le ifer  1972 , p . 113; M ich a e l W . S u le im a n , “A m erican  M a ss  M ed ia  a n d  th e  
J u n e  C on flic t,” in  A b u -L u g h o d  1970 , p . 152. S u le im a n  d o es  n o t  d ea l w ith  th e  W ar o f  
1 9 6 7  per se, b u t ra th er  h o w  it  w a s  rep orted  in  A m erican  n ew sm a g a z in e s  (e .g . Time, 
US News and World Report, e tc .) . H e  co n c lu d es  th a t th ere  w a s  a  s tro n g  p ro -Isra e li 
an d  an ti-A rab  b ia s  in  a ll th e  m a g a z in es h e  analyzed .
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decision is explained—cannot be said to be a move which lessened 
the risk of a war could be an explanation why this aspect of the crisis 
leading up to the war is not even mentioned in the majority of the 
sources. Due to the infrequency of works mentioning the whole 
concept of UNEF on Israel’s side of the border, in addition to the 
implications of Israel’s refusal, works that mention this concept are 
in this instance deemed pro-Arab, while works where this concept is 
ignored are considered pro-Israeli.
The closing of the Straits of Tiran
On May 22, at the Egyptian air base of Bir Gafgafa in the Sinai, 
President Nasser of Egypt announced that the Straits of Tiran were to 
be closed for Israeli shipping and for neutral ships bound for Israel 
carrying strategic goods (i.e. oil). The blockade went into effect the 
next day. When it comes to this theme, as was the case with Nasser’s 
request for the removal of UNEF, Nasser’s personal intentions are the 
main bone of contention between the sources. Even though some 
sources argue that Egypt may have had a fairly strong legal case for 
closing the Straits the move by Nasser, regardless of his intentions, is 
viewed almost universally as a step that intensified the crisis.34 The 
question is whether Nasser, by deciding to block the Straits, had his 
mind set on a war with Israel.
In some sources, Nasser’s actions from the very beginning leading 
up to the actual war were led by his desire to go to war against Israel. 
Or, as in the words of one writer: “During the tense days preceding 
the Six-Day War, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s thoughts and actions seemed 
to be governed exclusively by his monomaniacal desire to annihilate 
the State of Israel.”35 This view is a minority view, as shown above 
regarding Nasser’s intentions for having UNEF removed, but when it 
comes to the closing of the Straits, some of the writers who did not
34 F or e x a m p le s  o f  so u rces  w h ere  it  is  argu ed  th a t E gyp t m a y  h a v e  h a d  a stro n g  
leg a l c a se  fo r  c lo s in g  th e  S tra its, s e e  C hurchill & C hurchill 1967 , p . 4 2 b ; an d  
S ch le ifer  1972 , p p . n 8 f f .
35 R o sen sa ft 1 9 6 9 , p . 3 4 .
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see Nasser’s orders for the withdrawal of UNEF as an indication of 
his warlike thinking view the blockade of the Straits of Tiran as the 
turning point. By closing the Straits, something that Israel had always 
viewed as a casus belli, Nasser must have known that there was going 
to be a w ar.36
As for the writers who argue that Nasser in fact did not want war 
by having the Straits closed, the same arguments that were presented 
in the case of the removal of UNEF are quoted: the desire to deter 
Israel from striking at Syria, internal and external pressure and a 
wish on Nasser’s part to score a political victory over Israel.37 In the 
words of one of the writers who argue that the closing of the Straits 
was a way for Nasser to achieve a political victory:
It [the closing of the Straits] canceled the main achievement of the 
Sinai Campaign. The Israeli economy could survive the closure of 
the straits, but the deterrent image of the IDF [Israel Defense 
Force] could not. Nasser understood the psychological 
significance of this step. He knew that Israel’s entire defense 
philosophy was based on imposing its will on its enemies, not on 
submitting to unilateral dictates by th e m .3 8
The Egyptian closure of the Straits was in other words a gamble of 
sorts, where Nasser believed that he could force his will on the 
Israelis who would not react. Nasser’s decision, according to this 
view, was an example of brinkmanship. In the disciplines of 
international relations and political science, brinkmanship is 
sometimes described as the tactic employed when an actor challenges 
its opponent with an action deemed unacceptable and potentially 
harmful by the actor’s adversary. Needless to say, the actor who
36 S e e  fo r  in s ta n c e  Y ou n g  1967 , p . l4 i;D r a p e r  1 9 6 8 , p. 26 ; G ruber 1 9 6 8 , p . 47; 
K im ch e & B aw ly  1 9 6 8 , p . 178!.; R o sen sa ft 1 9 6 9 , p . 26f.; V io rst 19 8 7 , p . 191; B a iley  
1 9 9 0 , p . i9 8 f .;  S ach ar 1 9 9 6 , p . 6 2 6 ; B regm an  & E l-T ahri 1 9 9 8 , 67f.; G ilb ert 1 9 9 8 , p . 
3 6 8 ;  a n d  B ard 1 9 9 9 , p . 2 2 6 .
37 S e e  fo r  e x a m p le  C hurch ill & C hu rch ill 1967, Ch. 2; L aqueur 1 9 6 8 , p . 2 3 if .;  Y ost  
1 9 6 8 , p . 8 2 ; M u taw i 1987 , p . 93 f.; B lea n ey  & L aw less 1 9 9 0 , p . 4 4 ; K houri 1 9 8 5 , p . 
2 4 6 f.;  J .R . G a in sb orou gh , The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Politico-Legal Analysis 
(B rook fie ld , VT: G ow er P u b lish in g , 1 9 8 6 ), pp . I2 6 f ., I32f.; Q u ig ley  1 9 9 0 , p . 162; 
S m ith  1 9 9 2 , p . 196; M orris 1 9 9 9 , p . 3 0 6 ;  a n d  T h om as 1 9 9 9 , p . i6 o f .
38 S h la im  2 0 0 0 ,  p . 2 3 7 .
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pursues the tactic of brinkmanship estimates or hopes that the 
adversary will not respond and hence present the actor with a 
significant victory; be it territorial, economic, political, etc.
As with the case of Nasser’s decision to have UNEF removed, an 
emphasis on Nasser’s desire to engage in a war with Israel by closing 
the Straits of Tiran is here defined as the pro-Israeli view. Conversely, 
the interpretation that Nasser’s move was political in nature can be 
argued to be pro-Arab.
The Egyptian-Jordanian defense treaty
As the crisis began in May 1967, relations between Jordan and Egypt 
were not particularly good. It therefore came as a surprise to most 
observers when Jordan’s King Hussein traveled to Egypt on May 30, 
signed a mutual five-year Egyptian-Jordanian defense treaty and 
placed the Jordanian armed forces under the command of an 
Egyptian general; Abdul Munim Riad (not to be confused with 
Mahmoud Riad, the Egyptian Foreign Minister). General Riad was to 
work in cooperation with the Egyptian military command.
The reasons for Hussein’s decision to travel to Cairo and sign the 
treaty are more or less ignored in a large number of sources, or they 
are just explained as part of an overarching scheme to attack Israel: 
“The entire Arab world was called upon to support the Egyptian- 
Syrian attempt to wipe out the Jewish state.”39 Where the pact is 
analyzed more in depth, the consensus seems to be that Hussein 
made his decision because of Arab nationalist feelings, as well as 
because of pressure and fear of political instability from the 
Palestinian citizens of the kingdom. The following quote illustrates 
this view:
Hussein’s flight to Cairo had been a desperate bid by the king to 
maintain his credibility as a leader in the Arab world, and 
particularly among his Palestinian subjects on the West Bank.
39 D o la n  1991, p . 129 .
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With Nasser weaving clouds of glory by his challenge to Israel, 
Hussein faced severe unrest among his own people, perhaps civil 
war, if he chose to sit out the looming conflict as he had sat out 
the Sinai Campaign in 1956.40
Samir Mutawi, whose focus is on Jordan during the crisis and the 
war, argues that Hussein was genuinely afraid of an Israeli attack on 
his territory in order to capture Jerusalem and the West Bank. The 
king believed, according to Mutawi, that Israel could very well chose 
to attack his country even if there were no hostilities on the common 
border, as they could easily just use previous raids originating from 
Jordanian territory as an excuse. Hence, the treaty with Egypt should 
be viewed as an attempt by Hussein to discourage Israel from 
attacking Jordan. Mutawi also mentions the king’s commitment to 
the Arab cause as well as his fear of civil disturbances as factors 
leading to the decision to travel to Egypt.41
During the discussion of the previous themes, it was pointed out 
that the majority did not see Nasser’s request to have UNEF removed 
as an indication that he had his mind set on war. With the closing of 
the Straits of Tiran, some of those who argued that Nasser initially 
did not seek war change their perception and argue that the closing 
was an indication of Nasser’s hostile intentions. In the case of the 
Egyptian-Jordanian treaty, some of the writers who up to this point 
in the crisis have argued that Nasser was not set on war and that a 
military confrontation could have been avoided now make the case 
that the pact made war inevitable. The reason for this is that Israel’s 
position was severely undermined with the pact, and that the pact 
presented Israel with a great military threat:
The Defence Pact of May 30 was undoubtedly the turning-point 
between peace and war. Strategically, an alliance between Egypt 
and Jordan could scarcely be tolerated by Israel. For Israel would 
now be exposed to attack at its most vulnerable point, the ‘soft 
under-belly’ where Jordanian territory formed a salient into Israel
40 R a b in o v ich  1987 , p . 57.
41 Mutawi 1987, pp. 101-10.
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and provided a hostile base for attack only twelve miles from the 
Mediterranean coast. Under the defence pact, the Egyptian Chief 
of Staff would command both Jordanian and UAR Forces in the 
event of war, so establishing a pincer which could be manipulated 
from Cairo .42
What is interesting to note regarding this view of the defense pact is 
that it is assumed to be offensive in nature. The pact was officially a 
defensive treaty, which spelled out that both states committed 
themselves to come to the assistance of the other in the case of an 
attack. It could, in other words, only be a threat to Israel if Egypt and 
Jordan actually were planning an attack.
There are some writers who argue that the pact between Egypt 
and Jordan in fact did not present Israel with a significant military 
threat. The line of argumentation here goes beyond the obvious 
threat of Israel having to potentially fight two or, if one adds Syria to 
the equation, three armies. Instead, the authors who argue that the 
pact was not particularly important argue that for a militaiy pact to 
be truly effective, a great deal of time is necessary to invest in the 
effort of preparation and coordination. One of the authors in fact 
argues that the pact may in all actuality have caused more problems 
than it alleviated for Egypt and Jordan.43
The implications here should be quite clear: that King Hussein 
decided to sign a defense treaty with Egypt because he was afraid of 
civil unrest in his country, or indeed of an Israeli attack, needless to 
say paints a less belligerent picture of the king than just mentioning 
the pact, or than saying that the pact was part of an Arab plan to 
encircle Israel. As for the threat the pact posed to Israel, an emphasis 
on Israel’s grave situation after the pact came into effect signifies a 
more belligerent Arab effort, or a pro-Israeli view, because an 
emphasis on Israel’s precarious position also signifies an offensive
42 R a n d o lp h  S . C h u rch ill & W in s to n  S. C hurch ill, The Six Day  Wa7’ (L on d on : 
W illia m  H e in e m a n n , 1967 ), p . 52 f.
43 H a m m el 1 9 9 2 , p . 3 8 . O th er  w o rk s w h ere  it  is  argu ed  th a t th e  trea ty  w a s  n o t  a 
sig n ifica n t m ilita ry  th rea t to  Israel are Y ou n g  1967 , p. 8 0 ;  an d  K houri 1 9 8 5 , pp . 
2 4 9 , 281 .
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aspect of the pact. The authors who question or downplay the threat 
the pact posed to Israel are on the other hand defined to write from a 
pro-Arab perspective in this instance.
Israel’s situation leading up to the war
As we have seen above, quite a few writers see the Jordanian- 
Egyptian pact as something that seriously worsened Israel’s position, 
whereas some writers see the pact as quite inconsequential with 
regard to Israel’s security. As there is a discussion of the seriousness 
of the pact, in addition to the Iraqi and Saudi military contingents 
being moved into Jordan, about half of the specific works make the 
conclusion that Israel’s very existence was in danger prior to the war, 
while only 25% argue that Israel was not in any real danger.44 What is 
implicit, or in some cases explicit, in this assessment is: (1) that the 
Arabs were going to attack; and (2) that if Israel was attacked and 
defeated there was going to be Israeli casualties in genocidal 
proportions. In relation to a discussion of Israel being in an 
extremely dire position, and of course also because of Israel’s Jewish 
character, there are a number of allusions made to and parallels 
drawn to the Holocaust:
Would this be a new holocaust? Had Israel been born in 1948 only 
to be destroyed in 1967? Had the great “ingathering of all the 
peoples” brought them into one tiny land, the more easily to be 
slaughtered?
These were the darkest days the people had known since 
Auschwitz.45
Where Israel’s survival is described as having been in serious danger, 
the greater number of Arab troops is mentioned, as is the fact that 
Israel was more or less completely surrounded. There is furthermore 
no real distinction made between the states that Israel potentially
44 S e e  A p p en d ix  l  fo r  th e  exact d is tr ib u tio n  o f  h o w  th e  sp ec ific  w ork s re la te  
th e m se lv e s  to  th is  th em e .
45 G ruber 1 9 6 8 , p . 6 0 . Q u ote  is  tw o  p aragrap h s in  orig inal.
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faced in a confrontation (Egypt, Jordan and Syria) and the Arab 
world at large in a number of sources. In one of the sources, the 
author repeats in a number of instances that Israel’s 2 V2 million 
citizens faced over 100 million Arabs,46
As mentioned above, half of the specific works include the concept 
that Israel’s existence was threatened. In the more general books, the 
situation is somewhat different: less than half of the works make the 
claim that Israel’s existence was in danger, but these sources 
nevertheless outnumber those that argue that Israel was not in any 
serious danger. The reason for this is that the ambiguous sources 
make up the difference.47 There are also only a few allusions made to 
the Holocaust in the general works, and then it is mentioned in the 
sense that some Israelis were afraid of a second Holocaust or that 
Holocaust survivors were more worried during the weeks leading up 
to the war than other Israelis.
In the works where Israel’s situation prior to the outbreak of the 
war is described in less dangerous terms, the primary reason given is 
that Israel, despite the possibility of having to face three armies, was 
the strongest party. It has also been mentioned that there were no 
realistic Arab offensive plans—or even a desire to go to war—and that 
there was very little, if any, true military cooperation between the 
three Arab states. Referring to the situation after King Hussein’s trip, 
one author gives the following observation: “Egypt now had defense 
pacts with two nations who were sworn enemies of each other. 
Military rhetoric notwithstanding, the Arab military was hardly 
united .’^  The assessment of sworn enemies apart, Jordan did sever 
diplomatic relations with Syria in May 1967 due to the latter regime’s 
real or alleged aims of overthrowing King Hussein. Abdullah 
Schleifer, who at the time of the war was a journalist in Jordanian 
East Jerusalem, has written on what he deems as the almost
46 D o ro th y  F u ld h e im , Where Were the Arabs? (C leveland: T h e W o rld  P u b lish in g  
C om p an y , 1 9 67 ).
47 S e e  A p p en d ix  1 for  th e  ex a ct d istr ib u tion .
48 S m ith  1 9 9 2 , p . 197.
81
War 0/1967
universal view in May and June 1967 that Israel was the weakest 
party prior to the war:
The one common conviction that did arise among the masses of 
Arabs, Israelis, Europeans, and Americans—and, in the most 
immediately paralyzing sense, throughout the Arab elite in the 
final hours—was the belief that a formidable Arab war machine 
did indeed exist. In the case of educated Arab conviction, this 
Arab armed force was considered sufficient to withstand any 
Israeli assault and to mount a limited counterattack, but the 
broader Arab public imagined a sweep to Tel Aviv. In the carefully 
cultivated understanding of the Western and Israeli publics, this 
Arab force was poised for Nasser’s signal to rush in and 
exterminate every Israeli. 49
Although Schleifer mentions the Western and Israeli view that there 
was going to be a genocide if the Arabs were to win the war, he does 
not, and nor does any other writer who doubts the danger Israel was 
in, evaluate whether there would have been a bloodbath or not if the 
Israelis would have lost. Of course such an evaluation would be 
rather speculative, but it is interesting to note that there is no such 
attempt in any of the sources analyzed.
The implications of this theme are veiy important. This is because 
Israel used and still uses the argument of anticipatoiy self-defense for 
why it struck first in the war. Anticipatory self-defense basically 
means that instead of waiting to receive the initial blow, you instead 
strike first in order to gain, and hopefully keep, the initiative. As the 
legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense is a highly debated subject in 
international laws° (although this debate is in fact only mentioned in 
two of the sourcessi), an emphasis on the fact that Israel was faced 
with such a grave danger that it could mean the destruction of the
49 S ch le ifer  1972 , p . 125.
s° F or a  rev ie w  o f  th is  d eb ate , se e  for  in s ta n ce  A n th o n y  Clark A ren d  & R ob ert J . 
B eck , International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm  
(L o n d o n  & N e w  York: R o u tled ge , 1 9 9 3 ), C h. 5 . T h e  d eb a te  m o s tly  s e e m s  to  fo c u s  o n  
h o w  to  in terp ret A rtic le  51, w h ich  is  th e  artic le  in  th e  U N  C harter th a t  d ea ls  w ith  
th e  r igh t o f  s ta te s  to  u s e  fo rce  in  se lf-d e fe n se .  
s1 G a in sb o ro u g h  1 9 8 6  an d  Q u ig ley  1 9 9 0 .
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state legitimizes Israel’s attack on its neighbors. No one would expect 
Israel to wait for an attack that could prove fatal out of respect to 
international law, if indeed anticipatory self-defense is illegal, when it 
could prevent the danger to its existence by being the first to attack.
On the contrary, by arguing that Israel was not in any mortal 
danger, Israel comes across as the aggressor. If anticipatory self- 
defense is a widely debated concept, there seems to be an almost 
universal consensus that unprovoked aggression is indeed illegal 
according to international law.
Furthermore, to argue that Israel was about to be destroyed by the 
armies of three Arab states presents Israel as being the underdog; 
with all the sympathy usually given instinctively to the weaker party 
of a conflict. By maintaining that Israel did not face annihilation, or 
indeed an attack, the parties are presented as being more equally 
footed. Or, when one takes the massive defeat the Arab states 
suffered in the war that followed, the Arab states could be seen as in 
fact being the weaker party. In conclusion, the argument that Israel 
faced serious danger is here the pro-Israeli view, whereas the 
contention that Israel’s situation prior to the war was not grave is in 
this instance the pro-Arab view.
Reasons for Israel’s victory
There is no question in the sources that Israel won a great victoiy in 
the war and, subsequently, that the Arab states that participated 
(Egypt, Jordan and Syria) suffered great defeats. The question, 
however, is why Israel was able to win so decisively over its 
opponents and how the reasons given for Israel’s victory fit in with 
the general discussion of the War of 1967. What is of course of most 
interest is how the authors who argue that Israel was faced with the 
real prospect of annihilation prior to the war explain the fact that 
Israel was able to rout the armies of three countries and seize a large 
amount of enemy territory in only six days of fighting.
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It is noteworthy that in a large amount of the sources where 
Israel’s poor situation before the war is emphasized, there is only 
limited analysis of why Israel won. The major reason for Israel’s 
victoiy in most of these sources is the surprise air strike against the 
Egyptian air force on the morning of June 5, and the subsequent air 
strikes against the air forces of Jordan and Syria later that same 
day.52 Through these air strikes, Israel gained and kept almost 
complete air supremacy for the remainder of the war. Although 
Israeli historian Benny Morris does not argue in his book that Israel 
was in severe danger prior to the war, he claims that the air strikes 
were instrumental for Israel’s victory:
The day’s air offensives gave Israel almost unhindered superiority 
over the battlefields of Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan 
Heights and freed the IAF for continuous support missions 
against the Arab ground forces. The Israeli planes were to bomb, 
napalm, and strafe the Arab positions and armored columns 
almost at will; the main problems were to be fatigue, turnaround 
times, repairs, maintenance, and friend-or-foe identification of 
ground forces. The constant Israeli air attacks were a major factor 
in the successive demoralization and collapse of the Egyptian, 
Jordanian, and Syrian armies.53
Another aspect that has been brought forward as a key feature of 
Israel’s victory is the psychological aspect of fighting for its existence. 
According to this view, Israeli soldiers and officers fought with great 
courage to the limit of their capabilities and with a large amount of 
self-sacrifice. The Israeli soldiers, in this view, fought not only to 
preserve their own lives, but also to preserve the lives of their families 
and indeed for the survival of their state. Closely linked to this aspect 
of Israel’s victoiy is the argument that the Israeli officers were unique 
in the sense that they led their troops not with the command of 
“Forward!” but rather with the command of “Follow me!” The great
52 S e e  for  e x a m p le  C hu rch ill & C hurch ill 1967 , p . 177; G ruber 1 9 6 8 , p p . I93ff.;  
R a b in ov ich  1987 , p . 1 0 0 ; S a m u el 1 9 8 9 , p . 122; B ick erton  & K lau sn er  1991, p . 151; 
S m ith  19 9 2 , p . 198; F raser 1995 , p . 8 4 f.;  B ard 1999 , p . 2 2 6 f.; S c h u lz e  1 9 9 9 , pp . 
37ff.; a n d  S h la im  2 0 0 0 ,  p . 241.
53 M orris 1 9 9 9 , p . 318 .
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dedication and courage, as well as the high level of training, shown by 
the Israeli officer corps is also pointed out as a main aspect of Israel’s 
victory. The following quote illustrates these two concepts:
Its [the Israeli army] units came together to do a particular job, 
which was examined, discussed, decided upon, and executed in a 
workmanlike manner. If they fell down on that job, they knew it 
would mean the end of Israel, Officers maintained their authority 
not by orthodox discipline but by personal example. Their 
function was to lead and if necessary to get killed, as many of 
them did. But if they did get killed, their men knew what to do -  
and even if they did not, their training and their esprit de corps 
enabled them to keep the initiative. The morale and efficiency of 
the Israelis was not the product of military indoctrination; it was 
rooted in their realization that they had escaped massacre once, 
and were unlikely to get a second chance.54
In contrast to the factors brought forward above, there are authors 
who argue that Israel won the war so decisively and speedily because 
Israel in all actuality was the strongest party. The authors of the three 
specific works that deal more or less exclusively with the war from an 
analytical military point of view all argue that the war was won by the 
strongest p a r t y .5 5  Some of the factors mentioned that were involved 
in Israel’s victory include: (1) superior Israeli planning and military 
intelligence; (2) a unified command, whereas the three Arab states 
had three different commands; (3) shorter supply lines; (4) in all 
actuality more troops and military hardware on the separate fronts 
and sectors, as the Israelis were able to swiftly move troops from 
sector to sector and front to front; (5) inferior training and discipline 
in all three Arab armies; and (6) the early breakdown of 
communications in the Arab armies that was partly caused by Israel 
jamming its opponents’ radio frequencies.56 It should be pointed out
54 H ow ard  & H u n ter  1967 , p . 2 9 .
55 Y ou n g  1967; O ’B a llan ce  1972; a n d  H a m m el 1992 . T here are a  fe w  o th er  w ork s  
th a t  d ea l m o r e  o r  le s s  ex c lu s iv e ly  w ith  th e  m ilitary  a sp ec ts  o f  th e  w ar, h u t  th e y  are  
le s s  a n a ly tica l an d  m o re  d escr ip tiv e  in  natu re . T h e  au th ors o f  th e s e  w ork s, in  o th er  
w o rd s, are m o r e  co n cern ed  w ith  te llin g  a  s to iy  th a n  w ith  a n a ly s is .
56 S e e  a b o v e  w ork s, in  ad d itio n  to  K houri 1 9 8 5 , p. 2 6 o f.
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here that the air strikes are mentioned as being important as well, but 
more for determining the speed with which Israel won.
The implications of these two outlooks are quite clear. By bringing 
forward the surprise air strikes on the air forces of Egypt, Jordan and 
Syria as the main reason for Israel’s victoiy, Israel’s preemptive strike 
is justified (the pro-Israeli view). If Israel faced the grave danger of 
annihilation prior to June 5, the surprise attack on that day was the 
single factor that not only prevented the Arab armies from attacking 
Israel, but also ensured Israel’s continued existence as a state. The 
air assaults were then in other words both necessary and justified.
If, on the other hand, Israel was in fact the strongest party all 
along (the pro-Arab view), the justification of the surprise attacks 
becomes more precarious. This is because Israel, being the strongest 
party from the outset, was not in any mortal danger. Any argument 
for using anticipatory self-defense cannot in this situation use the 
claim that Israel had to launch a surprise attack in order to safeguard 
its existence. And, due to the heavily debated issue over the legality of 
anticipatory self-defense in general, Israel’s actions at the outbreak of 
the war could be seen as nothing short of unjustified aggression.
Main themes: conclusions
In her general study of the Arab-Israeli conflict, historian Kirsten 
Schulze argues that there are four different interpretations of who 
was to blame for the War of 1967. The first interpretation is what 
Schulze defines as the Israeli, and which lays the blame on Nasser for 
the war by closing the Straits of Tiran. The second interpretation sees 
Nasser’s actions as political, and not military, in nature and 
subsequently places the blame of the conflict on Israel’s shoulders. 
According to Schulze, the third interpretation sees the war as the 
result of a mutual policy of escalation that led to the war more or less
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by accident. And, finally, the fourth interpretation sees the war as a 
result of superpower manipulation of their regional clients/allies.57 
The three first interpretations brought forward by Schulze are 
seen in the sources analyzed, whereas there is only one example of 
the fourth.58 Soviet manipulation of both Egypt and Syria is 
mentioned in a number of sources with regard to the report claiming 
Israeli troop concentrations and intentions to attack Syria. This, 
however, is where the role of superpower manipulation ends in the 
sources analyzed, as it is mentioned in a number of sources that the 
Soviet Union repeatedly urged both Egypt and Israel to refrain from 
escalating the crisis. Although there were definite superpower 
interests in the region—Israel and Jordan had close relations with the 
United States, whereas Egypt and Syria were allied with the Soviet 
Union—the superpowers, according to the majority of sources, in fact 
only played a limited role in the crisis and the following war. In one 
of the sources, however, the United States is pointed out as giving 
more than just psychological assistance to Israel:
Although the United States did not acknowledge a direct role in 
the fighting, it sent reconnaissance aircraft that traced nighttime 
movement of Egypt’s ground troops to facilitate daytime Israeli 
air attacks on them. The Egyptian troops were forced to move at 
night because, with their air force destroyed, they had no 
protection against air strikes. The air strikes were important in 
Israel’s rapid victory.59
As we have seen in the discussion above, there are clearly a number 
of sources where it is claimed that the Arabs were responsible for the 
war. Some writers claim that Nasser wanted to go to war from the
57 S ch u lze  1 9 9 9 , p . 3 3 .
58 G lubb  1 9 6 8 , p . 2 1 -3 9 . In  th is  artic le , w h ich  is  a  rep rin ted  v er s io n  o f  a  le c tu re  
g iv en  b y  G lubb to  th e  M id d le  E ast In stitu te  in  W a sh in g to n  D .C. in  O ctob er  1967 , 
G lubb argu es th a t th e  S o v ie t U n io n  m a y  h a v e  p la n n ed  th e  w h o le  w ar  in  ord er  for  
th e  A rab s ta te s  to  g e t d efea ted . T h e  A rab sta tes  w o u ld  th e n  b e  fo r c e d  to  c o m e  to  th e  
S o v ie ts  fo r  a ss is ta n c e  a n d  th e  U SSR  w o u ld  h e n c e  b eco m e  m o r e  en tr e n c h e d  in  th e  
M id d le  E ast. It sh o u ld  b e  p o in te d  o u t th a t  G lubb o n ly  g ives lim ite d  a tte n tio n  to  th is  
th e o r y  in  h is  lec tu re .
59 Q u ig ley  1 9 9 0 , p . 162.
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very beginning, some see the removal of UNEF or closing of the 
Straits of Tiran as the turning point, whereas some see the defense 
pact between Egypt and Jordan as the determining factor. What the 
writers who put the blame on the Arabs all have in common is the 
argument that although Israel in fact initially started the war, it was 
only in reaction to prior Arab actions.
In the works where Israel is pointed out as the guilty party, the 
authors are usually more subtle in assigning blame. The charge given 
to Israel is mostly implicit in the sense that Israel is described as the 
strongest party, and that hence its use of anticipatory self-defense 
was not justified. Israel is in other words blamed for overreacting to 
threats that were not real, or at least not as serious as they are 
portrayed in some of the more pro-Israeli sources. Nasser’s actions 
prior to the war are also pointed out as being political, and not 
militaiy, in nature. The assignment of blame to Israel for the war is in 
this sense "softer” than in the sources where the Arabs are portrayed 
as the belligerent party. There are, however, exceptions where Israel 
is described in more aggressive terms: "A supportable case can be 
made that Israel sought or welcomed belligerent Arab postures to 
justify war against a weak Arab world as prophylaxis against possible 
future war.”60 One author in fact charges Israel with having decided 
to go to war already in the beginning/middle of May 1967, but began 
planning for a war in the near future from 1965 onwards.61
As far as the view that the war was the result of mutual Arab and 
Israeli escalation and that both parties were to blame for the war, this 
notion is mostly prevalent in the general studies. It is also among the 
general works where most of the works that are as a whole 
ambiguous of who is to blame are found. The general works tend, 
more so than the specific works, to give more than one side to the 
story and their authors also tend to be more careful with giving their 
opinions on controversial points. There are nevertheless a number of
60 T h o m a s 1 9 9 9 , p . 167. E m p h a sis  in  orig in al.
61 Ib ra h im  A b u -L u gh od , “Isra e l’s  A rab P o licy ,” in  A b u -L u ghod  1970 , p p . 6 6 -9 0 .
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general works where the author’s opinions on who is to blame are 
either explicit or not particularly hard to deduce.
In the above descriptions of the main themes, certain views were 
pointed out as being either pro-Israeli or pro-Arab. Below follows two 
charts where the proportions between the views deemed pro-Israeli, 
pro-Arab and ambiguous are shown. The values in the different fields 
indicate the number of works holding a certain view.
□ Pro-Israeli ■ Pro-Arab □Ambiguous
100% - 
80% - -1
60% -
4
40% -
20% -
0% -
---- 8 11 —
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Figure I: Proportion of views held in the specific works 
□ Pro-Israeli ■Pro-Arab □Ambiguous
100% - 
80% -
60% -
40% -
20% -
r»o/ .
<<* <<* <<* <<? 
Figure II: Proportion of views held in the general works
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What kind of conclusions can be made from the tables above? First 
some issues of the analysis of main themes need to be discussed. It 
should be pointed out, first of all, that not all designations of either 
pro-Israeli or pro-Arab are as clear-cut as others. What this means is 
that whereas some sources clearly spell out, for instance, that Nasser 
undoubtedly was set on war when he closed the Straits of Tiran, 
others only imply that he was. Then there are sources where it is not 
clear how the author relates him- or herself to the main themes. 
These sources have been deemed ambiguous in relation to the theme 
in question.
Second, it should be remembered that although some works are 
deemed as pro-Arab in relation to one or more themes, they are as a 
whole pro-Israeli in nature, and vice versa. This is especially clear 
considering that the majority of sources view Nasser’s request for the 
removal of UNEF as a political move (the pro-Arab view), while the 
majority of sources also view Israel’s position immediately prior to 
the war as extremely dire (the pro-Israeli view).
One of the first things apparent in the above charts is that there 
are quite a few sources that are deemed to be ambiguous in relation 
to the themes. This is in some cases due to what the sources 
concentrate on: for instance, some of the sources focus exclusively on 
the diplomacy and politics leading up to the war and leave the 
military aspects of the crisis more or less unexplored, whereas others 
do the reverse. In one of the sources, as a matter of fact, not a single 
one of the themes is evaluated upon as the author’s focus is 
exclusively on the Israeli paratroopers’ fight in Jerusalem,^ In other 
cases, some themes are only touched upon, but not evaluated (for 
example writing that “on May 30, Jordan’s King Hussein traveled to 
Cairo and signed a mutual defense treaty with President Nasser”).
Nevertheless, most of the sources analyzed do position themselves 
as being either pro-Arab or pro-Israeli in relation to the main themes.
62 Landau 1968,
9 0
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It is only regarding theme 6 (implications of the Jordanian-Egyptian 
defense treaty) that there are more ambiguous views held in the 
general works than there are outspoken views. All in all, however, it 
could be argued that the above charts illustrate that the method of 
sampling a few sources to identify differences in views in relation to 
major themes works quite well. The question then is whether or not 
the themes as such are valid, and whether or not the different views 
assigned to the themes are reasonable.
As described above, there are two themes (1 and 4) where the 
writers are classified as being either pro-Israeli or pro-Arab by either 
mentioning or not mentioning a certain event. The assumption made 
regarding these two themes is that the events as such (Israel 
threatening Syria and not accepting UNEF on its territory) could be 
construed as not working in Israel’s favor. And, by failing to mention 
them, the author has committed him- or herself to a pro-Israeli view 
in relation to this topic. It is in other words assumed that the author 
knew about this event and chose not to include it in the final work. It 
would seem as if the events described above are well-known enough 
to merit this classification. The problem, however, is that there 
probably are authors who did not know about the events in 
question—or did not focus their works on the politics/diplomacy 
leading up to the war—and are hence deemed pro-Israeli. It is of 
course impossible to know in how many of the works deemed pro- 
Israeli this is the case.
It is in the above charts possible to deduce that there is some chaos in 
how the different sources relate to the main themes. What this 
indicates is that there are no clear standard narratives of the war— 
either from a pro-Arab or pro-Israeli perspective. Or, to put it 
perhaps more accurately, there are some standard narratives, but 
they are not employed all that extensively. The standard pro-Israeli 
account would maybe read something like this:
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By asking UNEF to be removed in full, by closing the Straits of 
Tiran and by signing the pact with Jordan, Nasser clearly had his 
mind set on war. Prior to the war, Israel’s veiy existence was in 
danger and the only option Israel had in order to survive was to 
launch a surprise attack, which proved to be successful.
A standard pro-Arab narrative, on the other hand, could look like 
this:
Nasser initially only sought a partial removal of UNEF, and his 
actions were only deterrent and political in nature. He did not, in 
other words, seek to go to war against Israel. Israel was not in any 
serious danger prior to the war, even after the Jordanian- 
Egyptian defense treaty, and hence Israel’s surprise attack was 
not justified. Israel won the war because it was the strongest party 
already from the outset.
Although these standard interpretations are used in some sources, 
they are the exception. In the majority of sources, the authors chose 
their own interpretations, or indeed chose not to delve into certain 
aspects, and are not bound by the standard narratives. Nevertheless, 
at the end of the day it is also clear that there are more pro-Israeli 
views than there are pro-Arab views, especially when it comes to 
describing the later events of the crisis. This is probably not that 
surprising to most students of the Arab-Israeli conflict. What may, 
however, come as a surprise is that there are in fact so many 
ambiguous and pro-Arab views in relation to the themes.
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As for possible classifications of the themes, there are four possible 
categories:
(1) Themes in which a certain event does not paint a favorable 
light of one of the adversaries, and is hence ignored in a 
number of sources (themes 1 and 4);
(2) Themes where it is not entirely clear what took place, but the 
different authors chose one or the other narrative without 
commenting on the difficulties surrounding the event (theme
2);
(3) Themes where the intentions of a certain actor (in this case 
Egyptian President Nasser) are interpreted differently (themes 
3 and 5);
(4) Themes where larger situations and events are interpreted 
differently, with quite distinct implications (themes 6, 7 and 
8).
If one were to say that all differences in opinion shown in relation to 
the different themes are biased in some way, one could also make the 
case that the themes in the first two classifications are examples of a 
more conscious bias, while the themes in the latter two classifications 
could be said to be more of differences of opinion. The reason why it 
is possible to say that the themes belonging to the former two 
classifications could be construed as being examples of more 
conscious bias is because they most likely involve some sort of 
selection of the material. The selection referred to is that the author 
in these instances has made a narrative choice that works in favor of 
the view he or she is trying to transmit to the reader. When it comes 
to the second theme (whether or not Egypt initially requested the 
withdrawal of the whole of UNEF or not), there are as mentioned 
above only a few sources that mention the fact that it is not entirely 
clear of what actually took place. By choosing one factual statement 
(either in favor of a full or of a partial withdrawal) and by not
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mentioning that there is a debate of what happened, the author has in 
some ways manipulated how the event is described.
That authors manipulate the description of events to fit a grander 
scheme is of course nothing new and it could easily be said that the 
themes belonging to the latter two classifications could also be said to 
be examples of this. The difference, however, is that the themes in the 
latter classifications do not deal with events in the strictest sense of 
the word: they rather deal with interpreting a historical process. 
Whereas the themes belonging to the former classifications deal with 
whether something happened or how it happened, the themes 
belonging in the latter two classifications deal with the tougher 
questions of how to interpret a certain event or situation. Were the 
air strikes carried out by Israel instrumental to winning the war, or 
would Israel have won regardless? Was Israel facing the real prospect 
of destruction prior to the war, or was Israel’s position never 
particularly dire? These kinds of questions are not on the same level 
as whether or not Egypt at the outset sought a complete withdrawal 
of UNEF or not. This question could, theoretically at least, be settled 
through locating and reading all pertinent documents. The harder 
questions belonging to the latter themes, on the other hand, are 
much tougher to answer with the same certainty, and this where 
interpretation comes in. Interpreting is something historians and 
others do all the time, as many questions are more or less impossible 
to settle conclusively, and the themes belonging to the latter 
classifications are probably no different. The difference, perhaps, is 
that the authors of the examined sources in most cases just state how 
they view the events; without offering the different opinions that in 
fact do exist.
In the introduction, it was said that the question of whether works 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict should be considered scholarship or 
propaganda is an important question of this thesis. When it comes to 
the themes belonging to the two former classifications above, one has 
an easier case arguing that we are talking about propaganda than
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regarding the themes belonging to the latter two classifications. In 
other words, it could be said that there are most likely instances of 
propaganda within the former themes. There are probably authors 
who in all actuality deceive their readers by not telling the whole 
story. As for the latter themes, the different views held could be seen 
more as differences of interpretations, or bias in the sense of the 
word as used in this thesis as they present one of the actors of the 
conflict in a more positive light than the other.
Further Observations
In some of the early specific works, it is claimed that Israel in fact did 
not fire the first shot on June 5, but that Israel merely responded to 
Egyptian troop movements and indications that Egyptian airplanes 
were on their way towards Israel. This view corresponds well to the 
official Israeli account of events presented at the start of the war: i.e. 
that Israel was not the instigator of violence. This account changed 
about a month later (July 7) with a statement by Prime Minister Levi 
Eshkol; where he acknowledged that Israel did strike first as an act of 
anticipatory self-defense.^ Some of the writers simply transmit the 
Israeli account whereas there are some writers who question the 
validity of the Israeli claims. British journalist W. Byford-Jones, for 
instance, points out that it is unclear what happened to the Egyptian 
airplanes that were supposedly on their way to Israel, as the majority 
of the Egyptian air force was destroyed on the ground. Byford-Jones 
also questions whether it was indeed possible for anyone to see the 
dust of Egyptian movements towards the border from the area of 
Mitzpe Ramon in the Negev, as Israel had claimed as one of the
63 For a discussion on this topic see Quigley 1990, p. l63f.
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indications that Egypt was about to attack.^ In conclusion to these 
questions Byford-Jones argues that, “[p] rob ably Israel’s greatest 
achievement off the battlefields had been in making it seem to the 
world that Egypt had started the war.”6s What is interesting about 
this is that it shows the great speed some of the specific works 
published in 1967 were written and published, as it was only a month 
later that Israel officially acknowledged having fired the first shot.
Another interesting observation regarding the sources is the 
propensity of allusions made in the specific works to the Bible, early 
Jewish history, the history of the pre-state Jewish community of 
Palestine and the Holocaust. Besides the obvious allusions made to 
the Bible (e.g. “Hebron is where Abraham is said to be buried”), there 
are also statements alluding to the Bible or other aspects of Jewish 
history made that seem to play into a larger Zionist framework; 
justifying not only the war but also the very existence of Israel as a 
Jewish state:
For the first time in more than nineteen hundred years, the flag 
with the Star of David flew over Jerusalem. It had not done so 
since the Roman general Titus had marched his legions into the 
Temple to find the mysterious God of the Jews, whom they 
worshipped and for whose sake they refused to bow to the Roman 
gods—a refusal that meant death for them. . . . Not since that day 
had Jerusalem been theirs, and on this June day in 1967 there 
flooded through the land an emotion difficult to comprehend, one 
of spiritual exaltation as well as military pride. Other victories 
against the Arabs were a necessary achievement for survival, but 
Jerusalem was different; this was more than survival, this was a 
spiritual experience, a victory exalted beyond militaiy victory. No 
sooner had the gates opened than a hundred thousand people, as 
if animated by the same impulse, walked the long uphill path to 
the Wailing Wall. Strong men wept, soldiers and civilians alike.66
There are quite a few accounts about the capture of the Wailing Wall
in Jerusalem that are similar to the above quote, but allusions to the
fi4 For Byford-Jones’ discussion on this topic see Byford-Jones 1967, pp. 72, i03f, 
166.
65 Ibid., p. 166.
66 Fuldheim 1967, p. 67f.
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Jewish connection to the Holy Land either through history, the Bible 
or both are present in other contexts as well. As for the references 
made to the Holocaust, these are somewhat obvious in the sense that 
it is pointed out in a great deal of sources that Israel most likely 
would have faced casualties of genocidal proportions if it had lost the 
war. Although the connection between the allusions made to the 
Holocaust and the enterprise of Israel as a whole is mostly implied in 
the majority of the sources, the following quote illustrates the 
connection quite clearly:
To act against the enemies of the Jews, and if necessary to act 
alone—that was why the state of Israel had been created in the 
first place. In the Jewish mind, the situation in the spring of 1967 
seemed classic. The Jews menaced by their enemies, were now 
abandoned by their friends. Was this not the story of the 
Holocaust? It was the scenario for which the Jews demanded a 
state of their own. The crisis reaffirmed the Jewish disposition, 
cultivated during centuries of anti-Semitism, to believe that in 
crisis the Jews could count only upon themselves.6?
The connection between the Holocaust and Zionism is needless to say 
a large topic that probably deserves a study of its own. It is also a 
possibly contentious issue beyond the scope of this thesis, and is 
hence not further explored. It should be pointed out, however, that it 
has been claimed by some scholars that the War of 1967 acted as a 
catalyst for the growth of interest in the Holocaust in at least the 
United States.68
Possibly due to the swiftness of the war, there were not that many 
civilian casualties or acts of atrocities committed by either parties (or 
at least not in comparison with other wars of the twentieth century). 
Some appalling acts are nevertheless mentioned in a few sources, and
6? Milton Viorst, Sands o f Sorrow: Israel’s Journey from  Independence (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1987), p. 92.
68 For a discussion on the role of the War of 1967 for raising interest in the 
Holocaust in the United States see for example Peter Novick, The Holocaust in 
American Life (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), Ch. 8.
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these are here discussed. The one act that is mentioned in quite a few 
sources is the Egyptian army firing on its own troops trying to cross 
the Suez Canal. As the Egyptian army came to disintegrate from the 
Israeli offensive, a large number of Egyptian soldiers came to flee on 
their own or in small groups from the Israelis; trying to reach the 
Canal in order to cross over to the more populated western side. A 
great number of Egyptians never made it to the Canal and 
subsequently died of thirst, hunger and/or exposure to the sun and 
the other elements. It has been estimated that as many as 10,000 or 
even more Egyptian soldiers perished in this manner. The atrocity 
that has been pointed out is that there were instances where Egyptian 
soldiers on the western side of the Canal fired on other Egyptian 
soldiers trying to swim over the waterway. In some sources, the 
reasons for these killings are not mentioned, but in some it is said 
that the soldiers firing had orders to do so in order to prevent 
Egyptian refugees from reaching the populated parts of Egypt and 
subsequently telling the general public of the disastrous performance 
of the Egyptian army. It has also been pointed out, however, that the 
shootings could simply have been the result of mistakenly identifying 
the swimming soldiers as Israelis tiying to cross the Canal.6?
The other atrocity committed by the Arabs mentioned in some 
sources is the instance where two captured Israeli pilots are said to 
have been murdered on Syrian television. In one account, these pilots 
were hacked to pieces, in one they were crucified and in yet another 
source only the fact that they were murdered is mentioned.?0 In two 
works, furthermore, Egyptian villagers in the Nile Delta are charged 
with having murdered a captured Israeli pilot.?1
The Israelis, on the other hand, are charged in some accounts 
with having deliberately destroyed civilian property on the West 
Bank; in particular in the towns of Qalkilya and Tulkarm where a
6? See for instance Bashan 1967, p. 145; Byford-Jones 1967, p. 117; O’Ballance 1972, 
p. 168; and Bleaney & Lawless 1990, p. 48.
7° Fuldheim 1967, p. 95; Young 1967, p. 89; Gruber 1968, p. 109.
71 Bar-Zohar 1970, p. 216; and Young 1967, p. 89.
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great number of houses were destroyed and property damaged. It is 
also said in some sources that the Israeli army completely leveled 
four smaller villages in the so-called Latrun salient (close to the Tel 
Aviv-Jerusalem highway). Furthermore, the Israelis are also charged 
with having used napalm as well as regular artillery and air strikes on 
civilian areas in Jerusalem and in the rest of the West Bank. There 
are also charges made in some sources against the Israelis for having 
expelled a large number of West Bank Palestinians from their homes, 
and for having killed captured Egyptian prisoners of war.72 Abdullah 
Schleifer, the East Jerusalem journalist, has written that there was 
Israeli looting, committed by both soldiers and civilians, in captured 
East Jerusalem. Schleifer, who devotes quite a bit of space to 
improper Israeli behavior in Jerusalem, makes the point that poor 
conduct by occupying armies of course is nothing unique to the 
Israelis and that other cities have suffered worse fates, but he also 
points out that this aspect of the war was largely neglected by 
Western press .73
All in all, however, there is not a great deal of mention of 
atrocities or inappropriate actions committed by either parties in the 
sources analyzed.
While reading the more popular, or journalistic, accounts that were 
published shortly after the war, one is sometimes struck by the 
similarities between the books. It is of course inevitable that books 
that deal with the same topic tend to be quite similar, but with some 
of these works it goes a little beyond that. In quite a few of the works, 
the same quotes appear, the same events are described in similar 
terms, etc. What these works have in common is that they are all 
written from the perspective that the focus is on Israel—but not 
always from a pro-Israeli position—and that most of their authors
72 See for example Morris 1999, pp. 319, 32yf; O’Ballance 1972, pp. 205, 217; Smith 
1992, p. 200; and Thomas 1999, pp. 176-83.
73 Schleifer 1972, pp. 181-205.
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were in Israel around the time of the war. A possible reason for the 
similarities between these sources could therefore be that the authors 
of these works relied quite heavily on their Israeli hosts for material.
The following example illustrates the similarities between seven 
sources quite well. They all deal with the initial Israeli breakthrough 
into Jerusalem’s Old City by the commander of an Israeli paratroop 
brigade, Colonel Mordechai Gur. The three first quotes are in the 
words of their authors, while the latter three quotes are from Gur’s 
mouth directly. The last quote appears verbatim in two sources (see 
reference).
Colonel Gur ordered his sturdy driver, Ben Tsur, a bearded fellow, 
weighing some fifteen stones, to speed on ahead. They passed the 
tanks and saw the Gate before them with a car burning outside it. 
There wasn’t  a lot of room, but the Colonel told Tsur to drive on. 
So they passed the burning car and saw St. Stephen’s Gate half­
opened in front. Regardless of the danger that somebody might 
drop grenades into their half-track from above, Tsur pushed on 
and flung the door aside. The half-track crunched over the fallen 
stones, passed a dazed Arab soldier, turned left, and came to a 
third gate. Here, a motor-cycle lay blocking the way. In spite of 
the danger of booby-traps Tsur drove right over it. So Colonel Gur 
reached the Temple Mount.74
Gur told his bearded driver, Ben-Tsur, to race ahead. They saw a 
car in flames outside the gate. The gate was half-opened. Ben- 
Tsur flung it wide open and, heedless of grenades and snipers, he 
sped on toward the third gate, the last before the Mount of the 
Temple, A motorcycle barred the road. Was it a booby trap? Gur 
was somehow certain it was an Israeli cycle. It was not. They sped 
right over it .7 5
Five meters ahead loomed the gate. There was only a fraction of a 
moment before he [i.e. the driver] would hit, but it was enough to 
make out two huge doors, the left one hanging partially open. He 
steered for the center of the gate. The half-track slammed hard 
and the left door toppled backward, the right door swinging open. 
An Arab jumped clear behind the gate, and a shower of small 
stones from the damaged arch fell into the half-track. They were 
inside the Old City.
74 Byford-Jones 1967, p. 147.
75 Gruber 1968, p. 99k
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Gur ordered Ben-Tsur to turn sharply to the left. In that 
direction lay the Temple Mount, a walled compound with its own 
gates. A motorcycle stood across the path and the thought that it 
might be booby-trapped occurred to Ben-Tsur, but he drove the 
half-track over it and passed through the Tribes’ Gate into the 
Temple compound.?6
Our driver was a bearded fellow by the name of Ben-Zur. He 
tended to move along calmly, but when I told him ‘Drive on!’ he 
drove on. Near the gate a vehicle was burning, all but barring the 
way. But Ben-Zur had his orders, and he zoomed past it. At the 
gate a door swung, half-open; no doubt there were grenades 
above it. Ben-Zur sent the half-track right through, taking the 
door with him and just missing the shower of stones that came 
toppling down. An Arab was standing off to one side; would he be 
letting go with a grenade? Ben-Zur didn’t  give him time to make 
up his mind, but sped right by. We turned left to the third gate. It 
was open, but a motorcycle straddled the entrance; mined, no 
doubt, we thought. But Ben-Zur had his orders. He flattened the 
motorcycle (it had not been mined) and a moment later he halted 
the half-track on the Temple Mount.77
I told the half-track driver, ‘Bentsur, go ahead!’ and he spurted 
forward. We overtook the tanks, sped out in front, and there was 
the wall in front of us. A burning car on the road left us only a 
narrow passage. We passed the blazing vehicle and saw a half­
open door in the gate. Above it there could have been—or should 
have been—grenades. ‘Bentsur, keep going!’ I yelled. He stepped 
on the gas and plunged into the door, shattering it and crushing 
the stones raining down from above that were blocking the road. 
As we thrust through, we passed an Arab on our right. A thought 
flashed through my mind—he could throw a grenade of fire a 
weapon. Nothing happened and we raced on, swerved sharply to 
the left, and reached another gate blocked by a motorcycle. ‘Was it 
booby-trapped’ we wondered. ‘Bentsur, keep going!’ The driver 
crashed through the motorcycle, which was not booby-trapped, 
and headed for the Temple A rea.78
I told my driver, Ben Tsur, a bearded fellow weighing some 15 
stone, to speed on ahead. We passed the tanks and saw the Gate 
before us with a car burning outside it. There wasn’t a lot of room, 
but I told him to drive on and so we passed the burning car and 
saw the Gate half-open in front. Regardless of the danger that
?6 Rabinovich 1987, p. 364!. The first edition of this book was published in 1972 by 
the same publisher.
7? Mordechai Gur quoted in Bashan 1967, p,95.
78 Mordechai Gur quoted in Dayan 1967, p. 167.
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somebody might drop grenades into our half-track from above, he 
pushed on and flung the door aside, crunched over the fallen 
stones, passed by a dazed Arab soldier, turned left and came to 
another gate. Here, a motorcycle blocked the way but, despite the 
danger of a booby-trap, my driver drove right over it and we 
reached the Temple M ounts
It is fairly clear that the above examples are indeed really quite 
similar—both in language and the details of their content—and that 
they must be relying on the same source. However, none of the 
authors who describe this episode provides us with a reference; 
except for Raphael Bashan, who writes that this account first 
appeared in the Hebrew language newspaper (called Khativon) of the 
paratroop brigade that conquered the Old City, and to be based on 
Gur’s notes of the assault.80 The fact that the quote was translated 
from Hebrew to English could explain the discrepancies between the 
sources that quote Gur directly. The above examples also show the 
popular style employed in quite a few of the early specific works.
79 Mordechai Gur quoted in Churchill & Churchill 1967, p. 140; and in Young 1967, 
p. 135 .
80 Bashan 1967, p. 80.
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3- The time from 1967 to 1973
Introduction
In the previous chapter, the War of 1967 was described as it is 
problematized in the works under investigation. The War of 1967 
proved to be of truly great importance in the history of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. Regardless of its reasons, Israel’s Arab neighbors 
suffered a great defeat, the territory under Israel’s control was 
increased many-fold and a large number of Palestinians in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip came under Israel’s direct control.
What took place during the years in-between the War of 1967 and 
the War of 1973 is dealt with in this chapter. Or, to put it more 
correctly, what happened in relation to Israel and its Arab neighbors 
is discussed. The growth in importance of the PLO and the so-called 
Palestinian question is described in a later chapter. During the time 
of 1967-73, there was a comparatively large amount of activity in the 
realms of diplomacy and politics relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Various peace initiatives were launched by the superpowers, by the 
United Nations and indeed by the parties themselves. None of these 
materialized however, and this is the focus of this chapter. There was 
also an armed conflict that took place between Israel and Egypt 
during this time—the so-called War of Attrition—and this is also 
discussed.
The focus in this chapter, as was also the case in the previous 
chapter, is on the main themes. These could in some ways be said to 
be the most important aspects of this time period, with one 
exception. In the fall of 1967, the United Nations Security Council
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passed a resolution (number 242) that has come to be seen as one of 
the most important documents written on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
There is no reason to go into the details of the resolution or how it 
came about; it is sufficient to say that it provides the so-called “land 
for peace”-formula. It calls on all parties in the region to accept each 
other’s existence and boundaries, the end of all belligerency and for 
Israel to withdraw from territories captured in the war of earlier that 
same year.1 Another important aspect of resolution 242 is that it 
emphasizes the need to justly settle the refugee problem in the 
region.2 Resolution 242 is readily available in a great number of 
works on the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as on the Internet, but it has 
also been included in this work as an appendix (appendix III).
Sources
Compared with the literature relating to the War of 1967, the 
literature dealing with this time period is more modest in quantity. 
This time period is in some ways under-researched if one is to 
compare with other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But, in 
contrast to the sources used for the previous chapter, it is possible to 
give a short rundown of the individual titles that deal specifically with 
this time period. The general works used for this analysis are the 
same as those used in the previous chapter, whereas they are
1 In the French language version of the resolution, the definite article les is used in 
front of the word territories. Israel is in other words called upon to withdraw from 
all territories in this version. This has led to some controversy surrounding which 
of the two versions (i.e. the French or the English) should be regarded as the 
authoritative one, but the consensus amongst scholars of international law seems 
to be that it is the English version that should be favored. This is because the 
resolution was originally presented as a British draft, and it was this text that was 
voted on.
2 This has almost universally been seen as a reference to the Palestinian refugee 
problem, but in one of the sources analyzed in this study the authors say that it also 
refers to the Jewish refugees who left Arab states around the time of Israel’s 
establishment in 1948 (Davis & Decter 1982, p. 41).
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described in the introductory chapter. The specific works relating to 
the chapter are discussed in chronological order of publication:
Norman Bentwich’s book Israel: Two Fateful Years 1969-703 is a 
journalistic book that deals mostly with how domestic Israeli politics 
and society changed after the War of 1967. There are only a few 
references made to the problems dealt with in this study.
Edgar O’Ballance, who also wrote on the War of 1967, has in 
addition written a book on the War of Attritions Like his book on the 
War of 1967, this work deals mostly with the military aspects of the 
armed conflict. It is written in a popular style with, one would 
assume, a readership in mind that is more interested in military 
matters than in politics and diplomacy.
The first more academic book published in English that deals with 
the time of 1967-73 was published in 1974 by Lawrence W hettens 
This book is very detailed and analytical in nature. It is however quite 
clear that it was written during the Cold War; as there is a great deal 
of discussion of the role of the superpowers in the Middle East in 
general (i.e. not dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically).
In 1978 an anthology was published which was the result of a 
conference held at the Shiloa Center (since 1983 called the Moshe 
Dayan Center) for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv 
University.6 The conference in question, which dealt with the Middle 
East during the time of 1967-73, was held in 1974 and was as a matter 
of fact delayed due to the War of 1973. The anthology is quite large in 
scope, as it deals with such varied aspects as economics, inter-Arab 
and domestic Arab politics, the role of the superpowers, etc. There is
3 Norman Bentwich, Israel: Two Fateful Years 1967-69 (London: Elek, 1970).
4 Edgar O’Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East 1968-70 (London: 
Faber & Faber Ltd., 1974).
5 Lawrence L. Whetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East 
(Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 1974).
6 Itamar Rabinovich & Haim Shaked (eds.), From June to October: The Middle 
East between 1967 and 1973 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978).
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in fact only one article in this anthology that deals more specifically 
with the problems under investigation here.7
Israeli scholar of international relations Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov 
published a book in 1980 that deals more or less exclusively with the 
War of Attrition.8 The focus is on the war—mostly from a military 
tactical and strategic point of view—but the author also discusses 
some of the more political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict.
Another Israeli, Mordechai Gazit, has written a short book that 
was published in 1983.9 This book deals with the question of the 
different peace initiatives launched during this time period, and Gazit 
deals with his material in an academic and analytical manner. The 
book was prepared when the author spent a year as a senior research 
fellow at both the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations 
and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of 
Peace, both tied to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
The seventh book written on a specific aspect of the time period in 
question was published in 1985 by British writer Sydney Bailey.10 
Bailey has been the author of a great number of works on British 
politics and the workings of the United Nations. In this book, the 
author deals more or less exclusively with how the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 242 came to be (see above on this 
resolution). The book is very detailed and the focus is obviously on 
diplomacy and politics.
In contrast to some of the perhaps dry academic works described 
above stands David Korn’s Stalemate from 1992.11 This book is 
written in a more popular style, and the author is a former American
7 William B. Quandt, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Foreign Policy,” in 
ibid., pp. 3-24.
8 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970: A 
Case-Study o f Limited Local War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
9 Mordechai Gazit, The Peace Process 1969 -  1973: Efforts and Contacts 
(Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1983).
10 Sydney D. Bailey, The Making o f Resolution 242 (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985)
11 David A. Korn, Stalemate: The War ofAttiition and Great Power Diplomacy in 
the Middle East, 1967-70 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
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diplomat who served at the American embassy in Tel Aviv during 
most of this time period. The scope of this book is quite large, and the 
author focuses on both the military as well as the political/diplomatic 
aspects of the conflict.
The last book written specifically on this time period was 
published as late as 2000.12 It was written by American military 
historian George Gawrych, who teaches at the US Army Command 
and General Staff College and specializes on the Middle East. As 
indicated in the title, the book deals with both the 1967 as well as the 
1973 wars, but it also deals with the time in-between. Although the 
focus is mostly on military matters, there is also a discussion of the 
politics and diplomacy of the years 1967-73.
12 George W. Gawrych, The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between 
Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars (Westport, CN: 
Greenwood Press, 2000).
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Main themes
As described in the introductory chapter, there are main themes 
where there is controversy in the sources dealing with this time 
period. These main themes are:
(1) The secret decision made by the Israeli cabinet on June 19, 
1967—in other words shortly after the war—where it was 
decided that Israel return the Sinai and the Golan Heights to 
Egypt and Syria respectively in return for full peace;
(2) The nature of the Arab Summit meeting in Khartoum in 
August/September 1967;
(3) Nasser’s decision for starting the War of Attrition in March 
1969;
(4) The initiative of UN mediator Gunnar Jarring in February
1971;
(5) The initiative launched by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, 
also in February 1971.
These are dealt with below.
The secret Israeli cabinet decision
The method of sampling was introduced in the introductory chapter 
of this thesis, and the result of this sampling is the basis for the 
classification of the main themes. When it comes to the first theme of 
this chapter, however, it seems as if the method did present us with 
inaccurate results. But, before we go into what was perhaps 
inaccurate about this theme, let us first look at what this theme is 
about in the first place.
On June 19, 1967, the Israeli cabinet made a secret decision—the 
results of which it transmitted to the United States—that Israel was 
willing to return the Sinai and the Golan Heights to Egypt and Syria 
respectively in return for full peace, demilitarization and guarantees
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of free shipping through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. This 
decision did not include any mention of the areas of the West Bank, 
Jerusalem or the Gaza S trips
There are different views as to whether or not Egypt and Syria 
indeed were made aware of the decision but, nevertheless, the 
decision soon lost in importance. Some authors blame this on what 
they describe as Arab intransigence or aggressiveness as it was seen 
in the Khartoum declaration (see below.)^ Others say that it was a 
combined result of Arab refusal to negotiate in addition to a 
hardening of Israel’s position:
Egypt was not yet in a state of mind to make a rational 
compromise. Soon those in the Israeli cabinet — notably Yisrael 
Galili and Yigal Allon — who were against the land for peace 
proposal gained the upper hand, and the 19 June 1967 proposal 
was withdrawn.
The stalemate would last another decade. The greatest 
opportunity in the fifty years war to secure peace had been lost.^
Israeli historian Avi Shlaim has described the June decision as “one 
of the most significant decisions in the annals of Israeli foreign 
policy.”16 Be that as it may, but the secret decision does paint Israel in 
a more benign light. This decision was taken prior to the UN Security 
Council Resolution 242, which laid the foundation for the “land for 
peace”-formula. This was the reason why it was included as a main 
theme where mentioning the decision was seen as being pro-Israeli, 
whereas not mentioning it was regarded as being pro-Arab.
There is however a problem with classifying a theme in this manner. 
It has to be assumed that the authors are aware of the event in 
question, but chose to ignore it. When it comes to this decision it is 
not certain that this is the case. It was after all made in secret, and
Kom 1992, p. I3f; Shlaim 2000, p. 253; Morris 1999, p. 330. 
!4 See for instance Gilbert 1998, p. 402.
Bregman & El-Tahri 1998, p. 101.
16 Shlaim 2000, p. 253.
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there only seems to be a few references made to it in the primaiy 
sources. As far as official Israeli documentation, Israel in most cases 
employs a thirty year rule for declassifying secret material, so the 
decision would not have been made public prior to 1997 at the 
earliest.
In the sources where the decision is mentioned, it is sometimes 
referred to as being discussed in a few autobiographies. Israeli 
Foreign Minister Abba Eban’s An Autobiography (New York, 1977) is 
mentioned as discussing the decision, as is Minister of Defense 
Moshe Dayan’s Hebrew-language Aveneh Derech (Tel Aviv, 1976).^ 
However, in most of the works where the June decision is mentioned, 
it is not indicated where the author received his or her information.
If Eban and Dayan’s autobiographies indeed are the only primary 
sources where the decision is mentioned, it is probably not safe to 
assume that the decision is widely known. It would, in other words, 
probably not be advisable to label the sources where the decision is 
not mentioned as being pro-Arab. Using the June 19 decision as a 
main theme is in other words decided against.
The nature of the Arab summit meeting in Khartoum 
Between August 28 and September 2,1967, an Arab summit meeting 
was held in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. This was the first 
meeting between Arab leaders since the Arab-Israeli war a few 
months earlier. Eveiy Arab leader, with just a few exceptions,18 was 
there and the end result was a declaration that laid out a basic 
strategy for approaching the new situation in the Middle East. The 
whole declaration is reproduced as an appendix at the end of this 
thesis, but this is how the crucial article reads:
Morris 1999, Ch. 7 n. 119; Shlaim 2000, p. 253; Korn 1992, Ch. 1 note 9.
18 The Syrian and Algerian presidents decided not to attend the meeting, but sent 
their respective foreign ministers in their places. Due to health problems, neither 
King Idris of Libya nor the president of Tunisia attended as well. They did, 
however, send high-ranking officials to represent them at the meeting. Khouri 
1 9 8 5 , p . 312 .
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The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts 
at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of 
the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive 
Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since 
the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework 
of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no 
peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, 
and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own 
country.1?
This text and its implications has been interpreted quite differently in 
some of the sources under investigation, and that is the focus of this 
theme. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the 
Khartoum declaration is merely yet another instance of Arab 
intransigence and indicates an unwillingness to live together with 
Israel in peace.20 The wording of the last section of the declaration 
has sometimes led to the declaration being referred to as the “three 
noes of Khartoum,” or a derivative thereof. According to this view, 
the implications of the declaration are quite clear, as they are more or 
less spelled out in the three negatives above (no peace, no 
negotiations and no recognition). The negative use of language is also 
highlighted in some sources; for instance in Mitchell Bard’s easily 
accessible introduction to the Arab-Israeli conflict, The Complete 
Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict. Bard has here decided to name 
the section in which the Khartoum declaration is discussed and 
quoted as “The Arabs Say No, No, No.” Needless to say, Bard does not 
present the declaration in a light favorable to the Arab side of the 
conflict.21 In some sources, where the secret decision made by Israel 
mentioned above is discussed, the declaration in Khartoum led to a 
hardening of Israel’s position and subsequently why the secret 
decision lost its significance.22
Avalon Project at Yale Law School. URL: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ 
mideast/khartoum.htm.
20 See for example Korn 1992, pp. 7if, 2o8f; Gawrych 2000, p. loof; Gilbert 1998, 
p. 402; Samuel 1989, p. 123; Dolan 1991, p. 131; Blumberg 1998, p. 115; and Davis & 
Decter 1982, p. 37.
21 Bard 1999, p. 232.
22 See for example Korn 1992, p. 71L
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On the other hand, there are sources where the Khartoum 
declaration is looked upon from different perspectives.^ Israeli 
historian Avi Shlaim, for instance, views it as somewhat of a triumph 
for the more moderate forces in the Arab world:
In fact, the conference was a victory for the Arab moderates who 
argued for trying to obtain the withdrawal of Israel’s forces by 
political rather than military means. Arab spokesmen interpreted 
the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace treaty, but 
not a rejection of a state of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a 
refusal to talk through third parties; and no dejure  recognition of 
Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a s t a t e . 24
The declaration is in other words to be seen as moderate in the sense 
that it did not call for a military solution to the conflict, as indicated 
in the first section of the declaration, as well as providing the Arab 
states with “bargaining chips.” The Arab states, according to this 
view, could offer peace, direct negotiations and recognition to Israel 
if they were given considerable concessions .=5 Or, the declaration was 
moderate in the sense that it gave the Arab states the possibility of 
offering Israel everything but formal recognition and peace.26 The 
intransigent wording of the three noes is also in some cases explained 
as being a concession made both to the more extreme forces present 
at the summit meeting, as well as to the general Arab public. They are 
also presented as being a response of sorts—and perhaps as a way of 
the Arab states to save face—to the perceived or real Israeli 
unwillingness to withdraw from some or all of the territories 
captured in the war as part of a settlement.2/
What these views all have in common is that they present the 
Khartoum declaration in a less negative light than the former view 
that argued for the declaration’s inflexibility. In the framework of this
23 See for example Whetten 1974, p. 49ff; Bailey 1985, p. 174; Khouri 1985, p. 3i3f; 
Lesch & Tschirgi, p. 22; Fraser 1995, p. 88; and Bailey 1990, p. 26if.
24 Shlaim 2000, p. 258. Emphasis in original.
2s See for example Bailey 1985, p. 174.
26 See for instance Khouri 1985, p. 313b and Shlaim 2000, p. 258.
2z Morris 1999, p. 345f; and Khouri 1985, 3i3f.
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thesis—and the methodology of assigning different views as being 
pro-Israeli or pro-Arab—the first view, where the declaration is 
presented as an uncompromising and somewhat extreme text, is the 
pro-Israeli view. The Arab states are in this view presented in a 
belligerent and not particularly conciliatory manner. Conversely, the 
second view, where the declaration is described in more moderate 
terms is deemed to be the pro-Arab view. Writing from a pro-Arab 
perspective, or at least with regard to this issue, the Khartoum 
declaration is problematic, as it does not, at least perhaps on first 
inspection, portray the Arab states in a particularly favorable light. 
Journalist Milton Viorst, however, gives an interesting interpretation 
of the declaration, which not only is favorable to the Arab side but 
also presents the declaration as being somewhat of a milestone in 
Arab-Israeli relations:
[A] fundamental change had taken place at Khartoum, so subtle it 
is not clear that the Arabs themselves at first discerned it. There, 
the shift away from bombast began. On the eve of the Six-Day 
War, Nasser had proclaimed that his “object will be the 
destruction of Israel.” In contrast, at Khartoum the Arab 
leadership promised—even in pronouncing the “three noes” and 
rejecting a peace conference—to recover the occupied territory, 
not in battle but in “joint political and diplomatic action.” 
Thenceforth, Arab governments would often enough speak of war, 
but with the object of improving their leverage to compel Israel to 
return lost territories. The talk of destroying Israel itself virtually 
disappeared.
The Khartoum conference, notwithstanding the “three noes,” 
demonstrated that the Six-Day War had broken a psychological 
barrier. It was not that Arabs became more tolerant of Zionism. 
Rather, they learned they had no choice but to tolerate Israel’s 
existence. The recoveiy of the lost land became the new objective, 
transforming the rhetoric and, with it, the real goals of Arab 
leadership.
It is a reasonable premise that the Arabs’ shift began as no 
more than a tactic. Yet for many Arabs, hearing the new, more 
limited objective proclaimed over and over again, while talk of 
Israel’s destruction vanished, inevitably created a fresh truth. It is 
a truth on which a whole generation of Arabs has now been 
raised. If it did not convert the Arab mind to approval of Israel, it 
surely narrowed the distance between rejection and acceptance. If
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asked directly in 1967, most Arabs would, like Nasser, have 
answered that nothing had changed. Some would offer the same 
answer today. But the shift in goals that took place in Khartoum 
contained an implicit admission by the Arab world that Israel had 
become part of Middle East reality, likely to be around for a long 
time. It was a signal that the Arabs had found room in their 
worldview for Israel’s legitimacy.28
The War of Attrition
The war of June 1967 ended in cease-fire agreements on all fronts. 
However, the fighting did not end completely, as skirmishes took 
place every now and again on all three fronts. Almost from the veiy 
beginning of the cease-fire, there were skirmishes between Egyptian 
and Israeli ground forces and naval ships along the Suez Canal, as 
well as in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. One of the most 
spectacular results of these skirmishes was probably the sinking of 
the Israeli destroyer Eilat in the fall of 1967.29
Although there was a certain amount of activity on the Egyptian- 
Israeli front, it is not normally termed as being a full war. In March 
1969, however, Egypt launched what has since been called the War of 
Attrition. The name comes from a speech held by Nasser, the 
Egyptian president, soon after the outbreak of the war where he said 
that Egypt had embarked on a war of attrition against Israel. From 
initially being limited to artillery duels across the canal—with 
occasional commando raids undertaken by both parties—the war 
came to escalate in the summer, when Israel started using its air force 
to bomb the Egyptian artillery on the western bank of the canal. The 
war escalated further in January the following year (1970) as the 
Israeli air force began bombing Egyptian targets that were not in the 
proximity of the canal (mostly around Cairo and in the Nile Delta). As 
Egypt and the Soviet Union were relatively close allies at this time, 
the USSR began sending massive amounts of material and personnel
28 Viorst 1987, p. 105!
29 The sinking of Eilat was the first time guided surface-to-surface missiles were 
used in real naval warfare, and is therefore a milestone of sorts in the history of 
warfare at sea.
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to Egypt in the spring of 1970. And, before the war finally ended in 
August through an American brokered cease-fire agreement, Israeli 
and Soviet pilots had fought each other in the skies over the canal.30 
Although there is some controversy surrounding the Israeli 
decision to start bombing the Egyptian interior, the major 
controversy is the question of why Egypt decided to launch the war in 
the first place. The Israeli decision for starting its in-depth bombings 
is discussed below, as this topic is not large enough to be construed 
as a main theme. There are essentially two differing views as to why 
the Egyptian president Nasser decided to embark on a larger war in 
March 1969. The first view sees the decision as yet another instance 
of Arab aggression .3’ What is implied in this view (or perhaps even 
outspoken) is the Arab—or in this instance Egyptian—inability and 
unwillingness to try to solve the conflict through peaceful means. The 
following quote by British historian Martin Gilbert illustrates the 
contrast between the approach to the conflict as seen by Israel and 
Egypt:
Golda Meir’s first announcement as Prime Minister was to say 
that ‘we are prepared to discuss peace with our neighbors, all day 
and all matters'. Within three days, President Nasser replied that 
‘there is no voice transcending the sounds of war’ and ‘no call 
holier than the call to war’. In March 1969 -  following Nasser’s 
dictum ‘what was lost in war must be restored by war’ -  Egyptian 
artillery opened fire on the Israeli forces stationed on the east 
bank of the Suez Canal. Israel returned the fire with alacrity. What 
became known as the War of Attrition had begu n .32
Egypt, in other words, was simply not willing to solve the conflict 
peacefully, and the War of Attrition was another example of Egypt’s 
aggressive position. Whether or not Egypt hoped to be able to
30 For a comprehensive account of the War of Attrition from a military point of view 
see for instance Bar-Siman-Tov 1980.
31 See for example O’Ballance, p. 57; Korn 1992, p. 108; Gawrych 2000, p. 103-110; 
Bard 1999, p. 237; Blumberg 1998, p. 117; Dolan 1991, p. 132; Fraser 1995, p. 92; 
and Samuel 1989, p. 123.
32 Gilbert 1998, p. 410. Golda Meir became Israel’s new prime minister after her 
predecessor, Levi Eshkol, died in February 1969.
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eventually cross the canal and recapture the Sinai, or whether Egypt 
just hoped to force an Israeli withdrawal without making any 
concessions of its own is not entirely clear according to this view. The 
decision made by Nasser to embark on another war with Israel is 
furthermore in some instances explained as being a way for him to 
enhance his image as a leader of the Arab world, who did not fear 
carrying on the fight against Israel.33
The opposite view of Nasser’s decision to launch the War of Attrition, 
which is actually the majority view, is that the war was part of an 
attempt to solve the conflict through political means. One line of 
argumentation in this is that Nasser sought to create enough 
instability in the region to force the superpowers to get involved in 
trying to solve the c o n f l i c t . 3 4  Related to this perspective is that Egypt 
did not want the cease-fire line from 1967 (i.e. the Suez Canal) to 
develop into a de facto  border. As long as the cease-fire line was 
under dispute, this line of thinking goes, there was bound to be some 
outside involvement to settle the dispute p o l i t i c a l l y . 35 Yaacov Bar- 
Siman-Tov, an Israeli scholar of international relations, provides us 
with an example of the third view on the more political motivation of 
the decision to start the war:
Prolonged war of attrition was thus a strategy directed toward 
reversing the balance of power between the warring sides in favor 
of Egypt (by means of erosion of Israel’s strength), or at the very 
least to create a balance of power between the two sides. Once this 
balance of power was brought about between the two sides, Egypt 
could envisage adopting some other kind of strategy in order to 
realize her aims in full. The effectiveness of the new strategy 
chosen would be enhanced by the already lowered state of the 
enemy’s morales6
33 See for example O’Ballance 1974, p. 57; and Bard 1999, p. 237.
34 See for example Bailey 1990, p. 288; Morris 1999, p. 348; and Lesch & Tschirgi 
1998, p. 24.
35 See for example Shlaim 2000, p. 289; Khouri 1985, p. 363; and Tessler 1994, p. 
445.
36 Bar-Siman-Tov 1980, p. 56.
Il6
1967-73
So, although the war was to wear down the Israelis through military 
means, the ultimate goal was political in nature. Bar-Siman-Tov also 
argues that part of the Egyptian strategy was to eventually cross the 
canal to establish a foothold on the eastern bank, but the purpose of 
this was only to have further leverage over Israel.37
What these views have in common—and they are needless to say 
not mutually exclusive—is that Nasser’s decision to launch the war 
was politically motivated. Although starting a war is aggressive as 
such, its end objective was not just aggression for its own sake, but 
rather to improve Egypt’s stance in achieving a political solution to its 
dispute with Israel. By focusing on a political final aim of the war, 
Nasser and Egypt are portrayed in a more favorable light than in the 
view exemplified by Martin Gilbert above; where the decision is 
presented as being nothing but an example of Egyptian belligerence. 
Hence, the view of the start of the War of Attrition as something with 
a political goal in mind is here deemed to be the pro-Arab view, and 
the view where the decision to launch the war is described as only 
being aggressive in nature is the pro-Israeli view.
The Jarring proposal
In February 1971—that is about six months after the cease-fire 
agreement between Egypt and Israel following the War of Attrition 
went into effect—Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish diplomat who had 
been appointed to mediate in the Middle East by the secretary- 
general of the United Nations, gave Egypt and Israel each a proposal. 
In this memorandum (it was presented in identical forms to both 
parties), Jarring requested an undertaking by Egypt to enter into a 
formal peace agreement with Israel. And, from Israel, Jarring 
requested that it withdraw to the former Palestine-Egypt border from 
the days before 1948. Israel would in other words withdraw from the
37 Ibid., p. s 6 f.
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Sinai Peninsula, but the Gaza Strip would still be in Israeli 
possession.38
About a week after Jarring’s initiative, Egypt gave its reply. Egypt 
was willing to enter into a peace agreement with Israel under these 
premises, but with a few additional demands: (1) a commitment to 
settle the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with earlier UN 
resolutions on the topic; (2) that Israel was to withdraw from the 
Gaza Strip as well; and (3) that a UN peacekeeping force was to be 
established to ensure that no further violence erupted. Two weeks 
later, the official Israeli reply came and there it said that Israel 
viewed Egypt’s willingness to sign a peace treaty with great favor. 
However, when it came to the issue of Israeli territorial concessions, 
it was said that Israel was willing to withdraw from the cease-fire 
lines to what were to be the final borders as settled in the peace 
treaty, but it was also said that Israel would not withdraw to the pre- 
War of 1967 lines.39
The reason why the so-called Jarring initiative has been included as a 
main theme is because there are some sources that describe it as a 
major breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations, while others either 
downplay its importance or just do not mention it at all.4° Where the 
importance of the initiative is stressed, Egypt’s willingness to actually 
sign a peace treaty with Israel, and hence recognize its existence, is 
brought forward. This, according to some sources, was a major step 
forward and Israel is blamed for not grasping this opportunity. Baylis 
Thomas, for instance, quite clearly stresses the initiative’s 
importance: “Israel was bluntly negative, declaring that there would 
be no withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines -  a missed opportunity to
38 See for example Quandt 1978, p. 17; Khouri 1985, p. 366; Sachar 1996, p. 695!.; 
and Shlaim 2000, p. 300.
39 Ibid. It should be noted that Sachar does not mention that Israel did not accept 
withdrawing to the lines of June 5, 1967; only that Israel ultimately found the 
proposal unacceptable.
4° For examples of the former view, see Quandt 1978, p. 17; Shlaim 2000, p. 30of; 
and Khouri 1985, p. 366. For examples of the latter view, see Gazit 1983, p. 66-73; 
Viorst 1987, p. 142; Gainsborough 1986, p. 181; and Sachar 1996, p. 695f.
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avoid the 1 9 7 3  Yom Kippur w a r .”41 Where Israel’s negative reply to 
Jarring’s initiative is mentioned and looked upon in an unfavorable 
light, the fact that Jarring himself was disappointed with Israel—as 
were indeed the American Secretaiy of State William Rogers and 
other American officials—is brought forward.^
Conversely, there is also the view where Jarring’s initiative is 
either downplayed as not being particularly important, not 
mentioned at all or presented as being unreasonable from Israel’s 
perspective. Israel should in other words not be blamed for replying 
it would not withdraw to the old armistice lines. In his academic work 
on the various negotiation efforts that took place during the time 
period at hand, Mordechai Gazit writes of the last sentence of Israel’s 
reply; where it was said that Israel would not withdraw to the old 
lines:
It was this last sentence which drew most of the fire. Israel ought 
not, it was contended, have put its position in the negative, and 
should not have stressed its refusal to withdraw to the June 1967 
lines. This contention, however, would seem ill-founded. Even if 
Israel had made her withdrawal merely conditional on the 
establishment of “agreed boundaries”, this answer would still 
have been considered unacceptable, because the notion “agreed 
boundaries” involves negotiations to settle where the boundaries 
will be, while Jarring’s aide-memoire altogether excluded 
negotiations between Israel and Egypt on the issue of territory.43
Gazit also argues that by demanding from Israel a complete 
withdrawal from the Sinai, Jarring had stopped being an impartial 
mediator, and instead come to side with one of the parties (i.e.
Egypt). 44
41 Thomas 1999, p. 196.
42 Benny Morris, for instance, quotes the American Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern Affairs Joseph Sisco as saying that “Israel will be considered 
responsible for the rejection of the best opportunity to achieve peace since the 
establishment of the state.” Morris 1999, p. 389.
43 Gazit 1983, p. 66f.
44 Ibid., p. 73.
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Whether or not something may have come out of Jarring’s 
proposal is of course difficult to say, and it is furthermore not the 
purpose of this whole exercise, but Egypt did answer in the 
affirmative (with some additional conditions) to its part of the 
proposal, whereas Israel answered in the negative. As such, Israel’s 
rejection of sorts can hardly be said to paint Israel in a particularly 
good light. Hence, the sources where Jarring’s proposal is discussed 
and Israel criticized are deemed to be pro-Arab in relation to this 
theme. The sources where the proposal is downplayed, not 
mentioned or presented as not being viable in the first place (see for 
instance above quote) are said to be pro-Israeli.
The Sadat plan
On September 28,1970, the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser 
died of a heart attack. Nasser was a very influential leader—both 
domestically and internationally—and when he was succeeded by his 
much less well-known deputy Anwar Sadat, it was unclear not only 
how long Sadat was going to stay in power but also what the 
implications were going to be with regards to Israel.
Sadat’s first real initiative concerning the conflict with Israel was 
his proposal in February 1971. As can be recalled from the above 
section on Jarring’s initiative, it was also first sounded in February 
and the fact of the matter is that both Sadat’s and Jarring’s plans 
were floated around simultaneously. This certainly led to some 
confusion—especially considering that neither initiative dealt with 
the other—but as the Jarring initiative lost in importance after 
Israel’s reply in late February, the Sadat plan became more central. 
The plan, as proposed by Sadat, was briefly that Israel was to 
withdraw from the eastern bank of the Suez Canal to positions 
further inland, and that Egypt could begin to open the canal for 
shipping and to rebuild the Egyptian cities on the western bank of the 
canal that had been seriously damaged in the War of Attrition. 
Sadat’s plan, he said as he presented it to the Egyptian National
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Assembly, was to be the first step for implementing UN Security 
Council Resolution 2 4 2 . 4 5
This plan was in fact quite similar to ideas that had already been 
communicated by Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan to Israeli 
press. The purpose of this idea, according to Dayan, was to reduce 
Egypt’s willingness to engage in another war with Israel. 
Nevertheless, the Sadat plan was received rather coldly in Israel, and 
although Israel never formally rejected it, its importance vanished to 
nothing as the negotiations over the details of the plan dragged on for 
months through the use of the US as a go-between.
The negotiations between Egypt and Israel over Sadat’s plan were 
quite complex; especially considering that they involved the United 
States as well. To add to the intricacy of the negotiations, there also 
seems to have been the case that the American Secretary of State 
William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had 
different agendas, which they transmitted to the different parties. 
There is no need to delve into these developments here. The question 
at hand, however, is initially how the sources discuss whether or not 
the plan was viable in the first place, and whether Israel in fact 
rejected it by stonewalling the plan. And, secondly, there is also the 
question of whether or not the plan is presented as being important.
In quite a few sources, the blame for why the plan did not 
materialize is laid at the feet of Is ra e li  This quote, for instance, 
which is from the book that accompanied the BBC series on the Arab- 
Israeli conflict sums up this argument quite succinctly:
In a speech to the Israeli Knesset five days later [i.e. after Sadat 
first launched his plan], Prime Minister Golda Meir responded to 
Sadat’s initiative. Gideon Rafael sums up this occasion: ‘After 
Sadat’s Februaiy 4th speech, I had strongly urged Golda to
45 See for example Gazit 1983, pp. 78-100.
46 See for instance Whetten 1974, p. I46ff; Quandt 1978, p. 18; Khouri 1985, p. 366; 
Schulze 1999, p. 45; and Lesch & Tschirgi 1998, p. 24.
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respond. In the Knesset on 9 Februaiy, she extended a finger to 
him -  not a handV
Although Israel never formally rejected the plan, its initial cold 
reception and insistence on small details ended the viability of the 
plan. The Sadat plan, in other words, ended up like so many other 
initiatives on the Arab-Israeli conflict: never formally rejected, but 
losing in momentum and finally ending up in the dustbin of failed 
proposals. In some sources, it is even said that Israel accepted the 
plan of sorts almost a year after it was first launched, but by that time 
Israel’s concessions were too small and too late.48
The question then is whether or not the Sadat plan was an 
important event in Egyptian-Israeli relations and if Israel in fact 
missed an opportunity. Former Irish diplomat Conor Cruise O’Brien, 
for example, is quite clear on this point: “After that great, historic 
initiative, things went on exactly as before, until the Yom Kippur 
War; and the reason for the Yom Kippur War was that they did go on 
exactly as b efore .”49 Israel, in other words, perhaps could have 
avoided the war that was to take place two years later if it had been 
more forthcoming regarding Sadat’s plan.
Where Israel is blamed for not acting more favorably to the plan, 
and where the plan is presented as a major breakthrough in 
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, it is given quite a bit of attention. This 
is not the case where the role of the plan is downplayed, or where 
Israel is not said to implicitly have rejected the p l a n . 5 0  There are a 
number of sources where the plan is not mentioned at all, and in 
others it is only touched upon briefly. In Mark Tessler’s massive work 
(around 900 pages) on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the peace moves at 
the time are presented in this manner: “While he had promised his
47 Bregman & El-Tahri, p. 108. Gideon Rafael headed Israel’s foreign ministry at the 
time.
48 See for example Shlaim 2000, p. 3o8f; and Morris 1999, p. 390.
49 O’Brien 1986, p. 505.
5° See for example Gazit 1983, pp. 94f, 124ft; Gainsborough 1986, p. i84f; and 
Sachar 1996, p. 696.
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countrymen that 1971 would be a ‘year of decision/ the year came and 
went with no important accomplishments, and the Egyptian 
president’s transparent excuses were satirically lampooned in 
Cairo.’V
In some other works, where the plan is discussed more 
extensively, both Israel and Egypt are said to share some of the blame 
for why the plan did not m a te r ia liz e s  The plan is also in one instance 
said to have been unreasonable from the very beginning and, 
implicitly, that Israel should not be blamed for its f a ilu r e s
The instances where the Sadat plan is presented as being an 
important initiative that could have led to some serious results, but 
that was implicitly rejected by Israel are here deemed to be pro-Arab. 
The reason for this is twofold: (1) that Egypt took the first step in 
trying to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict, or at least a 
peaceful interim agreement; and (2) that Israel rejected this plan by 
not being accommodating enough. Taking O’Brien’s view as 
presented above—that the plan could have led to the war of 1973 not 
having taken place at all—is even more damning of Israel. 
Downplaying the plan, not mentioning it or leaving the blame for why 
the plan did not succeed on both actors is here classified as being the 
pro-Israeli view. The reasoning here is that dealing with the plan in 
either of these three ways does not paint Israel in a bad light, as the 
pro-Arab view undoubtedly does.
Main themes: conclusion
In the above sections, some views were presented as being pro-Arab 
and some as being pro-Israeli with regard to the main themes that 
are discussed. Below follows two charts to illustrate how these views 
manifest themselves in the specific and general works respectively.
51 Tessler 1994, p. 478f.
s2 See for example Bickerton & Klausner 1991, p. 174; and Gawrych 2000, p. 129!.
53 Davis & Decter 1982, p. 44. In this work, the plan is presented as an American 
initiative, which Sadat made unreasonable by insisting that the Israeli withdrawal 
from the Suez Canal was only to be the first step for Israel withdrawing completely 
to the lines of pre-June 1967.
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Specific works, just to remind the reader, are the works that focus 
exclusively on the time period at hand, whereas the general works 
deal with a greater time span.
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Two things need to be brought forward. The first thing is that there is 
no bar for theme one. As can be recalled from above, theme one— 
which dealt with the secret Israeli cabinet decision—was rejected as a 
theme, as there were uncertainties as to how well-known this event 
was in the first place. The second thing that needs to be brought 
forward is that some works have been assigned as being ambiguous 
with regard to themes four and five in the specific works. As can be 
recalled from above, these two themes deal with the initiatives of 
Gunnar Jarring and Anwar Sadat respectively. The assignment of 
pro-Israeli/pro-Arab was made dependent on whether or not the 
initiatives were emphasized or not, and whether or not Israel is 
blamed for they not materializing. The problem with a few of the 
specific works is that they do not deal with this time period or with 
the various negotiations of the early 1 9 7 0 S .5 4  So, in other words, these 
works have been deemed to be ambiguous with regard to themes four 
and five.
Comparing the main themes in this chapter with those in the 
previous chapter on the War of 1967, it becomes obvious that the 
present ones are more disparate. They do not follow a more or less 
straight line of narrative—as was the case in the previous chapter— 
but are interspersed in the main narrative of what took place during 
the time period in question.
This has to do with the major difference between this time period 
and the War of 1967. In the accounts of the War of 1967, an event that 
took place over the course of a few weeks is described; while in this 
case, a greater time span is described that not only saw the events 
described above, but also the rise of the PLO as a more independent 
force, the beginnings of building Israeli settlements on the territories 
as well as some (it would turn out) major domestic changes in Israeli
54 Bentwich 1970; O’Ballance 1974; and Bar-Siman-Tov 1980. The first book was 
published in 1970, so it would for obvious reasons not include anything on the 
Jarring and Sadat initiatives. The latter works deal more or less exclusively with the 
War of Attrition and events that transpired prior to the war.
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society. For this reason, there is not the same continuity between the 
main themes in this chapter as in the pervious.
Going back to the graphs above, however, the same chaos of sorts 
as was shown in the previous chapter is clear here as well. What this 
means is that there is a wide spectrum of ways of approaching the 
issues presented. There are, in other words, not a majority of 
standard narratives. A pro-Israeli standard narrative would read 
something like this:
The Khartoum declaration was another instance of Arab 
intransigence and hostility towards Israel, and showed that there 
was no Arab willingness to settle the conflict peacefully. The War 
of Attrition was yet another instance of Arab aggression, and the 
Jarring and Sadat initiatives were not particularly viable or 
important [or they are not mentioned at all],
A pro-Arab standard narrative, on the other hand, could sound like 
this:
The Khartoum declaration was in fact moderate and paved the 
way for the Arab world being willing to solve the conflict 
politically. The so-called three noes are to be viewed as perhaps 
bargaining chips that could be discarded in exchange for 
substantial Israeli concessions. The War of Attrition was nothing 
but an Egyptian strategy for eventually settling its conflict with 
Israel through political means. Both the Jarring and the Sadat 
initiatives were important and viable and, had they not been 
rejected by Israel, they could have led to peace or at least to the 
War of 1973 never having taken place.
Just as in the case of the War of 1967, these two standard narratives 
give vastly different outlooks on what took place and how the events 
should be interpreted. But, as was also the case in the previous 
chapter, these standard narratives rarely appear. The authors have 
more control and freedom over what explanations they chose and 
what events they chose to concentrate on.
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Compared with the main themes in the previous chapter, there is 
only half the number of themes in this. They can be classified in the 
following manner:
(1) Theme where there are differences of opinion as to how 
interpret a particular text and its implications (theme 2);
(2) Theme where the intentions of a person or state are under 
dispute (theme 3);
(3) Themes where the importance, viability and the reasons 
behind the ultimate failure of a political initiative are looked 
upon differently (themes 4 and 5).
As far as the two first themes, it is fairly easy to say that they are 
merely instances of bias, as the term is used in this thesis to signify 
differences of opinion that have implications for how the antagonists 
are portrayed. The Khartoum declaration is quite problematic, and it 
is of course possible to make different inferences from it. The same 
goes for Nasser’s intentions for starting the War of Attrition. It is not 
possible to deduce from the archival source material what his 
intentions were, and whether you see it as merely an instance of Arab 
aggression or part of a larger strategy to solve the Egyptian-Israeli 
dispute politically is more or less just a difference in outlook.
The latter two themes, which are of course really quite similar, are 
more problematic from a bias/propaganda point of view. As already 
stated above, the works under investigation have been deemed pro- 
Arab for emphasizing the importance of either initiative (i.e. Jarring 
or Sadat) and that they were rejected by Israel. The classification as 
pro-Israeli, on the other hand, has been based on whether the source 
in question blames both sides (or only Egypt) for why the initiatives 
did not bring about anything tangible, downplays the initiatives and 
their importance (as compared with the pro-Arab sources) or simply 
does not mention the initiatives at all. The issue of which side is to 
blame and whether or not the initiatives in fact were important is of
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course mostly a judgment call. Or, to put it differently, these are 
questions of interpretations, and as such are to be considered bias 
within the framework of this thesis. When it comes to the question of 
not even including the two initiatives, it is more difficult to assess 
whether we are speaking of mere bias or propaganda. As the two 
initiatives hardly can be said to “work in Israel’s favor,” it is tempting 
to say that by not even including mention of them, the author has 
deliberately chosen to mislead his or her readers. It could also be the 
case, however, that the author simply views the initiatives as 
irrelevant enough to not even include them. It should probably not be 
an issue of whether or not the authors are aware of these two 
initiatives, as they are discussed in quite a few sources and 
apparently received a fair amount of attention when they were 
current in the early 1970s. Whether or not one should look at not 
including mention of either the Jarring or the Sadat initiatives as 
simple bias or propaganda is a judgment call, but it is to be construed 
as pro-Israeli.
Further observations
There are besides the five main themes discussed above a number of 
minor controversies or interesting items in the sources. These are: (1) 
the nature of Israel’s decision to begin to carry out aerial bombings in 
the Egyptian interior during the War of Attrition; (2) the more 
general question of why there was no peace during this time period; 
and (3) the role of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. These are 
discussed below.
In January 1970, during the War of Attrition discussed above, Israel 
made the decision to escalate the war further by beginning to bomb 
military targets in the Egyptian interior (mostly around Cairo and in
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the Nile Delta). There are a number of reasons quoted in the sources 
for why the Israelis choose this line of action. Some of these include 
that Israel sought to relieve pressure on its troops along the Suez 
Canal, that Israel wanted to force Egypt to end the war and that the 
in-depth bombings were initiated in order to, if possible, lead to the 
overthrow of President Nasser. Whatever the goals were behind 
Israel’s decision, the in-depth bombings did not lead to the war 
ending, but rather to it being further escalated as the Soviet Union 
became more directly involved with assisting its ally.
What is interesting here is the claim that Israel sought Nasser’s 
overthrow through its bombing campaign. There is no instance in the 
sources where Israeli leaders are said to have said publicly that this 
was a goal, but there are sources where Israeli politicians are quoted 
as saying that they would not mourn Nasser’s disappearance or that a 
change of regime in Egypt would not be a bad thing.55 In other 
sources, the authors simply arrive at the conclusion that removing 
Nasser was part of the goals involved with the in-depth bombings, 
while others only mention the more military strategic aims as 
described above. 56
The whole topic of why Israel decided to embark on its in-depth 
bombings is not dealt with in the majority of sources, but it is 
interesting in the sense that stating that Israel sought Nasser’s 
removal is quite unfavorable to Israel. The reason for this is that it is 
common inter-state practice not to interfere in the domestic political 
situation of each other. This concept is also firmly entrenched in the 
UN Charter. Needless to say, meddling in domestic politics has 
always been done by states, and it seems as if this formal taboo may 
be disappearing when it comes to the world community and so-called 
rouge states. But, nevertheless, saying that part of Israel’s goals for
55 See Korn 1992, pp. 176-84; and Morris 1999, p. 355.
s6 For examples of the former view see, in addition to the references in the previous 
footnote, Smith 1988, p. 219; and Shlaim 2000, p. 292. For examples of the latter 
view, see for instance Bar-Siman-Tov 1980, p. 117!.; Gilbert 1998, p. 413; Bregman 
2000, p. 64; and Gawrych 2000, p. 114.
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initiating the in-depth bombings was to have Nasser overthrown is 
not particularly flattering for Israel.
Another important aspect of the works analyzed is the whole question 
of why the time period in question did not produce any peaceful 
solutions to the conflict, but was in fact only an “in-between period” 
between two armed conflicts. This question is really quite central, but 
there a r e — p e r h a p s  surprisingly—only a few sources where this is 
discussed. There are—perhaps not too surprisingly—three 
perspectives on why there ultimately was no peace: that both sides 
are to blame, that the Arabs are to blame and that Israel is to blame. 
Historian Kirsten Schulze has laid part of the blame on both parties, 
or perhaps even on the situation in general, quite concisely: “Israel’s 
strong position after the war did not encourage concessions, while 
the Arabs’ weak position made it impossible to become an equal 
negotiating p a r t n e r .  ” 57 The other views are discussed below.
In a few sources, it is said that Israel did everything in its power to 
achieve a peaceful settlement after the War of 1967. That this did not 
materialize is either implicitly or explicitly blamed on the Arabs. The 
declaration of Khartoum is, for instance, presented as a clear example 
of continued Arab hostility towards Israel and it is presented as being 
a guiding light for the Arab states in the following years.58
During this time period, the impression is given in some sources 
that the greatest chances for a peaceful settlement existed between 
Israel and Egypt, as compared with the other neighboring states to 
Israel. But, it is argued in some sources, it was mainly due to Israeli 
inflexibility and intransigence that the dispute was not settled 
p o l i t i c a l l y . 5 9  Israel did seek peace of sorts, but i t  was to be on its own 
terms and only in accordance with its needs:
57 Schulze 1999, p. 41.
58 See for example Gazit 1983, p. I24ff.; Bickerton & Klausner 1991, p. 163; Dolan 
1991, p. 131; and Bard 1999, p. 242ff.
59 See for example Whetten 1974, pp. 302ff, 326; O’Brien 1986, pp. 505-10; and 
Khouri 1985, p. 365.
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Israeli insistence that its security required dealing with the Arabs 
from a position of military strength was the prime factor in 
prolonging the conflict. A resumption of hostilities after six years 
of fruitless attempts to start negotiations was the harsh price the 
Israelis had to pay for not learning the lesson that their demand 
for essentially an unconditional surrender ran counter to their 
true security interests.60
The general question of who was to blame for why there was no 
peaceful settlement during the time of 1967-73—and hence perhaps 
for why the War of 1973 took place—is curiously enough only dealt 
with explicitly in a few sources, but it is of course dealt with implicitly 
in the majority of sources. The smaller main themes are of course all 
part of the larger question of why there was no peace.
Closely related to the view that Israel was to blame for why the years 
in question produced no substantial results is the view that a great 
deal of the blame is to be put on the shoulders of the person who was 
Israel’s prime minister during most of the time in question, Golda 
Meir. She is in some sources presented as having personally ended 
the developments that could in have led to peace. Former American 
diplomat David Korn has written the following:
Her critics joked that Golda Meir had not had a new idea since the 
1920s. Though she had lived in the Middle East for more than 
forty years, her image of the Arabs could hardly have been more 
stereotyped. She denied absolutely that there existed a Palestinian 
people. She never tired of saying that she for years had challenged 
those who claimed peace was attainable to bring her a live Arab 
who would say publicly that he was ready to accept Israel and 
make peace with it. No one had been able to do it before, and she 
did not think anyone ever really would.61
60 Whetten 1974, p. 326.
61 Korn 1992, p. I4if.
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Others have also concentrated on Meir’s inflexibility, stubbornness 
and apathy with regard to Israel’s relations with its neighbors.62 The 
question then is why Meir is singled out. The personalities of both 
Nasser as well as Sadat are of course also evaluated upon in the 
sources—both positively and negatively—but the reasons why authors 
would want to do that are more clear; in a more authoritarian 
country like Egypt during the time in question, personalities are 
generally more important than in democratic countries like Israel,
It could be that putting a large deal of blame on Golda Meir is 
apologetics of sorts. To say, in other words, that Israel was inflexible 
during the time in question, but that was largely because of this one 
person. There could have been peace between Egypt and Israel if 
Meir had not been prime minister during this time, and it is not 
“Israel” that should be blamed for this but rather Prime Minister 
Golda Meir.
It could also be that the harsh criticism that Meir receives in some 
sources is merely another example of holding women to a different 
standard than men. It has been said that another female prime 
minister, Margaret Thatcher, was judged more harshly—both while 
she was in office and afterwards—for no other reason than being a 
woman. If this is indeed the case is naturally very hard to determine, 
but it can be construed as being, so to say, food for thought.
This section ends with another quote, which shows not only how 
Meir is criticized but also the view that Israel could have had peace if 
only she had acted differently:
Golda Meir’s premiership was marked by a stubborn refusal to 
reevaluate Israel’s relations with the Arab world. She personally 
had no understanding of the Arabs, no empathy with them, and 
no faith in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with them. This 
bolstered a simplistic view of the world in which Israel could do 
no wrong and the Arabs no right. More than most Israeli leaders, 
she exhibited the siege mentality, the notion that Israel had to
62 See O’Brien 1986, pp. 505-510; Viorst 1987, p. 138; Bregman 2000, p. 167; and 
Shlaim 2000, p. 323!.
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barricade itself behind an iron wall, the fatalistic belief that Israel 
was doomed forever to live by the sword. Meir was a formidable 
war leader, but her own policy of immobilism was largely 
responsible for the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. In her five 
years as prime minister she made two monumental mistakes. 
First, she turned down Jarring’s suggestion that Israel should 
trade Sinai for peace with Egypt, the very terms on which the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was to be based eight years later. 
Second, she turned down Sadat’s proposal for an interim 
settlement, thus leaving him no option except to go to war in 
order to subvert an intolerable status quo .63
63 Shlaim 2000, p. 323!
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Introduction
The War of 1973 was either the fourth or the fifth Arab-Israeli, 
depending on how you count.1 (In some cases, the Egyptian-Israeli 
War of Attrition is not referred to as having been a war in the larger 
meaning of the word, but rather just skirmishes.) The war is not only 
referred to as the War of 1973, but also as the Yom Kippur War, the 
Ramadan War (or a derivative thereof) or the October War. The war 
broke out on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur and was mostly 
fought during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. This is how one 
author of one of the sources used discusses the different names of the 
war:
The war between the Arabs and the Israelis, which broke out in 
the Middle East on 6 October 1973, is known to the Arabs as the 
“War of Ramadan,” to the Israelis as the “Yom Kippur War,” and 
generally to nonpartisans in the West as the “October War of 
1973-”2
This war is different from probably all the earlier wars in the sense 
that there is no question as which side fired the first shot (either 
actually or metaphorically). All accounts of the war agree that the war 
began with a coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria on Israel, an
1 The earlier wars having been, in chronological order: The War of 1948, The Suez 
War of 1956, The War of 1967 and the 1969-1970 War of Attrition.
2 Edgar O’Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, 
CA: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 1. It is of course interesting to note that O’Ballance 
after discussing the implications of which name to use for the war then decides on 
the name of Yom Kippur War in the title of his book.
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attack that had been planned months in advance. As will be seen 
below, the reasons for this war, however, are disputed. Below follows 
a brief outline of the main events of the war:
October 6: Egypt and Syria attack Israel in a surprise attack; crossing 
the Suez Canal and breaking through into the Golan Heights. 
October 8: Israel launches an unsuccessful counterattack on Egypt. 
October 9-11: The Israeli army is able to drive the Syrians out of the 
Golan, and also captures additional Syrian territoiy.
October 14: Egypt launches a new offensive from its narrow 
bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. This offensive 
is repelled by Israel.
October 15: A small Israeli unit crosses the Suez Canal and sets up a 
bridgehead on the western bank.
October 16-22: Israeli positions on the western bank of the canal are 
improved and it seems as if the Egyptian Third Army, which is 
positioned on the eastern side of the canal, is about to be 
completely cut off.
October 22: United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution 
calling for a cease-fire.
October 22-25: The cease-fire is broken and Israel is able to capture 
more territoiy on the western bank of the canal.
October 25: The cease-fire finally comes into effect and the war ends.
With the exception of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the War 
of 1973 was to be the last inter-state war in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
And—but of course with the benefit of hindsight—after the war and 
the subsequent disengagement agreements between the parties, it is 
quite possible to say that the Arab-Israeli conflict had shifted from 
being a primarily inter-state conflict between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors to a conflict that above all involved Israel and the 
Palestinians. This, quite naturally, did not happen overnight, but the
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War of 1973 probably did play a part in accelerating this already 
visible development.
So, in other words, the War of 1973, just as the War of 1967, was 
an important event in the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Contraiy 
to that armed conflict, however, there is not as much controversy in 
the historiography surrounding the War of 1973, and this is clear 
when looking at the main themes of this chapter. The themes are 
discussed below, but first follows an introduction to the sources used.
Sources
Compared with the literature on the War of 1967, there is less written 
on the War of 1973. This is perhaps because there are less 
controversial points surrounding the war, that the war was not seen 
as great of an event as the War of 1967 or simply the fact that there 
were no additional journalists in the region when the war broke out. 
As can be recalled from the chapter on the War of 1967, there were 
many journalists in the Middle East in the weeks leading up to the 
war and many of these wrote books while there or after their return. 
The War of 1973, by contrast, was not expected so there were no 
more journalists than usual in the region.
As with the case of the literature on the War of 1967, there is a 
disparate group of books used in this present analysis. There is a 
highly illustrated book that on the surface looks almost like a 
children’s book, but is on closer inspection obviously written with an 
adult readership in mind.3 Then there is the book written by an 
Egyptian Marxist journalist, who focuses on what the results of the
3 David Eshel, Mid-East Wars: The Yom Kippur War (Hod Hasharon, Israel: 
Eshel-Dramit, 1978).
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war were and what they will be for the futures There is an anthology 
of articles on the war written by Israeli academics, and then there is a 
similar anthology composed of articles written by Arabs.5
Most of the works are nevertheless quite similar accounts written 
by Western academics or journalists. The main focus in a great 
number of these works is on the military aspects of the actual war, as 
the war itself is quite interesting from a more strict militaiy point of 
view. First, the fact that it was a successfully executed surprise attack 
is of interest. Second, the fact that the Egyptian army had to 
somehow cross the Suez Canal in order to engage the Israelis is also 
interesting from a military tactical perspective. Thirdly, the fact that 
the Israeli army was able to turn the tables and launch a canal 
crossing of its own is another interesting aspect of the war from a 
military point of view. And finally, like so many wars, the War of 1973 
saw the use of new weapons or the use of new tactics with old 
weapons. In this case, it was the use of various anti-tank weapons 
used by the Egyptian and Syrian infantry.
4 Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, After the Guns Fall Silent: Peace or Armageddon in the 
Middle-East (London: Croom Helm, 1976).
5 See P.R. Kumaraswamy (ed.), Revisiting the Yom Kippur War (London & 
Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000) and Naseer H. Aruri, Middle East Crucible: 
Studies on the Arab-Israeli War o f October 1973 (Wilmette, IL: The Medina 
University Press International, 1975) respectively.
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Main Themes
Compared to the War of 1967, the accounts of the War of 1973 do not 
include as many various points of controversy (or main themes as 
they are referred to in this thesis). With regard to the War of 1973, 
there are three main themes and they are discussed below:
(1) The nature of the Arab war aims;
(2) The question of which side broke the first cease-fire of October 
22,1973; ,
(3) The issue of which sides ultimately should be viewed as being 
responsible for the war.
The nature of the Arab war aims
The War of 1973 was the result of a coordinated surprise attack by 
Egypt and Syria, and this attack came about after a great deal of 
planning that had taken place beforehand. So, as already mentioned 
above, the War of 1973 is quite different from the War of 1967 as at 
least one of the warring parties wanted the war to take place when it 
did and had some conceptual idea behind what should be 
accomplished with this use of force. This is not in dispute. What is 
disputed, however, are the aims of the Arab states.
One perspective on this is to present Egypt and Syria as having 
nothing but political goals with the war. The war, in other words, was 
fought not so much to gain territory, but for what were ultimately 
political reasons. In the view of an Egyptian journalist writing on the 
war, there could only be three possible reasons for why the Arab 
states launched the war: (1) to exterminate the state of Israel; (2) to 
recapture the territories captured by Israel in 1967; or (3) to use the 
war for political purposes to achieve a negotiated solution to the
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conflict.6 The following quote discussing the Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat’s decision for launching the war illustrates this last 
view:
Sadat was not suggesting a full-scale war against Israel, but a 
limited war. The main aim of this was to break the stalemate. As 
Shazly [the Egyptian chief of staff] recalls, Sadat said to his 
commanders, Tf you get back ten centimetres of Sinai, I can solve 
the problem.’ The idea of a limited war was both new and 
controversial. It meant, in effect, that Sadat was prepared to 
compromise and to accept that a limited war would only liberate 
part of the land occupied by the Israelis during the 1967 War. By 
the same token, it implied that Sadat would consider negotiating 
the remaining portions of Egypt’s occupied land -  this was an 
unthinkable proposition for most Egyptians who had been swayed 
by a decade of rhetoric that had focused on revenge and the 
destruction of Israeli
The Arabs, in other words, saw the war as the first step in the process 
of having their territories lost in 1967 returned. Although starting an 
armed conflict quite naturally is aggressive in nature, this is 
mitigated by the fact that the goals of the war ultimately were not 
military (i.e. aggressive) in nature. On the contrary, they were 
political (i.e. peaceful).8
The other view on the question of Arab war aims is that the war was 
fought either to recapture the territories lost in 1967, or to go even 
further and brake into Israel proper. In other words, the Arab war 
objectives were ultimately aggressive in nature.? There are different 
views on the level of Arab belligerence: on the one end there is for 
instance American journalist David Dolan who simply says that
6 Sid-Ahmed 1976, p. 27. Although the author believes that recapturing the lost 
territories by force would be considered a legitimate undertaking, the war was 
launched for political reasons.
7 Bregman & El-Tahri 1998, p. 114! Emphasis in orginal.
8 See for example Bregman & El-Tahri 1998, p. 114ft.; Donald Neff, Warriors 
against Israel: How Israel Won the Battle to Become America's Ally 1973 
(Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988), p. 306; O’Ballance 1978, p. I3ff.; O’Brien 
1986, p. 512-21; Avraham Sela, “The 1973 Arab War Coalition: Aims, Coherence, 
and Gain-Distribution” in Kumaraswamy 2000, p. 56; and Shlaim 2000, p. 319.
? Bard 1999, p. 246; Davis & Decter 1982, p. 47f; and Sachar 1996, p. 748,
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“[t]he full-scale Arab jihad was renewed on Saturday afternoon, 
October 6, 1973.”10 At the other end of the spectrum are those who 
present the Arab war objectives as an attempt to recapture the lost 
territories of 1967. The war was in other words not fought to destroy 
the state of Israel, but rather with the more limited objective of 
recovering lost Egyptian and Syrian lands.11 But, even though this 
presents the Arabs in a less belligerent light than the view that the 
war was fought to destroy the Jewish state, this perspective still 
portrays the Arab side in a negative and aggressive manner. The 
reason for this being that the Arabs at the end of the day chose not to 
try to achieve a negotiated settlement, but rather impose their own. 
Compared with the perspective that the war just a stepping-stone 
toward a negotiated settlement—and not a means to an end in itself— 
this view does portray Egypt and Syria in a more negative light. 
Needless to say, the perception that the Arabs fought the war in order 
to destroy Israel is also really quite negative of the Arab states in 
question. There is also the view where the war is presented as a 
means both to recover lost land as well as wiping out Israel:
Egypt’s aim was to recover the whole of Sinai, and if they had 
succeeded in overrunning the passes and the opportunity had 
been present the Arabs would have gone on to demolish Israel as 
state and hand over the country to the Palestinians,12
In the original classifications of the main themes, the former view— 
that the objective of Egypt and Syria was to regain some of their lost 
territory in order to negotiate a final settlement—was deemed to be 
pro-Arab. This is because it paints the Arab states as being less 
aggressive than in the latter view where the objective is either 
presented as recapturing all of the lost territories or destroying Israel.
10 Dolan 1991, p. 132.
11 See Frank Aker, October 1973: The Arab-Israeli War (Hamden, CN: Archon 
Books, 1985), p. 19. Here, Egypt is presented as seeking to recapture its lost 
territories, whereas Syria is described as seeking to win a complete victory over 
Israel. See also Gainsborough 1986, p. 183.
12 A.J. Barker, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), p. 97.
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This view is classified as being the pro-Israeli view. So are also the 
sources where there is no reason given for the Arab attack. Not 
discussing possible objectives for the attack is in other words 
classified as being pro-Israeli, as presenting the view of two states 
attacking another without any objective is probably not to be 
construed as nothing but sheer aggression.^
There is, however, a problem with the above classification. In a 
number of sources, the view is presented whereby Egypt is said to 
have had limited and political goals with the war, whereas Syria is 
said to have had the goal of either recapturing the whole of the Golan 
or even to break into Israel proper.^ So, in other words, the objective 
of one party is described in pro-Arab terms while the objective of the 
second party is described from a pro-Israeli stance. There are three 
ways of approaching this problem. The first is to deem all these 
sources as being ambiguous. There is an inherent contradiction in 
relation to the theme, and hence the sources are of no use regarding 
this. The second and third way to approach this question is to deem 
these sources as either being pro-Israeli or pro-Arab: although one 
party is presented as being more peaceful the other is portrayed as 
being more belligerent. The question then is which of the two 
designations is the more accurate: pro-Arab or pro-Israeli?
Although this is quite naturally a judgment call—which by its very 
nature is not scientific in the proper sense of the word—it could be 
argued that presenting the view of Egypt having limited, political 
goals with the war whereas Syria had larger, more military guided 
goals is in fact pro-Arab. This is primarily due to two factors.
First, Egypt at the time was (and perhaps still is) the most 
important Arab state. In most works on the Arab-Israeli conflict in
!3 See for example Michael I Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case 
of the Yom Kippur War, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 19 (Jerusalem: 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976); Lesch & Tschirgi 1998; and Samuel 1989.
See Jerry Asher & Eric Hammel, Duel fo r the Golan: The 100-Hour Battle that 
Saved Israel (New York: William Morrow, 1987), p. 19k; Peter Allen, The Yom 
Kippur War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982), pp. 20f., 83; Bailey 1990, 
p. 310; Bickerton & Klausner 1991, p. I75f.| Bregman 2000, pp. 71, 83; Schulze 
1999, p. 45f.; and Thomas 1999, p. 198.
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general or the War of 1973 in particular, Egypt is given a much 
greater deal of attention than Syria. Hence, even though Syria’s goals 
are presented as being more aggressive than Egypt’s (i.e. the pro- 
Israeli view), the image being projected is that of a more reasonable 
and less belligerent Arab side as Egypt is given more attention.
Second, the goals of the Arab states in question are actually 
presented as being different. This in itself is probably to be construed 
as being pro-Arab. The reason for this is that in traditional pro-Israeli 
accounts, there is usually a “lumping together” of all the Arab actors. 
The Arabs is one large group that can consist of the whole Arab 
world, a few Arab states, the Palestinians, etc. Be that as it may, but 
when the disparate Arab actors are combined into a single group they 
are in most cases presented in a negative light (see for instance the 
above quote on the Arabs restarting their jihad above). The Arabs are 
in some sense united in their hatred of Israel. So, emphasizing that 
Egypt and Syria did have different goals with the war does present 
the Arab side in a more pluralistic and arguably less aggressive 
manner.
Nevertheless, however, this aspect of the theme is problematic, 
and it is further discussed in the conclusion of the main themes in 
this chapter, as well as in the concluding chapter of this thesis where 
the methodology used is evaluated.
The broken cease-fire of October 2 2 .1Q73
As a result of joint US-Soviet negotiations, a United Nations Security 
Council resolution was presented early in the morning of October 22 
(New York time). This resolution (Security Council Resolution 338) 
called for a general cease-fire to go into effect no later than twelve 
hours after it was adopted. This resolution was to end the war, but 
the issue at hand concerns the fact that the war continued for another 
few days until October 25. The cease-fire was in other words broken 
and the question here is that there are two different views as to which 
side violated it.
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As can be recalled, the war on the northern front had by October 
22 more or less come to a standstill. The Syrians and Israelis were 
still fighting and there were skirmishes taking place between the two 
parties for months after the war officially ended, but there were no 
major troop movements after the October 22 cease-fire went into 
effect. The war on the northern front had already essentially come to 
an end by that time. On the southern front, however, the war was still 
very hot at the time when the October 22 cease-fire was declared.
Israeli troops had already crossed the Suez Canal a week prior, 
and had improved their positions quite drastically during that time. 
The Egyptian Third Army—which was stationed on the eastern bank 
of the canal—looked like it could be completely cut off as the Israeli 
army gained more ground on the western bank. By October 22, the 
Egyptian Third Army was still not completely encircled, but by the 
time the fighting finally ended on October 25, it was.
This is where there are differing views as to what happened. There is 
on the one hand the view that the cease-fire came at a time when the 
Egyptian and Israeli forces were very mixed-up and where there were 
no clear front lines. In what most likely began as smaller skirmishes 
soon led to the fighting continuing until the situation on the ground 
was “cleaner” and a cease-fire more sustainable. So, it was in other 
words both sides that broke the cease-fire.^
Another way of presenting the broken cease-fire is simply to 
ignore the cease-fire being broken. The war is then presented as 
having ended on either October 22 (the date of the first cease-fire 
resolution) or October 25 (the date of the last cease-fire resolution), 
and there is no mention of the cease-fire having been broken by 
either of the parties.16
See for example Aker 1985, p. 120; Allen 1982, pp. 224, 228f.; Barker 1974, p. 
137; Bickerton & Klausner 1991, p. 178; Gilbert 1998, p. 458; and Sachar 1996, p. 
781.
16 See for example Eshel 1978, p. 74f.; Lesch & Tschirgi 1998, p. 26; Samuel 1989, p. 
138ft.; andTessler 1994, p. 476f.
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Yet another manner of presenting the broken cease-fire is to say 
that it was primarily broken by Israel. This is how Milton Viorst 
discusses Israel breaking the cease-fire:
But having grudgingly accepted the agreement, the Israelis 
immediately found excuses to violate it. Determined to punish 
Egypt for the effrontery of starting the war, they continued to 
move forward, tightening the ring at the rear of the Third Army, 
enlarging their military options to include the capture of Cairo or, 
at least, the surrender of Egypt’s forces.1?
Israel, in other words, deliberately violated the cease-fire in order to 
encircle the Egyptian Third Army. Completely surrounding the 
Egyptian force—and thus being able to control its access to food and 
water—would be beneficial for Israel in the disengagement talks 
likely to take place after the war, this line of thinking goes.18 In some 
sources it is also said that Israel had the approval of Henry Kissinger, 
the American secretary of state, in breaking the cease-fire in order to 
further improve its positions.1? Israeli historian Benny Morris, 
furthermore, argues that although the cease-fire was broken by both 
Egypt and Israel, the difference is that the Israeli violations were 
sanctioned by the Israeli cabinet and high command. The Egyptian 
violations, on the other hand, were locally initiated.20
Emphasizing that the initial cease-fire was broken largely by Israel is 
of course quite damning of this country, as a United Nations Security 
Council resolution is to be followed. Accepting a cease-fire resolution 
and then breaking it in order to improve its situation is not fair play. 
So, the view that Israel was the party that primarily broke the cease­
x7 Viorst 1987, p. 166.
18 See for example al-Haytham al-Ayoubi, “The Strategies of the Fourth Campaign” 
in Aruri 1975, p. 96; Gainsborough 1986, p. 182; Gerner 1994, p. 116; Walter 
Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New York: 
Quadrangle/The New York Times Books, 1974), p. io8ff, 197; O’Ballance 1978, p. 
256f.; Khouri 1985, p. 370; and Smith 1988, p. 231,
w See for example Fraser 1995, p. 103; Morris 1999, p. 435f.; and Neff 1988, p. 
270k
20 Morris 1999, p. 430.
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fire is henceforth termed as being the pro-Arab view. Conversely, 
either saying that both sides violated the cease-fire or simply not 
mentioning that the first cease-fire was broken is then termed the 
pro-Israeli view. This is more in opposition to the pro-Arab view that 
Israel was the insubordinate party than that the view that both 
parties broke the cease-fire implicitly is more positive towards Israel. 
Saying, in other words, that both parties broke the cease-fire or 
simply ignoring the question of blame does not paint Israel in a 
positive light per se, but this perspective should be seen in contrast to 
the pro-Arab view that paints Israel in a negative light.
Responsibility for the war
Compared to the War of 1967, the War of 1973 is more 
straightforward as to which side, so to say, fired the first shot. It was 
the Arab states. Egypt and Syria began the war—this is not in 
dispute—but the question then is why. The time period between 1967 
and 1973, as described in the above chapter, saw some moves 
towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict between (arguably) 
the most important parties: Egypt and Israel. Nothing, however, 
came from these steps. And, this is where the question of blame for 
the War of 1973 ultimately lays according to the sources where this 
issue is discussed.
As is the usually the case, there are two different views of which 
side is to blame for the war. One view places this blame on the 
shoulders of Israel. Israel, it is said, was quite content with the status 
quo that had developed after its victory in 1967. The Arabs, or at least 
Egypt, had sought to regain their lost territories through political 
means, but this had failed due to Israeli intransigence:
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The principal reasons for the October War of 1973 were that Egypt 
and Syria sought to recover their own territories seized by Israel 
in 1967, after they had exhausted, without success, all diplomatic 
means to secure Israel’s withdrawal, and to free their soil from 
foreign occupation.21
Or, as put forward quite succinctly by Irish diplomat Conor Cruise 
O’Brien:
The Yom Kippur War could have been avoided if the Government 
of Golda Meir, under the ascendancy of Moshe Dayan, had not 
acted on the assumption that Israeli needed no foreign policy, 
only a defense policy.22
So, even though Syria and Egypt started the war, the ultimate blame 
should be placed at the feet of Israel. Had Israel been more 
forthcoming and willing to compromise, the War of 1973 would never 
have taken p laces
The other view of looking at this is to blame the Arab states for the 
war. As there is no question of which side started the war, putting 
blame on the Arabs is in some cases done by just not indicating any 
Israeli responsibility. By just mentioning that the Arabs began the 
war without delving into any real or perceived Israeli responsibility, 
the question of blame is quite easily transferred to the Arab states. 
This is in other words blame by implication.^
Another perspective on the question of ultimate blame for the 
War of 1973 is to more explicitly say that the Arab states were to 
blame. Here, a basic Arab unwillingness to live in peace with Israel is 
sometimes referred to: “Meanwhile, rather than reconciling
21 Gainsborough 1986, p. 183.
22 O’Brien 1986, p. 510.
2s For examples of this view, see al-Ayoubi 1975, p. 6sff.; Gerner 1994, p. 115; Kouri 
1985, p. 364f.; Laqueur 1974, p. 254f.; Lesch & Tschirgi 1998, p. 25; Morris 1999, p. 
388ff.; O’Ballance 1978, p. 13; Sela 2000, p. 44ff.; Shlaim 2000, p. 319; and Viorst 
1987, p. i6of.
24 See for example Allen 1982; Bickerton & Klausner 1991; Blumberg 1998; Eshel 
1978; Gilbert 1998; Handel 1976; and Samuel 1989.
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themselves to Israel’s existence, the Arab states looked for a way to 
avenge the humiliation of their defeat.”as The War of 1973 was, in 
other words, merely another instance of Arab aggression and 
inflexibility. As Israel can and could not negotiate on the 
fundamentals of its own existence, it bears no responsibility for the 
war.
As the first view sees the war as something that could be blamed 
on Israel, this perspective is termed the pro-Arab view. And, 
conversely, the second view, which sees the war as being the Arabs’ 
“fault,” is deemed the pro-Israeli view.
Main themes: conclusion
One of the main differences between the main themes related to the 
War of 1973 and the previous aspects of the conflict discussed above, 
is that there are fewer points of controversy. As can be recalled from 
the War of 1967, there were many different points where the sources 
disagreed. Another difference between the previous chapters and the 
present is that there is perhaps more of a tilt towards a pro-Arab 
perspective than was previously the case. Below follows in table form 
the distribution between the views held in reference to the different 
themes:
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3
Figure I: Distribution of views in the specific works
25 Bard 1999, p. 246. For other examples of this view, see Barker 1974; Davis & 
Decter 1982, p. 45ff.; and Dolan 1991, p. 132.
□ Pro-Israeli ■ Pro-Arab □ Ambiguous
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□ Pro-Israeli ■ Pro-Arab □ Ambiguous
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Figure II: Distribution of views in the general works
So, as one can see from the above graphs there is a definite pro-Arab 
tilt with regard to themes one and three in at least the general works, 
whereas the views held with regards to theme two are more evenly 
distributed. Themes one and three, as can be recalled, deal with the 
objectives of the Arab states and the ultimate responsibility for the 
war respectively. They are in other words more interpretative than 
theme two, which deals with the more down-to-earth matter of who 
broke the October 22 cease-fire.
The question then is why there is such a clear pro-Arab tilt with 
regard to theme one. Part of the answer lies in the way the theme was 
initially classified: even those sources that present Syria as having 
maximalist goals while Egypt’s are more political and limited in 
nature have been deemed pro-Arab (see above). There are quite a few 
sources that hold exactly this perspective, and it is of course 
problematic to determine that Syria having maximalist goals 
(regardless of Egypt’s objectives) is to be regarded as pro-Arab. Or, 
putting it differently, it is quite clear that presenting both Syria and 
Egypt as having limited, political objectives with the war clearly can 
be construed as being pro-Arab, while both states having different 
agendas is more problematic. The best way to deal with this problem
4
9
118
4
1 T
Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3
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would probably be to classify the sources in three different categories: 
pro-Arab (both states having limited objectives), pro-Israeli (both 
states having more aggressive goals) and something like an 
intermediate pro-Arab. Using this classification, we would have the 
following distribution (the sources deemed ambiguous have been 
excluded due to clarity):
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Figure III: Distribution of views in relation to theme one (Arab 
war aims)
Although the term “intermediate pro-Arab” is not particularly good, 
the above chart shows that there are quite a few sources that walk the 
middle ground between the clearly pro-Arab and pro-Israeli sources. 
What this illustrates though is that in some instances the dyad of pro- 
Arab/pro-Israeli is kind of a rough tool, and that sometimes there is 
the need for a classification that describes more of a middle ground. 
This issue is discussed further in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis, where problems found when using this methodology are 
discussed.
□ Pro-Israeli □ Intermediate pro-Arab ■ Pro-Arab
6
2
83
T
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In this chapter, there are three different kinds of themes:
(1) Theme where the intentions/objectives of two parties are 
under dispute (theme one);
(2) Theme where what actually happened is under dispute (theme 
two);
(3) Theme where it is disputed how to interpret a larger historical 
event (theme three).
Just like the case with the earlier chapters the points of controversy— 
or main themes as they are called in this thesis—are quite diverse in 
their scope and significance. Themes one and three (i.e. regarding the 
Arab states’ objective and the ultimate blame for the war) are more 
interpretive in nature and should be looked upon as being nothing 
but bias as the term is used in this thesis. They represent nothing but 
mere differences of opinion, and it would be difficult (or perhaps 
even impossible) to decide empirically and conclusively which 
perspective is correct.
When it comes to theme two (on the broken cease-fire), it would 
seem as it would be possible to determine with greater accuracy 
which perspective is the correct. Was the cease-fire broken primarily 
by Israel or by both sides? In theory it is probably feasible to answer 
this question conclusively, but part of the problem is that you would 
have to rely mostly on the accounts provided by the parties directly 
involved (i.e. Egypt and Israel), as there does not seem to have been 
any non-partisan observers present at the time. This could change of 
course if new material would surface, but for the time being the 
question of the broken cease-fire should be looked upon as being 
more a question of bias than willful propaganda.
In the previous chapters, the question of standard narratives is 
raised. One problem with the War of 1973 is that there are not many 
points of controversy, and subsequently only three main themes.
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There is also the problem of the objectives of Syria and Egypt raised 
above. Nevertheless, a standard pro-Israeli narrative of the War of 
1973 would probably look something like this:
On October 6,1973, Egypt and Syria in an act of aggression with 
the aim of retaking their lost territories and if possible carry the 
war further attacked Israel without any prior warning. The UN 
sponsored cease-fire of October 22 was broken by both Egypt and 
Israel, and the war did not end until October 25. The Arab states, 
with their inability to live in peace with Israel, are to blame.
A pro-Arab standard narrative, on the other hand, would perhaps 
come out something like this:
On October 6,1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in a surprise 
attack. The objective of the war was to break the deadlock and to 
eventually reach a negotiated settlement for the return of the 
territories lost in 1967. The UN sponsored cease-fire of October 
22 was primarily broken by Israel in order to improve its position 
on the ground and to encircle the Egyptian Third Army. Israel is 
largely to blame for the war, as its intransigence left Egypt and 
Syria with no other choice than armed conflict to break the status 
quo.
Compared with the earlier chapters, there are more standard 
narratives present in the sources. This is probably, however, due to 
the fact that there are simply less possible ways in which to depict the 
War of 1973—there are not as many main themes—compared with 
the events dealt with in the earlier chapters.
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Further observations
As the War of 1973 began with a surprise attack without any public 
warnings or direct indications, there is some debate as to what degree 
Israel was aware that there was going to be a war. Most sources 
where this is discussed argue that Israel did not know for certain that 
war was about to break out until the early morning of October 6 (or 
in some cases on the day before). The war, as can be recalled, began 
at 2 pm. that same day. That there was no further warning was an 
intelligence failure on the part of Israel. In most sources where Israeli 
knowledge of the impending attack is discussed, it is also said that a 
preemptive strike was discussed but decided against due to political 
considerations. Israel, according to this view, did not want to “come 
off’ as the aggressor.26
This is obviously in contrast to the view held in many sources on 
the War of 1967. At that time, Israel’s very survival was at stake and a 
preemptive strike was the only option. The Israeli leadership deciding 
against striking first implies a belief that Israel’s military position had 
changed since 1967 as it no longer faced total destruction. Whether or 
not this is due to the Israeli army being stronger, the Arab armies 
being weaker or because of the strategic buffer given by the territories 
taken in 1967 is in most cases not clear. This, however, is how the 
issue is looked upon in one source:
The options then [in 1967], too, had been to make the first strike 
or be obliterated; Israel had chosen survival and been condemned 
roundly as the aggressor. On this occasion the greater risk was to 
be taken—a risk, however, partly offset, at least in Israeli opinion, 
by the much stronger borders she possessed in 1973.27
26 See for example Allen 1982, p. 4of.; Barker 1974, p. 40; Bregman & El-Tahri 
1998, p. H9ff.; Fraser 1995, p. 99; Gainsborough 1986, p. 183; Gilbert 1998, p. 431; 
Handel 1976, pp. 37, 52; Laqueur 1974, p. 88f.; Neff 1988, pp. 131-9.; O’Ballance 
1978, p. 59ff.; Samuel 1989, p. 137; Schulze 1999, p. 47; and Shlaim p. 319.
27 Allen 1982, p. 46.
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In general, the War of 1973 is described in less dramatic terms than 
the War of 1967. There are a few exceptions where Israel’s position at 
the outset is described in quite dramatic terms, but in most cases the 
doomsday feeling that was transmitted in a number of sources on the 
War of 1967 is not present.28 Nevertheless, this is how Mitchell Bard 
describes the military position at the beginning of the war:
The equivalent of the total forces of NATO in Europe was 
mobilized on Israel’s borders. On the Golan Heights, 
approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced an onslaught of 1,400 
Syrian tanks. Along the Suez Canal, fewer than 500 Israeli 
defenders with only three tanks were attacked by 600,000 
Egyptian soldiers, backed by 2,000 tanks and 550 aircraft.^
Bard’s perspective, however, is the exception. In most cases, the war 
is not described in terms of Israel facing destruction. So, in this 
sense, the War of 1973 is in quite a few sources presented with less 
emotion and as having been more of a “normal” war than the War of 
1967.
Part of the reason why the War of 1973 is not described in very 
emotional terms is probably because it was more or less entirely 
fought between the militaries of the warring parties, and there were 
hardly any civilian casualties. In this sense, the war of 1973 was a 
“clean war,” or at least compared with other wars of the twentieth 
century. There are however a number of instances in the sources 
where various atrocities committed by the Arab side of the conflict 
are mentioned. In most of the works where atrocities are brought up, 
the authors simply mention what Israel claimed happened—the 
killing of smaller numbers of Israeli prisoners of war by the hand of 
their mostly Syrian, but in some cases also Egyptian, captors— 
without committing themselves to whether these claims were true or
28 For examples of when Israel’s position at the outset of the war is described in 
more dramatic terms, see Bard 1999, p. 247; Dolan 1991, p. 133; Gilbert 1998, p. 
432; and Samuel 1989, p. 138.
29 Bard 1999, p. 247.
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not. The Israeli allegations are simply just transmitted through to the 
read ers
In two cases, there are direct allegations made directly by the 
authors of the sources used. British colonel A.J. Barker says that 
some Israeli soldiers who surrendered to the Syrians “were 
butchered and their mutilated bodies were buried nearby” .31 But, the 
authors that are most damning in their condemnation of the Arabs 
are Leonard Davis and Moshe Decter. They delve into the question of 
atrocities in greater length than any other source and are more clear 
about their accusations against the Arabs. The following quote, which 
contains a quote inside a quote, is a good example of how the Arab 
side is presented by Davis and Decter:
Syrian Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas told the Syrian National 
Assembly in December 1973 of the following example of “supreme 
valor” by Syrian troops:
“There is the outstanding case of a recruit from Aleppo who 
murdered 28 Jewish soldiers all by himself, slaughtering them 
like sheep. All of his comrades in arms witnessed this. He 
butchered three of them with an ax and decapitated them. In 
other words, instead of using a gun to kill them, he took a hatchet 
to chop their heads off. He struggled face to face with one of them 
and throwing down his ax managed to break his neck and devour 
his flesh in front of his comrades. This is a special case. Need I 
single it out to award him the Medal of the Republic? I will grant 
this medal to any soldier who succeeds in killing 28 Jews, and I 
will cover him with appreciation and honor his bravery. ”32
The language in the above quote is of course really quite strong, and 
it is not representative of the language used when describing the 
atrocities taking place in the war. Rather, it has been included to 
exemplify the extremely negative view of “the Arab” as presented in 
some sources. In the above quote, not only is the anonymous recruit
3° See Asher & Hammel 1987, p. 94; Lester A. Sobel (ed.), Israel & the Arabs: The 
October 1973 War (New York: Facts on File, 1974), p. i4if.; and O’Ballance 1978, 
pp. I29f., 306. O’Ballance also transmits the Israeli allegation that captured Israeli 
soldiers were subjected to a truth drug by their Syrian captors (pp. 256,335).
31 Barker 1974, p. 69.
32 Davis & Decter 1982, p. 51. There is no reference given to this quote.
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from Aleppo presented as somewhat of a monster, but the Syrian 
establishment is also depicted in less than civilized terms as it not 
only accepts this behavior but also in fact rewards it with a medal.
There are no allegations made—either direct or indirect—against 
Israel for having violated the rules of war. The only allegation of 
misconduct by Israel is the Syrian claim that Israeli pilots were found 
chained to their cockpits due to poor morale. This is naturally quite 
similar to the claim made in the War of 1967, where the Israeli army 
claimed it found Syrian soldiers chained to their guns on the Golan. 
The author who transmits this allegation against Israel, Edgar 
O’Ballance, is quite skeptical about its validity.33
A small aspect of the War of 1973 that is in fact only mentioned in 
two sources is the charge that American Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger in fact encouraged Sadat to go to war.34 The line of 
argumentation here is that the US could only exert pressure on Israel 
to withdraw from Egyptian territory if there was a crisis in the area. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that Kissinger was and still is a 
controversial figure, and these charges are no less controversial. Not 
only would Kissinger’s supposed encouragement run counter to 
stated US policy at the time, but it is also not clear whether or not 
Kissinger had the approval of his superior, President Richard Nixon. 
As already mentioned, this is a small aspect only mentioned in a few 
sources, but it is interesting in the larger picture of the history of the 
latter part of the twentieth century where the role and actions of 
Henry Kissinger are quite heavily contested and debated.
33 O’Ballance 1978, p. 306.
34 See Bregman 2000, p. 69; and O’Brien 1986, pp. 512-21.
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It is probably not an exaggeration to say that one of the most 
influential non-state actors in world politics in the latter pait of last 
century has been the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO, as 
representing the Palestinians in various forums, has received a 
tremendous amount of attention compared with other, similar 
organizations, and its chairperson since the late 1960s, Yasser Arafat, 
is probably in possession of one of the most well-recognized names 
and faces in world politics today.
The PLO was founded in 1964 to represent the Palestinian people, 
but it was not until after the War of 1967 that it started to become a 
more important actor in the conflict. And, it could be argued, by the 
time this analysis ends, in 1974, it had become one of the principal 
actors. If the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 was more or less an inter­
state affair between Israel and its Arab neighbors, then by 1974 it had 
clearly gained another dimension through the rise of the PLO and the 
addition of a Palestinian component.
The PLO was created in 1964 as already mentioned, but it was not 
until after the War of 1967 that it truly became an important actor. 
After the war, in 1968 to be precise, the nature of the PLO changed, 
as the various guerrilla organizations came to dominate the 
organization. The PLO after 1968 not only became more independent 
from the Arab states, but it also became more of an umbrella 
organization where the different guerrilla organizations held different 
degrees of influence. The most important of these organizations was
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that founded by Arafat and a few of his companions: Fatah.1 Other 
organizations include the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP)2 and al-Saiqa in addition to a number of smaller 
groups.
Some of the major events surrounding the PLO during this time 
period—apart from the various guerrilla organizations gaining greatly 
in influence as mentioned above—are discussed further below, but 
they include:
■ The violent confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanian 
regime in September 1970, whereby the PLO for all practical 
was expelled from Jordan.
■ The campaign of international terrorism, especially in the 
form of plane hijackings, that took place in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.
■ The emergence of the so-called Black September Organization, 
which undertook what is probably the most well-known 
terrorist operation committed by the Palestinian groups; 
namely the taking of Israeli athletes as hostages during the 
1972 Olympic Games in Munich.
■ The important and final political acknowledgement of the PLO 
as a representative of the Palestinians in 1974, when it was 
afforded the status of the sole representative of the Palestinian 
people by the Arab League. Later that same year, Yasser Arafat 
addressed the United Nations General Assembly and the PLO 
was given observer status in this world body.
1 Fatah seems to be the variation of the name most often used. Other variations 
include al-Fatah, Fateh and Fath. They are all, however, names of the same 
organization.
2 The DFLP is also sometimes referred to as the Popular Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) as well as the Popular Democratic Front (PDF). 
The DFLP seems to be the most commonly used name however.
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Sources
The specific sources used for the analysis of the rise of the PLO are 
quite disparate in nature. There are a few that are quite academic and 
analytical in nature^ whereas there are some that are much more 
popular in styles The history of the PLO certainly has some spy novel 
characteristics to it, and it is hence quite natural that there are books 
that focus on these aspects of the organization’s history.
Due to his great importance in the history of the post-1968 PLO as 
well as probably due to the interesting life he has led, there have been 
quite a few biographies written on Yasser Arafat.5 These have also 
been included in this analysis, as they are to a large degree also the 
history of the PLO. The life of Yasser Arafat and the PLO, in other 
words, have traditionally been so intertwined that a biography of the 
former almost reads like a histoiy of the latter.
There are a few works written by Palestinians and some by Arabs 
of other origins, as well as some written by Israelis.6 Helena Cobban’s 
work on the PLO and Alan Hart’s biography on Arafat are perhaps to 
be regarded as standard works in the sense that they seem to have
3 See for example Paul A. Jureidini & William E. Hazen, The Palestinian Movement 
in Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976); and Alain Gresh, The PLO: The 
Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State (London: Zed Books, 
1988).
4 See for example Neil C. Livingstone & David Halevy, Inside the PLO: Covert 
Units, Secret Funds, and the War Against Israel and the United States (London: 
Robert Hale, 1991); and Jillian Becker, The PLO: The Rise and Fall o f the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984).
5 Alan Hart, Arafat: A Political Biography (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1989); Andrew Gowers & Tony Walker, Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and 
the Palestinian Revolution (London: W.H. Allen, 1990); John & Janet Wallach, 
Arafat: In the Eyes o f the Beholder (London: Heinemann, 1990); and Said K. 
Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (London: Bloomsbuiy, 1998).
6 Works written by Palestinians and Arabs of other origins include Jamal R. Nassar, 
The Palestine Liberation Organization: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration 
o f Independence (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1991); Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and 
the Search fo r  State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 9 3  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997); and Aburish 1998. Works written by Israelis include Aryeh 
Y. Yodfat & Yuval Amon-Ohanna, PLO: Strategy and Tactics (London: Croom 
Helm, 1981); and Neil C. Livingstone & David Halevy, Inside the PLO: Covert 
Units, Secret Funds, and the War Against Israel and the United States (London: 
Robert Hale, 1991).
158
Rise o f PLO
been quoted quite extensively by other authors.7 All in all, the sources 
used in this section are quite disparate in style, scope as well as 
general outlook.
Main Themes
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the PLO has generated a 
fair amount of controversy over the years, and this is reflected in the 
main themes related to this time period. These are:
(1) The meaning of the PLO formula for a “democratic, secular 
state for all its citizens”;
(2) The reasons for the Israeli army’s defeat at the Jordanian town 
of Karameh in 1968;
(3) Responsibility for the international terrorism and hijackings 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s;
(4) Reasons for Jordan’s King Hussein to decide to move against 
the PLO in 1970;
(5) The organizational affiliation of the Black September 
Organization.
These themes are discussed below.
The nature of the formula for a “democratic, secular state”
Whether or not he actually said so or not (it seems to be contested), 
the view of the PLO vis-a-vis Israel prior to 1967 is often captured by 
observers through the phrase of “throwing the Jews into the sea” as 
supposedly uttered by the first chairperson of the PLO, Ahmed 
Shukayri. Whether or not he actually made this statement makes no
7 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Hart 1989.
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difference here, but to a large degree that seems to have been the 
perceived political policy of the PLO prior to 1967. In the late 1960s, 
however, there is a shift as the concept of a “democratic, secular state 
for all its citizens” is formulated. Exactly which group first developed 
this concept is not that relevant—in some instances it is said to have 
been the DFLP8 and in some Fatah?—what is relevant in this context 
is how the concept is interpreted. The formula for the democratic 
state became official PLO policy in the late 1960s.
There are some authors who do not look upon this formula with 
favor. It is said that the formula for a democratic state is merely a 
euphemism for the destruction of Israel, and it is also said in some 
instances that it is a propaganda ploy.10 This is how two Israeli writers 
present their view:
The term “democratic state” was much used by the PLO. It should 
be noted that it means an Arab state named Palestine, established 
on the territory of all of Palestine, after the destruction of the 
State of Israel. The slogans promise equal rights to its citizens, but 
to Jews it means only rights of a religious minority to individuals 
and not of a national entity -  and only to those Jews who “will be 
considered Palestinians” -  and not to a people. It says nothing 
about the right of Jews to self-determination or any minimal 
national rights.11
The term democratic state, in other words, did not include the Jewish 
people, but only the Palestinians. And, as the authors make quite 
clear, this was to take place after the destruction of Israel.
There is also the view that regardless of the intentions of the PLO 
in sanctioning this formula, it would have been impossible for the 
Israelis to interpret it differently than merely a call for collective 
suicide. First of all, the implicit rejection (and call for dismantlement) 
of Zionism present in the formula is said to be the same as the
8 See for example Wallach & Wallach, p. 233.
? See for example Hart 1989, p. 275; and Gresh 1988, p. 17.
10 See for example Yodfat & Ohanna, 1981, p. 57; Davis & Decter 1982, p. 101; 
Becker 1984, p. 82; Bickerton & Klausner, p. 165; Wallach 8c Wallach 1991, p. 233; 
and Sachar 1996, p. 810.
11 Yodfat 8c Amon-Ohanna 1981, p. 57. Emphasis in original.
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rejection and call for destruction of the Jewish presence; as Zionism, 
in the view of the Israelis, is said to be the raison d'etre of the Jewish 
state. Second, it would have been impossible for the Israelis to take 
the formula “at face value” after years of violence and conflict.12
As is often the case, there are a number of different ways in which to 
look at this issue. The opposite from the above is quite obviously to 
argue that the formula for a “democratic, secular state” should be 
viewed as something positive offered by the PLO. The biographer of 
Yasser Arafat, Alan Hart, for instance argues that the formula in a 
sense does call for the dismantling of Israel, but then only by political 
means. Israel, in other words, with its political institutions is to be 
dismantled and replaced with a state for both Jews and Arabs. So, 
even if the formula in a sense calls for the destruction of Israel, it is 
not to be interpreted as a call for genocide or “throwing the Jews into 
the sea” but rather just to bring something down in order to build 
something new.^ French scholar Alain Gresh, who has written on the 
evolution of Palestinian political thought, argues that the formula 
represents an important stage as the PLO now accepted the idea of a 
Jewish presence in a future Palestine. Gresh also makes the point 
that the view that the formula calls for a secular state is incorrect. The 
term that is used, however quite sparingly according to Gresh, is non­
sectarian. Whether or not secular and non-sectarian could be said to 
illustrate the same idea in this context is probably more or less 
semantics.^
12 See for example Bard E. O’Neill, Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political- 
Military Analysis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 8, 22lf.; and Barry 
Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History o f the PLO (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 40.
J3 Hart 1989, p. 275. For other works where the moderate aspects of the formula are 
emphasized, see also Jureidini & Hazen 1976, p. 98; Khouri 1985, p. 358; Quigley 
1990, p. 228; Nassar 1991, p. 198f; Gerner 1994, p. 89f.; Tessler 1994, pp. 437-42; 
and Thomas, 1999, p. 191b
14 Gresh 1988, pp. 49ft. Secular and non-sectarian obviously is not the same thing, 
but in normal discourse the two terms seem to indicate the same notion. For 
instance, the United States is sometimes described as being a secular state. This is 
not correct in the strictest sense of the word, as the majority of Americans seem to
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Whether or not the destruction of Israel actually refers to the physical 
destruction of Israel or just the destruction of its political institutions 
is however not a question of semantics. The difference between the 
two outlooks is crucial. According to one perspective, the PLO “was 
suggesting a political formula that articulated the rights of 
Palestinians and offered a possible solution to the conflict with Israeli 
Jews.’^ s And, from another perspective, the formula was “a 
euphemism for propaganda purposes to dismantle Israel and was 
intended to replace the admittedly ineffective slogan of ‘driving the 
Jews into the sea.’”16 Looking at the formula as a means to solve the 
conflict through a multicultural state for both peoples is of course 
much more positive towards the PLO than to say that it was simply a 
ploy or euphemism for the physical destruction of Israel. Hence, the 
former view is here deemed to be the pro-Arab view, whereas the 
latter view is defined as the pro-Israeli.
The battle at Karameh
After the War of 1967, the low-intensity conflict between Israel and 
the various Palestinian groups continued. Although Israel was quite 
successful in countering Fatah and other groups on the West Bank, 
raids continued to be undertaken from across the Jordan River. And 
the Israeli army continued to retaliate. One of the largest of these 
operations was undertaken on March 21, 1968, when a fairly 
substantial Israeli force crossed the river in order to move against the 
Fatah bases in and around the Jordanian village of Karameh.
Whether or not Karameh in strict military terms was a major 
Palestinian victory and thus an Israeli defeat, it was certainly viewed 
as such in many quarters and the battle came to be a great publicity
have some religious belief (i.e. are not secular). What is meant is of course non­
sectarian as the United States does not have an official state religion. The terms 
secular and non-sectarian, in other words, are sometimes used to describe the same 
concept although they do not actually have the same meaning in the strictest sense. 
« Thomas 1999, p. I9if.
16 Bickerton & Klausner 1991, p. 165.
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boost for both Fatah as well as Yasser Arafat personally. The battle at 
Karameh is in many cases presented as having been the catalyst that 
led to the Palestinian movement as represented by Fatah and the 
PLO becoming as important as it did in the late lgbos/early 1970s.
There are two different perspectives when looking at the battle at 
Karameh. One is to present it as a victory by Fatah over the Israeli 
army, and the other is to portray it as a Fatah victory with 
considerable Jordanian assistance. Palestinian journalist Said 
Aburish, for instance, is quite clear in how he presents the battle:
The ill-trained and poorly equipped Palestinians heroically held 
their ground and used the rocky terrain effectively against an 
estimated fifteen thousand-strong Israeli force. For a few hours 
the Palestinians fought alone, compensating for their lack of 
heavy weaponry with impressive improvisations and dramatic 
individual sacrifices. The Jordanian artillery and armoured units 
stayed behind and held their fire, but when the pressure on the 
guerrillas intensified, the Jordanian field commander, 
Mohammed A1 Abdallah -  who had already made repeated calls 
to army headquarters to ask for permission to assist the 
Palestinians -  took the initiative and ordered his troops into the 
fray. At this point, the Israelis decided not to press their attack 
and withdrew.1?
Although there was Jordanian assistance, it was the Palestinians who 
put up the hardest fight.18 In others works, the Palestinian aspect of 
the fighting is downplayed or not even mentioned,^ or the battle is 
not presented as a having been a defeat for the Israelis.20
^Aburish 1998, p. 81.
18 In addition to the above quote, see for example Jureidini & Hazen 1976, p. i3f,; 
Amos 1980, p. 34; Cobban 1984, p. 42; Khouri 1985, p. 358; Gresh 1988, p. ix; 
Smith 1988, p. 214; Brynen 1990, p. 38; Bickerton & Klausner 1991, p. 165; Nassar 
1991, p. 81; Rubin 1994, p. i8f; Tessler 1994, p. 425; Fraser 1995, p. 90; Lesch & 
Tschirgi 1998, pp. 23, 75; Schulze 1999, p. 43; and Thomas 1999, p. I94f. Baylis 
Thomas not only does not bring up any Jordanian assistance, he in fact makes the 
claim that the Jordanian army failed altogether to come to the assistance of the 
Palestinians.
w See O’Neill 1978, p. 47; Hart 1989, p. 263; Gowers & Walker 1990, p. s8ff.; 
Wallach & Wallach 1990, p. 32; Sayigh 1997, p. I78f.
20 See Becker 1984, pp. 4, 62f.; and Livingstone & Halevy 1991, p. 8of.
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Even though there are two different views on how it was fought, the 
battle of Karameh is probably not to be construed as being a main 
theme as they are used in this analysis. The reason for this is quite 
simple: there are no discernable views vis-a-vis the actors. In other 
words, it is not possible to say that one view is pro-Israeli or vice 
versa. Saying that the battle was an Israeli defeat primarily because 
of Palestinian resistance or due to Jordanian involvement is not 
clearly assigning blame or vindicating either of the main actors.
As the purpose of this analysis is to analyze the question of bias— 
and not just scholarly differences—this theme is rejected as a main 
theme. It could in fact be hypothesized that an emphasis on the 
Palestinian component can be viewed as either pro-Israeli or pro- 
Palestinian. Pro-Israeli in the sense that the Palestinian groups are 
presented as a strong and viable threat to Israeli security. Pro- 
Palestinian in the sense that the fact that the outnumbered 
Palestinians were able to beat off a stronger Israeli force can only be 
attributed to the strong Palestinian belief in their cause. (This is of 
course similar to the argument made in reference to the War of 1967, 
where one reason for the Israeli victoiy is said to have been the 
strong Israeli motivation and belief in their cause.) Nevertheless and 
speculation aside, due to the difficulties of placing this theme in 
relation to the binary designation of pro-Israeli/pro-Arab it has been 
decided against using it in the present analysis. It is, however, 
discussed further in the concluding chapter where difficulties with 
using the methodology employed in this thesis are discussed.
The use of terrorism
In the late 1960s, yet another aspect was added to the history of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict; namely the use of international terrorism. 
Already from the creation of Israel in 1948 there had been various 
actions undertaken against Israeli targets by Palestinian groups and 
individuals. In Israel they were referred to as being terrorist 
operations and in Palestinian quarters they were referred to guerrilla
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actions (or derivatives thereof). What was new with the use of the so- 
called international terrorism that began after the War of 1967 was 
that the targets were outside the immediate area of the conflict, and 
indeed often outside the Middle East.
Mostly, the terrorism involved plane hijackings, and as the targets 
often were European and American airlines a great deal of the 
passengers had no relation whatsoever to the conflict in the Middle 
East. Almost needless to say, the international terrorism of the late 
1960s and early 1970s was quite heavily criticized in the West and it 
is therefore natural that the issue of Palestinian terrorism has been 
debated to a large degree.
There are two principal views of looking at the issue at hand. As the 
PLO was made up by a number of different organizations, with 
Yasser Arafat’s Fatah being the largest and most influential, one way 
of presenting the international terrorism of this time period is to 
emphasize the organizational differences. This is how two American 
scholars writing in the mid-1970s evaluate the issue of Palestinian 
terror:
When tabulating the terrorist acts that have taken place since 
1968, certain points should be stressed. Ih e  PFLP was responsible 
for most of the terrorist acts that took place between July 1968 
and March 1974. The BSO was a close second. The terrorist 
groups also practiced certain types of acts as opposed to others. 
For instance, the PFLP concentrated mostly on attacks and 
hijackings while the BSO specialized in bombings and sabotage. 
Yet statistics show that of all the acts instigated by the guerrilla 
groups, most stressed bombings, with attacks coming in second 
and hijackings third. Israel, quite naturally was the recipient of 
most of these acts. However, Jordan was a close second. Fatah, 
because it basically refrained from acts of international terrorism, 
concentrated its attacks primarily against Israel and Jordan.2*
The PFLP, or Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was and
still is a Marxist group that is often presented as being quite a bit
21 Jureidini & Hazen 1976, p. 88.
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more radical than Fatah. The BSO, or Black September Organization, 
was a small group that only existed in the first half of the 1970s. The 
BSO is discussed further below.
The intricacies of internal PLO politics apart, what the above view 
illustrates is the view that Fatah, and hence the PLO in general, was 
not behind the international terror. It was smaller groups that were 
behind these attacks and Fatah and the PLO in general should not be 
held responsible.22
The other view to present the international terrorism of the late 
i96os/early 1970s is to look upon it as having been undertaken by the 
PLO or the Palestinians at large. Mitchell Bard, for instance, is quite 
clear in his view on the terrorism: “After 1967, the scale of terrorism 
intensified, with the PLO increasingly choosing to attack Israeli 
targets, or simply Jews, outside the Middle East. This was the height 
of hijacking and other heinous activities.”^  There is in other words no 
distinction made between the PLO as an umbrella organization and 
the member groups of which it consisted.2*
The implications of this theme are quite clear: in the first view, 
Fatah and in some ways the PLO in general are presented as being 
more moderate, whereas in the second view the whole of the PLO is 
presented as being more militant and extreme. Hence, the first view 
is here said to be the pro-Arab perspective and the second to be the 
pro-Israeli.
What is interesting about this theme is that it illustrates quite well 
the importance of how something is presented. As both views in some
22 See for example Amos 1980, pp. 76-81; Cobban 1984, p. I45f.; Khouri 1985, p. 
359; O’Brien 1986, p. 481; Hart 1989, p. 286; Wallach & Wallach 1990, pp. 166, 
232; Gowers & Walker 1990, p. 84; Nassar 1991, p. 88; Gerner 1994, p. 86ff.; Fraser 
1995> P- 9 i; Sachar 1996, p. 699ft.; Sayigh 1997, p. 2l3f.; Bregman & El-Tahri 1998, 
p. 142; and Morris 1999, p. 376ff.
2s Bard 1999, p. 239.
2* See O’Neill 1978, pp. 86,110,15if.; Davis & Decter 1982, p. 99ft.; Becker 1984, p. 
85; Viorst 1987, l35f.J Samuel 1989, p. 130; Bailey 1990, pp. 295, 301, 343; 
Livingstone & Halevy 1991, p. looff.; Blumberg 1998, p. 113; and Gilbert 1998, p. 
4i7ff.
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sense are historically correct—it would seem as if the actions 
undertaken were carried out by smaller member groups of the PLO— 
the issue at stake is how this historical reality is presented. Was the 
PLO in general an organization that condoned and committed 
terrorism, or was it just the smaller and more radical groups that did 
so? Of course, the answer to this question to a large degree lies with 
how the PLO is looked upon organizationally, but it is also very much 
a question of presentation. This theme, in other words, is perhaps a 
clearer example of where the different views held are biased than 
other themes. It is probably historically correct both saying that the 
terror of the time period was carried out by smaller member groups 
of the PLO, as well as saying that it was undertaken by the PLO in 
general. But, the outcome in how the Palestinian cause during this 
time period is presented is vastly different.
The Jordanian expulsion of the PLO
After the War of 1967, Jordan came to be what was in all probability 
the most important base of the PLO and its different groups. In some 
sense this was probably natural, as the Israeli-Jordanian border is 
quite long and as there is a large Palestinian population in Jordan. 
The battle at Karameh (see above) was to be a great boost for the 
Palestinian presence in Jordan, and the Jordanian King Hussein even 
publicly praised the fighters after their clash with the Israelis.
In 1970, however, after only three years had passed since the war 
and two since the battle of Karameh, the situation in Jordan had gone 
sour. After a violent confrontation in September that year between 
the Jordanian army and the PLO, the latter was more or less 
completely expelled from Jordan and was forced to set up their 
presence in other Arab states (most notably Lebanon). The reasons 
behind this violent confrontation—which has come to be referred to 
as Black September in Palestinian historiography—is the concern of 
this theme.
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One way of looking at the reasons behind this confrontation is to 
argue that it was the more radical groups of the PLO (the 
Marxist/Maoist PFLP and DFLP) that challenged the Jordanian 
regime. These militant groups with their call for a Leftist revolution 
needless to say posed a challenge to the regime in Jordan, and the 
king had to act. Mainstream PLO, as represented by Fatah and 
Arafat, did not seek to overthrow the king, however, and in fact acted 
to defuse the increasingly tense situation in Jordan prior to 
September 1970. When the king decided to take action, he did not 
differentiate between the radical and the more mainstream groups 
and hence moved the Jordanian army against all PLO factions:
The core ideology of Fateh . . . included a stress on Palestinian 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of existing Arab states; but 
this concept was not shared by many of the other Palestinian 
guerrilla groups gaining influence in Jordan in the late 60s. The 
PFLP still clung to the pan-Arabist ideological approach of its 
Arab Nationalists’ Movement origins; the DFLP, despite Fateh’s 
midwifery at its birth, was soon thereafter calling for the 
establishment of soviets (workers’ and peasants’ councils) in some 
areas of northern Jordan; Saiqa and the Arab Liberation Front 
were the Palestinian guerrilla sections of respectively the pro- 
Syrian and the pro-Iraqi wings of the (pan-Arabist) Baath party, 
and so on. For all of these groups, a confrontation with Hussein, 
whom they saw variously as ‘reactionary’, ‘a puppet of Western 
imperialism’ or ‘a Zionist tool’, was considered not only desirable, 
but also ideologically necessaiy. Thus, in direct contradiction to 
Fateh’s long-held ideology, throughout late 1969 and the first half 
of 1970, the Palestinian guerrillas’ challenges to Hussein’s 
authority multiplied as rapidly as their traffic-control roadblocks 
spread throughout more and more of the capital. 2s
According to this view, in other words, the blame for the 
confrontation should not be placed on the shoulders of Arafat and 
Fatah, but rather with the smaller, more radical factions of the PLO. 
The PLO at large as represented by Fatah is innocent.26
2s Cobban 1984, p. 48f.
26 See for instance Jureidini & Hazen 1976, p. 51; Yodfat & Ohanna 1981, p. 30; 
O’Brien 1986, p. 480; Smith 1988, p. 223; Gowers & Walker 1990, p. 75ff.; Wallach 
& Wallach 1990, pp. 167, 312, 470; Nassar 1991, p. 131; Sayigh 1997> PP> 244k, 258;
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There is however another way of looking at the confrontation, and 
that is to say that it was in some sense inevitable. The Palestinian 
movement in Jordan had gained so much in size and weight that that 
fact alone was a challenge to the regime. And, although the more 
radical groups are to be held utterly responsible for the 
confrontation, some of the blame should rest with Arafat and Fatah 
for failing to properly define the role of the Palestinian movement 
inside Jordan. As for the perhaps inevitability of the clash, it has been 
argued that the two parties—the PLO and King Hussein—in fact had 
incompatible goals for the future of the occupied territories and that 
a clash between the two in all actuality perhaps was bound to happen 
at some point in time.2?
The second major way of looking at the clash is to simply say that it 
was the PLO that challenged the Jordanian regime and its king. The 
distinction in policy present among the different groups as indicated 
in the above quote is not a factor, and it was the whole of the PLO 
that challenged the regime in Jordan and sought to overthrow its 
head of state.28
The distinction here between the different outlooks is quite clear. 
On the one hand, mainstream PLO as represented by Fatah is cleared 
of guilt for causing the violence in September 1970. On the other 
hand, the whole of the PLO is blamed. As the first view makes a 
distinction between Fatah and the other more radical groups in 
relation to their relations with the Jordanian regime, it is here said to 
represent a pro-Arab view. The reason for this is that it makes this 
distinction between what is said to be a mainstream and a radical 
PLO. Mainstream PLO was not interested in interfering with the
Aburish 1998, p. I03ff.; Bregman & El-Tahri 1998, pp. 142-47; Lesch & Tschirgi 
1998, p. 23; and Thomas 1999, p. 195.
2? O’Neill 1978, p. 168; Sayigh 1997, pp. 244L 258; and Aburish 1998, p. I03ff.
28 See for instance Becker 1984, p. 75f.; Khouri 1985, p. 359; Viorst 1987, p. 135; 
Samuel 1989, p. 142; Bailey 1990, p. 290; Biynen 1990, p. 11; Bickerton & Klausner 
1991, p. i68f.; Livingstone & Halevy 1991, pp. 8i, 103; Rubin 1994, pp. 34f., 141; 
Blumberg 1998, p. 113; Gilbert 1998, p. 417; Bard 1999, p. 24of.; and Morris 1999, 
p. 373f.
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domestic politics of an Arab state; it was only the more militant 
groups that wanted to do so. By contrast, saying that it was the whole 
of the PLO that challenged King Hussein’s regime almost needless to 
say paints the whole organization in a more aggressive light, and is 
thus to be construed as the pro-Israeli view.
The nature of the Black September Organization 
In late November 1971, Prime Minister Wasfi Tal of Jordan was 
gunned down in Cairo. The group that claimed responsibility for his 
assassination called itself the Black September Organization (or 
BSO), and this was to be its first of quite a few actions. The name of 
the organization was a reference to the violent expulsion of the PLO 
from Jordan (see above). The BSO quickly turned out to be most 
prolific when it came to various terrorist attacks: mostly letter bombs 
and plane hijackings. Probably the most well-known of all actions 
undertaken by the BSO—and in all likelihood by the Palestinian 
groups in general—was when a group of BSO members captured nine 
Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and took them 
hostage. Due to the fact that it took place during such a highly 
publicized event as the Olympic Games, the hostage-taking received 
an immense amount of attention.
The controversy surrounding the Black September Organization is 
not so much regarding the magnitude of its acts of violence; the 
controversy is rather over the organizational affiliation of the group. 
As already discussed above in relation to theme three, the question of 
affiliation is touchy indeed. In that theme, as can be recalled, the 
question was to what degree it is possible to talk of the PLO as 
committing the terrorist actions of the late 196os/early 1970s.
The case of the BSO, however, is different as there are a number 
of authors who claim that the organization had direct ties to Fatah. 
The BSO, in other words, was an offshoot from mainstream PLO. If 
there indeed existed clear ties between the terrorist organization of 
the BSO and the moderate, mainstream organization of Fatah, the
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allegations made that the PLO was a terrorist organization probably 
would hold more ground. The BSO acting as a front for Fatah would 
in other words make this organization—as well as the PLO in general 
due to Fat ah’s great influence in this umbrella organization—seem 
quite a b it more extreme and m ilitan t.2?
The other view of looking at the organizational affiliation of the BSO 
is to say that there were no ties between this organization and 
Fatah.30 It is sometimes said that the BSO did have some former or 
present members of Fatah within its ranks:
The truth about the Black September (Terror) Organization can 
be summed up as follows. It was a part of Fatah. The entire 
leadership, including Arafat, debated the playing of the terror 
card. But the decision to use terror was not taken by the 
leadership. With the exception of Abu Iyad who, at the time, was 
widely regarded as Arafat’s number two, all of Fatah’s top leaders 
were opposed to the use of the terror weapon. The decision to 
resort to it was taken by embittered individuals within the ranks 
of Fatah’s fighters.31
But, even if there were some Fatah members within the BSO, Fatah’s 
leadership is cleared from having “played the terror card.” Within 
this view that the BSO was not an arm of Fatah, there are a number of 
different perspectives as to what degree there was a BSO-Fatah 
connection. In some cases, there was no connection between the two 
groups in any way. In some cases, as illustrated in the above quote, 
there were connections between the groups on the personal level but 
not on the organizational level. And, in some cases, there was some 
connection between the Fatah leadership and the BSO, but the 
leadership around chairman Arafat did not approve of the activities
2? See for instance O’Neill 1978, p. 151; Yodfat & Arnon-Ohanna 1981, p. 33; Davis 
& Decter 1982, p. 99; Becker 1984, p. 77,107; O’Brien 1986, p. 48if.; Smith 1988, p. 
225; Samuel 1989, p. 130; Wallach & Wallach 1990, pp. 169, 328, 384; Livingstone 
& Halevy 1991, p. 103-6; Rubin 1994, p. 38; Fraser 1995, p. 95; Sachar 1996, p. 701; 
and Morris 1999, pp. 376ff., 386.
3° See for instance Jureidini & Hazen 1976, p. 84; Amos 1980, pp. 64, 221; Quigley 
1990, p. 198; Nassar 1991, p. 97f.; Gerner 1994, p. 90; andTessler 1994, p. 483ff.
31 Hart 1989, p. 337.
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of the BS0.32 The Fatah leader mostly said to have played a role with 
regards to the BSO is Abu Iyad mentioned in the quote above.33
In view of the binary designations of pro-Israeli/pro-Arab, the 
view of the BSO that designates it as being an arm of Fatah is here 
said to be the pro-Israeli view. The reason for this is that by saying 
that there was a clear connection between Fatah and the terrorist 
organization of the BSO, Fatah is presented as a more militant 
organization. As Fatah more or less represented the mainstream and 
moderate views held within the PLO, this organization is also tainted 
by a clear Fatah-BSO connection. This is also the case where it is said 
that the BSO was created as an arm of Fatah, but where Arafat did 
not play any role in this decision. The opposite is the case where it is 
said that there was no connection between Fatah and the BSO (or 
where the connection is limited to individuals): Fatah is cleared from 
the connection with terrorism and could still be looked upon as a 
moderate force. This is the pro-Arab view.
Main themes: conclusion
The Palestine Liberation Organization is an organization that 
throughout the years has given rise to a large degree of controversy. 
Is it or is it not a terrorist organization? Is it or is it not committed to 
the national rights of the Jewish population of Israel? Is it or is it not 
dedicated to solving the conflict through peaceful means instead of 
through violence? These questions, as well as others, have 
surrounded the PLO throughout its history. In this chapter, these 
questions are broached in some sense through the main themes 
discussed above. Below follows in table form the tabulated results of 
the analysis regarding the main themes in this chapter. Theme two, 
which deals with the battle of Karameh, has been excluded due to the 
difficulties surrounding that theme (see above).
32 Cobban 1984, pp. 54b, 148; and Aburish 1998, p. 123b
33 Abu Iyad (or Salah Khalaf which was his real name) is often said to have been 
Arafat’s second-in-command. He was assassinated in 1991.
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There are two quite noticeable aspects of the above charts that 
probably need mention. The first thing is the fact that there is a quite 
clear pro-Arab tilt in the specific works. In the previous chapters, it
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was not possible to see such a clear tilt towards the pro-Arab point of 
view.
The other thing that can be noted in relation to the above graphs 
is the fact that the absolute majority of general sources are to be 
deemed ambiguous in relation to the first main theme (which deals 
with the nature of the “democratic state”-formula). Although this is 
perhaps somewhat strange—as regardless of how it is viewed, the 
formula for a democratic state could be said to have been an 
interesting development in the history of the PLO—it should also be 
recalled that the general works in most cases only dedicate a small 
amount of attention and text to each individual topic. And, in relation 
to the history of the PLO in general, the formula for a democratic and 
secular state for all its inhabitants is perhaps not as important as 
other aspects.
The main themes regarding the rise of the PLO can be classified in 
the following fashion:
(1) Theme where the controversy is how to interpret a certain 
policy or formula (theme one);
(2) Theme where the actual historical reality is disputed (theme 
five);
(3) Themes where the same historical reality can be presented in 
different manners with different implications (themes three 
and four).
When it comes to the main themes in this chapter, there is one theme 
(theme one) where the controversy is how to interpret a certain policy 
or formula. The formula, as discussed above, is the call made by the 
PLO in the late 1960s for a democratic and secular/non-sectarian 
state for both Jews and Palestinians. The controversy, simply put, is 
whether or not to take this formula, so to say, at face value or whether 
to say that it should not be taken seriously and that the implicit anti-
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Zionist call in the formula is a call for the physical destruction of the 
Jewish state.
There is one theme (theme five) where the actual historical reality 
is in dispute. Was the Black September Organization an arm of Fatah 
or not? This question could in theory be answered with a yes or a no, 
but at least for the time being this seems difficult; especially when 
one considers the secrecy surrounding the organization at the time.
And, lastly, there are two themes (three and four) where the same 
historical reality can be presented in two different manners with 
different implications. Saying that the PFLP and other smaller groups 
were responsible for the terror of the late i96os/early 1970s or that it 
was the PLO in general that was behind the same terror is quite 
different. The same is of course also the case with the situation in 
Jordan: saying that it was the more militant groups that caused the 
confrontation or saying that it was the PLO also presents the latter in 
different lights. The interesting thing about these two themes, 
however, is that both outlooks, or interpretations, in some sense are 
not mutually exclusive. The PFLP was a member of the PLO so it 
could be said that the latter was a terrorist organization. But, on the 
other hand, it could also be said that the PFLP was a perpetrator of 
terror, whereas the PLO in general was innocent. Both claims could 
both be deemed accurate, but their implications for how the 
Palestinian movement is presented are quite different.
On the question of standard narratives—the kind of narratives that 
are more or less exclusively pro-Israeli or vice versa—it seems as if 
they to a large degree are more prevalent, at least in the specific 
works, in relation to the rise of the PLO than they were in relation to 
the other aspects of the time period as discussed in the previous 
chapters. The reason for this is hard to explain. It could be that the 
works written on the PLO or Yasser Arafat simply are more 
ideologically motivated. Alan Hart, for instance, who has written a 
biography on Arafat, seems to be quite impressed by his object of
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study. Although he is not unquestionably loyal to Arafat, his affinity 
shines through throughout the b o o k .3 4  Likewise, Jillian Becker’s work 
on the PLO seems to have been guided to a large degree by her 
antipathy and disgust with said o r g a n i z a t i o n . 3 5  Even if there are of 
course works analyzed in the previous chapters that seem to have 
been guided by ideological motives, it would seem as if these kinds of 
works are more prevalent when it comes to the PLO. This is perhaps 
due to the controversial nature of the PLO.
Looking at the four themes discussed above, the following could 
probably be how a pro-Israeli standard narrative would read:
When the PLO called for a democratic and non-sectarian state for 
all its citizens, it was just a euphemism for the destruction of 
Israel. The goal was still to destroy the Jewish state. The PLO 
carried out the international terrorism that took place in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, it was the PLO that 
challenged the authority of King Hussein of Jordan and this lead 
to the violent clash of September 1970. The Black September 
Organization that undertook a number of violent terrorist actions 
was a front for Fatah, Yasser Arafat’s own organization.
A pro-Arab standard narrative, on the other hand, could look like
this:
The PLO formula for a democratic and non-sectarian state for all 
its citizens was a major step forward in Palestinian political 
thinking and was an attempt to solve the conflict through political 
means. It was groups like the PFLP that carried out the 
international terrorism of the time period, and likewise it was the 
smaller and more militant groups that challenged King Hussein in 
Jordan. Fatah, the mainstream and moderate Palestinian 
organization, refrained from international terrorism and did not
34 For instance, Hart concludes in the beginning of his work that (1) no leader, Arab 
01* Jew, has done more to prepare a settlement than Arafat; (2) that there could 
have been a settlement already by 1980 had Israel produced a leader with the same 
skill and courage as Arafat; and (3) that Arafat holds the key to peace on the Arab 
side. Hart 1989, p. I3f.
35 This is how Becker describes the PLO in the first few pages of her book: “The 
history of the PLO is a chronicle of wrong judgments, of repeated mistakes, of 
lessons never learnt, of faith in wishes. It is full of cruelty, wretchedness, atrocity, 
violent death and the destruction of a countiy, all proceeding from the follies of 
fanaticism and self-deception.” Becker 1984, p. 5.
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seek to overthrow the Jordanian regime. The Black September 
Organization, although it is possible that it included some former 
or present members of Fatah, was an independent force.
Further observations
Probably one of the most curious aspects when Yasser Arafat is 
discussed is when his sexual orientation is delved into. 
Unsurprisingly, this subject is not broached in most sources. 
However, there are two sources where it is said that Arafat is either 
homo- or bisexual. In one of these sources, it is casually mentioned 
that Arafat started to be called Yasser by a male teacher with whom 
he had an affair while still in school .36 In the other source where the 
sexuality of Arafat is discussed, it is said that there is ample anecdotal 
evidence as to the chairman of the PLO being either bi- or 
homosexual. The authors of this work for example quote the memoirs 
of a Romanian intelligence officer who claims to have conclusive 
evidence of Arafat having an affair with one of his bodyguards .37
What is interesting about this is of course not whether the claims 
are true or not, but rather the fact that the two sources that bring up 
the question of sexuality are probably the ones that are the most 
critical of Yasser Arafat. Not only is Arafat accused of being a terrorist 
and a criminal—as is the case in these two sources—he is also 
“accused” of being homosexual. What this shows is not only how 
critical some authors are of Arafat, but also that the label of 
homosexuality is supposed to be negative in these authors’ opinion. 
Or at least was when the two works were written (1984 and 1991). It 
is not certain whether or not labeling someone as being homosexual 
today could be construed as an attack, but it most likely will not be in 
the not so distant future.
36 Becker 1984, p. 41.
37 Livingstone & Halevy 1991, p. 91.
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As Yasser Arafat has been, and still is, an immensely important 
person in Palestinian politics, there is a great deal written on Arafat 
from a more personal angle as well as the more strictly political. One 
of the most curious aspects mentioned where the person of Yasser 
Arafat is discussed is where it is said in two instances that he has 
somewhat unusual habit of pouring tea instead of milk over his 
cornflakes to eat for breakfasts There are other things mentioned in 
the sources about the more personal aspects of Yasser Arafat (e.g. his 
love for fast cars or his habit of not going to bed until very late at 
night) as well as a great deal of anecdotes from his quite eventful life. 
That Arafat receives so much attention—and not only in the 
biographies dealing with him—is of course a reflection of the 
importance he has had in the history of the PLO.
Another note-worthy aspect of the works on the PLO involves the 
incident that took place in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. In the 
early spring of 1973, a number of Black September Organization 
members managed to break into the Saudi embassy where a 
reception was being held for the American charge d ’affaires. A 
number of guests were taken hostage and the BSO members made a 
couple of demands for the release of prisoners in several countries. 
The negotiations, however, got nowhere and the episode ended in the 
embassy’s basement with the murder of the American ambassador 
and the American and Belgian charge d ’affaires.
The murder of diplomatic personnel is needless to say not 
commonplace, but the interesting aspect of the events in Khartoum 
are the charges that the hostage-takers were receiving orders on the 
radio directly from the PLO headquarters in Beirut.39 In some cases, 
it is even said that Arafat personally was to have ordered the murders 
of the diplomats:
38 Wallach & Wallach 1990, p. 22; and Gowers & Walker 1990, p. 73.
39 O’Neill, 1978, p. 188; Davis & Decter 1982, p. 99; Livingstone & Halevy 1991, pp. 
87, 279ff.; and Rubin 1994, p. 38.
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U.S. officials had ample evidence of Arafat’s and the PLO’s direct 
involvement in the Khartoum murders but chose—for reasons 
never made clear—to suppress the evidence, including the 
intercepts of the radiotelephone conversations between Abu 
Ghassan [the BSO operative in charge in Khartoum] and Fatah 
headquarters in Beirut.^
What is interesting about these allegations is that they are quite 
naturally damning of the PLO (or Fatah) leadership and also of 
Arafat where he is implicated. To say that there was a Fatah-BSO 
connection in general terms is one thing; to say that Arafat or 
someone else within the Fatah leadership specifically ordered the 
murder of hostages goes quite a bit further in labeling Fatah (and by 
extension the PLO) to be a terrorist organization.
The events in Khartoum are only mentioned in a few sources and 
hence there are also only a few works where the Fatah leadership and 
Arafat are cleared of the allegations made against t h e m . 4 1  That there 
would not be that many works arguing against the claim of Fatah 
culpability is perhaps not too surprising, as the Fatah-BSO link is 
discredited in a number of sources. If, in other words, it has already 
been argued that the BSO was not acting under orders from the Fatah 
leadership in general, there is no reason to argue that the BSO was 
not acting under orders in this instance either.
40 Livingstone & Halevy 1991, p. 283.
41 Sayigh 1997, p .  311; and Aburish 1998, p .  125.
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6. Four examples
The purpose of this chapter is to see how four different sources 
describe the events analyzed in this thesis. This is done so that the 
reader can get a clearer picture of how the different sources position 
themselves with regard to the themes described in the above 
chapters. But, and perhaps foremost, the major purpose of this brief 
expose is to illustrate how different the various stories turn out 
depending on how the author positions him- or herself with regard to 
the main themes.
Four sources have been selected that represent four different 
strands of narrative. Two are quite clearly pro-Israeli and pro-Arab 
respectively, whereas two are less discernable in their views.
Martin Gilbert
Martin Gilbert’s Israel: A  History was published just in time for 
Israel’s fiftieth anniversary as a state in 1998. The book begins with 
telling the story of Zionism in the latter part of the nineteenth 
centuiy and goes through the years of the pre-state Jewish 
community in Palestine (which is often referred to by its Hebrew 
name the Yishuv), the establishment of Israel in 1948 and continues 
right up to the time it was published. The book is written in an easily 
accessible language, and the focus is more on telling a story than to 
analyze.
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Martin Gilbert, who hails from Great Britain, has in addition to 
this work published a great number of historical works and atlases; 
including an officially endorsed biography of Winston Churchill. 
Gilbert is a honorary fellow of Merton College at Oxford.
War o f  iq 6 7
Gilbert begins his account on the War of 1967 by discussing the 
skirmishes that had taken place along the Israeli-Syrian border that 
spring, as well as the raids having been undertaken by various 
Palestinian groups.1 In light of the skirmishes, Gilbert brings up the 
Soviet claims that Israel was planning a war, but concludes that they 
were false and unsubstantiated.
The focus in Gilbert’s book is obviously Israel and in the War of 
1967, Israel’s main antagonist was President Nasser of Egypt:
Gradually, during May, President Nasser emerged as a champion 
of the Syrians -  or rather of the Arab world generally, the 
leadership of which he so wished to assert. Beginning on May 13, 
Egyptian troops moved in large numbers into the Sinai . . .  As the 
Egyptian troops moved forward, Cairo Radio set the tone of a 
propaganda war that became Egypt’s daily barrage: ‘Egypt, with 
all its resources, is ready to plunge into a total war that will be the 
end of Israel,’ the radio declared.2
Nasser, and the rest of the Arabs, are henceforth portrayed as the 
aggressors in Gilbert’s account. Nasser ordered the whole of the 
United Nations peacekeeping force to be removed, and he did this in 
order to raise the temperature and to threaten Israel. Furthermore, 
Nasser more or less committed himself to war by closing the Straits 
of Tiran in the Red Sea for Israeli shipping.
Israel, on the other hand, is described throughout as trying to 
resolve the crisis through peaceful means. However, as the crisis 
becomes increasingly threatening to Israel, its leadership comes 
closer and closer to making the decision to go to war. The pact
1 This section is based on Gilbert 1998, pp. 365-95.
2 Gilbert 1998, p. 366.
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between Egypt and Jordan certainly was a factor for why the decision 
was ultimately made, as the pact seriously worsened Israel’s position 
and threatened its very existence. When the war finally began, on 
June 5, it was Israel’s swift surprise air strikes against in particular 
Egypt that ultimately led to victory.
The time of 1067-73
Martin Gilbert’s book is in some respects a chronology of events, and 
in the chapter that deals with the time period following the War of 
1967 he brings up a number of aspects that have previously not been 
discussed in this thesis.3 Not only does Gilbert discuss how the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza—with their significant 
Palestinian populations—first came to manifest itself, he also 
discusses the birth of the so-called Land of Israel Movement with its 
maximalist goals as well as the beginnings of Israeli settlement 
construction on the territories captured in 1967. Gilbert also brings 
up the positive outlook generally held by the Israeli public during 
these years, as well as the immigration of a fairly large amount of 
Soviet Jews.
When it comes to the issues that have been discussed above in 
chapter three, Gilbert mentions the adoption of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 242. In relation to resolution 242, 
Gilbert makes two specific observations: (1) that it acknowledges the 
territorial and sovereign rights of all states in the area, including 
Israel; and (2) that it fails to mention the name Israel, This last point 
was distressing to the Israelis, a view Gilbert seems to share, in that it 
presumably showed an Arab unwillingness to refer to Israel by its 
proper name (and hence to accept its existence).
Gilbert furthermore brings up the secret decision made by the 
Israeli cabinet in June 1967, and this is how he describes it in relation
3 This section is based on Gilbert 1998, pp. 396-425.
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to the declaration made by the Arab League in Khartoum in 
September that same year:
Hardly had the war ended when, on 16 June 1967, the Israeli 
government conveyed far-reaching peace proposals to Egypt and 
Syria, through the good offices of the United States. These 
proposals included a readiness to withdraw from most of the West 
Bank, with only minor adjustments in the border. But when the 
Arab answer came, from the Khartoum Arab summit conference 
on September 1, it was a resounding negative, three negatives in 
fact: ‘No peace. No negotiation. No recogn ition .’t
The message Gilbert wants to convey here is quite clear: that Israel 
sincerely sought to resolve the conflict through peaceful means, but 
that the Arabs were of a different opinion, Israel is here portrayed as 
the reasonable party to the conflict, whereas the Arabs are described 
in less than levelheaded terms. It should also be pointed out here that 
Gilbert often “lumps” the Arabs all together, without making any 
distinctions between the perceptions of the different states.
The Arab unreasonableness conveyed by Gilbert above is also 
seen in how Nasser’s decision to embark on the War of Attrition is 
described. Nasser is said to have begun the war in order to regain the 
territories lost in 1967 and by this action to have completely rejected 
the hand offered by Golda Meir, the then newly appointed Israeli 
prime minister. Meir’s first statement in her new position, according 
to Gilbert, was that she was prepared to discuss peace with all of 
Israel’s neighbors at any time. Quite naturally, Nasser beginning the 
War of Attrition within days of this statement was a rejection of 
Meir’s pacific intentions. It should also be pointed out here that 
Gilbert does not discuss the initiatives launched to settle the 
Egyptian-Israeli conflict peacefully in 1971 (see below).
4 Gilbert 1998, p. 402. In other sources where this decision is discussed, it is most 
commonly said to have been made on June 19, and not June 16 as indicated by 
Gilbert. Furthermore, it is also said in a number of sources that it is not at all clear 
that the United States informed either Egypt or Syria of the secret decision.
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The War of 1 Q7 3
When discussing the War of 1973, Gilbert focuses to a large degree on 
the military events.5 Israel did not expect war beforehand and it was 
only on the morning of October 6, the same day the war began, that 
the military command realized that war was imminent. On realizing 
this, Israeli Chief of Staff David Elazar asked Moshe Dayan, the 
minister of defense, for permission to undertake a preemptive strike 
like the one six years earlier. Dayan, however, declined on the 
grounds that it would make Israel look like the aggressor and because 
the US had warned Israel from firing the first shot.
Gilbert does not portray the War of 1973 in as gloomy a light as he 
described the time right before the War of 1967. The same hopeless 
feeling of an impending doomsday is not conveyed here. Gilbert, in 
other words, does not present the War of 1973 as having been a fight 
for Israel’s very existence.6
When discussing the cease-fire agreement that came into effect on 
October 22 but that was broken almost immediately afterwards, 
Gilbert writes that it was indeed broken by all parties. But, the view 
that is generally conveyed by Gilbert is that the cease-fire was mostly 
broken by Egypt and Syria. These two parties were more responsible 
for why the cease-fire did not last than was Israel.
Gilbert hardly goes into why the war broke out at all in the first 
place, and Syria’s reasons for choosing to engage in another war are 
not discussed. The following quote is the only instance where Gilbert 
discusses possible reasons for Egypt to embark on the war:
Egypt had regained its honour: this was the object of the attack in 
the first place, rather than any sweeping forward through Sinai to
s This section is based on Gilbert 1998, pp. 426-61.
6 On one occasion, however, Gilbert makes a remark that could indicate that he 
views the war as a having been a fight for Israel’s very existence. Discussing the fact 
that the war broke out on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, Gilbert makes the 
case that it was in fact easier to mobilize than it perhaps would have been 
otherwise: “The fact that so many were in synagogue or at home saved the State.” 
(Gilbert 1998, p. 432)
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the borders of Israel itself. For Egypt the October War was a war 
not of conquest, but of self-assertions
Egypt’s aims, in other words, were not entirely aggressive in this war, 
whereas the lack of any discussion on the possible aims of Syria with 
this campaign could indicate that the latter’s only motivation was 
sheer aggression.
The rise of the PLO
Just like the inter-state Arab-Israeli relations that were interspersed 
in the text in the chapter on the time following the War of 1967, the 
Palestinian component of the conflict during these years is also 
described in different sections in this chapter.8 Although the ins and 
outs regarding the battle of Karameh was rejected as a main theme 
due to the difficulty in ascertaining which view was to be said to be 
the pro-Arab and vice versa, there is an aspect that Gilbert brings up 
regarding the attack that is of interest. Apparently, when the attack 
was being planned, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli minister of defense, 
went on an archeological dig near Holon in central Israel. Archeology 
was a hobby of Dayan’s, as it seems to have been for a number of 
prominent Israelis, but this dig was to have dire consequences as the 
trench that Dayan was excavating collapsed on top of him. Dayan was 
completely buried by the collapsing dirt and had to receive medical 
attention after he was dug out. The interesting aspect of this is not 
the accident in itself, but that Gilbert writes that Fatah claimed that 
Dayan had in fact been injured in a Fatah raid while he was 
supervising the preparations for the attack on Karameh. That Fatah 
would falsely make a claim like this about something so easily 
corroborated or disproved shows the low regard Gilbert holds of the 
mental capacities of this organization.
Gilbert in general does not differentiate between the various 
Palestinian groups. When discussing the international terrorism that
7 Gilbert 1998, p. 460.
8 This section is based on Gilbert 1998, pp. 396-425.
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took place in the late !96os/early 1970s, Gilbert makes no distinction 
between the different organizations and just says that Palestinians 
committed terror. Likewise with regard to relations between the 
Palestinian movement and Jordan’s King Hussein, Gilbert simply 
says that the PLO attempted to overthrow the king.
Gilbert does not go into the how the PLO policy of a “democratic, 
secular state for all its citizens” is to be interpreted. He is quite clear, 
however, how he views the ultimate goals of the PLO. For instance, 
he quotes Yasser Arafat as saying that the aim of the PLO is to 
liberate the land from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River, and 
that the major cause is not concerned with the results of the War of 
1967 but rather to eliminate the Zionist entity from Palestine.?
Conclusion
Martin Gilbert’s book on the histoiy of Israel is all in all quite pro- 
Israeli. The Arab side is portrayed throughout as being the aggressor, 
and the only exception really is that Egypt is not said to have had 
maximalist goals when embarking on the War of 1973. Egypt, in other 
words, did not have the overarching goal of eliminating the state of 
Israel, but rather more limited and political goals.
Israel in Gilbert’s book is portrayed as either the victim of Arab 
hostile intentions, or as the reasonable party in the conflict that tries 
to settle it through peaceful means.
9 Gilbert does not give a reference for the quote paraphrased above.
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Mark Tessler
Mark Tessler’s A  History o f the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict was 
published in 1994. It is a broad survey of the conflict from the 
emergence of Zionism and Arab nationalism in the nineteenth 
century up to the signing of the Declaration of Principles (or Oslo 
Accords) in 1993. The scope of the book is quite large and it consists 
of over 900 pages if one includes endnotes and bibliography.
Mark Tessler is a political scientist who at the time of writing was 
professor at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He currently 
holds tenure at the University of Michigan.
War of 1067
Contrary to Martin Gilbert discussed above, Tessler discusses the 
issue of Israeli threats having been made against Syria in May of 
1967.10 As discussed in the chapter on the War of 1967 above, it is in a 
number of cases argued that a contributing factor to the crisis in the 
spring of 1967 were the threats issued by Israel to Syria that it curtail 
the guerrilla activities of Fatah or face the consequences. Tessler 
discusses these threats and although he says it is impossible to say 
whether Israel intended to carry them out or not, they were in his 
opinion critical for raising the temperature in the area.
As far as the removal of UNEF is concerned, Tessler is of the 
opinion that although it is not entirely clear what happened, Nasser 
initially did not want the whole of this force to be removed.11 He did 
not want the positions in Gaza and at Sharm el-Sheikh—i.e. the 
positions most likely to develop into trouble spots—to be abandoned.
10 This section is based on Tessler 1994, pp. 378-97.
11 As discussed in chapter two above, there is controversy regarding the nature of 
Egypt’s initial request for having UNEF removed. Did Egypt initially want the 
whole of the peace-keeping force removed, or did it only want the UN force to 
abandon certain positions? As discussed above, this controversy is only broached in 
a few sources and Tessler is one of these. In most other sources, on the other hand, 
it is simply just said that Egypt initially wanted either a complete or a limited 
withdrawal without mentioning that it is in fact less than clear what actually 
happened.
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Furthermore, Tessler brings up the two views held regarding Nasser’s 
intentions for having UNEF removed: the view that this was due to 
Nasser’s aggressive intentions and the view that the request to have 
UNEF removed was a political move. Tessler, in contrast to Gilbert 
above, leans toward the latter interpretation. Tessler also mentions 
that Israel was asked to accept UNEF on its side of the border but 
refused. Israel having accepted UNEF on its side of the border would 
have lessened Israeli-Egyptian tension, Tessler argues, but it would 
not have solved the issue over the Straits of Tiran.
If Nasser’s actions so far, according to Tessler, had been relatively 
moderate and politically guided, the Egyptian closing of the Straits of 
Tiran was different. Although Tessler says that it is of course not 
possible to know for sure what Nasser’s intentions were for closing 
the straits, he also contends that "in taking this step, Nasser and 
other Egyptian leaders understood that it would be considered a 
casus belli by Israel.”12 The closing of the Straits of Tiran was the 
turning point in the crisis and what made an armed clash inevitable.
When King Hussein of Jordan traveled to Cairo and signed a 
mutual defense pact with Nasser on May 30, Israel’s situation 
worsened quite seriously. Israel prior to the war not only faced 
superior numbers of Arab troops and military hardware, but it also 
faced the difficult prospect of having to fight a war on three fronts. 
When Israel chose to strike on June 5, the major factor for why it won 
was the surprise air strikes on the air forces of its adversaries.
The time of 1067-73
Just as Gilbert above, Tessler deals with the time between the wars of 
1967 and 1973 by discussing different aspects.^ Dealing with the 
inter-state politics of the time, Tessler offers a quite detailed 
discussion on the declaration of the Arab League in Khartoum. Here, 
Tessler first tells his readers how analysts of a more pro-Israeli
12 Tessler 1994, p. 392.
This section is based on Tessler 1994, pp. 407-481.
188
Four examples
persuasion have tended to see the Khartoum Declaration as extreme 
and intransigent. Tessler then proceeds to discuss the declaration in 
the framework of it in fact being moderate in nature. First, there is no 
talk of the destruction of Israel in the declaration. Second, there is an 
emphasis for unified political efforts to secure an Israeli withdrawal. 
Third, the three noes (no peace, no recognition and no negotiations 
with Israel) can be seen as being bargaining chips, so to say, and to be 
traded in for similar Israeli concessions. Although Tessler does not 
say so explicitly, he does lean toward the latter view in seeing the 
Khartoum Declaration as being quite moderate in nature.
Having discussed the declaration at Khartoum, Tessler then 
moves on to UN Security Council Resolution 242 before he continues 
to discuss the War of Attrition. The War of Attrition, according to 
Tessler, began as a result of Egypt's declared objective of destroying 
the Israeli defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal 
(the so-called Bar-Lev Line). The Egyptian attack was in other words 
an attempt to prevent the situation from developing into a situation 
of permanent status quo. Another reason for why Nasser decided to 
embark on war in 1969, although this was never stated at the time, 
was to create a sense of urgency among the great powers and the 
United Nations to solve the situation along the Egyptian-Israeli 
cease-fire line. The War of Attrition, in other words, was started 
primarily for political reasons.
Tessler is quite brief when it comes to the initiatives of UN 
mediator Gunnar Jarring and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. On 
Gunnar Jarring, Tessler does not discuss the plan drafted by the 
Swedish diplomat in 1971, but simply concludes that “the Jarring 
mission came to an end in April 1969 having made almost no real 
progress toward the resolution of the c o n f l i c t s  Sadat is described as 
having tried unsuccessfully to resolve the conflict with Israel through 
diplomacy. Tessler only mentions Sadat’s attempts briefly in a few
*4 Tessler 1994, p. 422.
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sentences and does not mention the specific initiative launched by 
the Egyptian president in early 1971. Tessler, however, does bring up 
another initiative launched by Sadat in 1971, but then only in an 
endnote:
Sadat had also sought a diplomatic breakthrough in 1971, taking 
action that some considered as dramatic as his expulsion of Soviet 
advisors the following year. Early in 1971, he gave an interview to 
Newsweek editor Arnaud de Borchgrave, in which he stated that 
Egypt was ready to recognize and make peace with Israel. De 
Borchgrave flew to Jerusalem with this information and told 
Prime Minister Golda Meir that Sadat would soon repeat his offer 
of peace to UN envoy Gunnar Jarring. Meir dismissed Sadat’s 
overture, however, leading some Israeli analysts, as well as de 
Borchgrave, to conclude that “Mrs. Meir here missed the greatest 
opportunity to prevent the [1973] war.”^
War of 1Q73
Mark Tessler does not deal with the War of 1973 at any great length.16 
He begins his account by giving details about the Egyptian and Syrian 
surprise attack, and how completely taken off guard the Israeli army 
found itself when the war started. Tessler then proceeds to discuss 
how the war eventually came to turn to Israel’s advantage, and that 
the situation was quite different from the initial outset when the war 
ended on October 24: “The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] had 
transformed what veiy nearly had been a disaster for the Jewish state 
into a total military victory.”^ Tessler, in other words and as 
compared with some other sources, does not go into the issue of the 
broken cease-fire of October 22.
After having discussed the war and how it ended, Tessler moves 
on to discuss possible reasons for why the two Arab states chose to 
launch the war in the first place. Prior to this discussion, in other
x5 Tessler 1994, note 30, p. 479. Brackets around the year 1973 in original. Contrary 
to the quote above regarding Gunnar Jarring having ended his mission in 1969, one 
is here given the impression that he was still working for a diplomatic solution in 
1971.
16 This section is based on Tessler 1994, pp. 474-81.
Tessler 1994, p. 477.
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words, Tessler merely describes the war as an Arab attack without an 
apparent objective. Discussing Arab objectives for launching the war, 
Tessler does not go into the objectives of Syria at any greater length. 
He does, however, indicate a certain Syrian moderation as he says 
that it had informally accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 
in 1972.
When Tessler discusses the goals held by Egypt, he argues that 
President Sadat’s plan all along was political and diplomatic at its 
core. The war was never intended to be anything more than a limited 
campaign with the aim of capturing enough territory to convince the 
Israelis that the key to Israel’s security was not holding on to 
territorial buffers, but rather to have good relations with their 
neighbors.
Interestingly enough—although Tessler is quite clear in his view 
that at least Egypt fought the war for strictly political reasons—he 
does not go into the question of which side is ultimately to blame for 
the war being fought in the first place. If the war was not fought for 
anything but political reasons, it is an interesting question which side 
is more to blame for why politics and diplomacy did not produce any 
results prior to the war. But, as already mentioned, Tessler does not 
delve into this issue.
The rise of the PLO
On the rise of the PLO, Tessler provides a fairly extensive account of 
how the organization went through a number of crucial 
organizational changes after the War of 1967. He also goes into the 
ideological changes that also took place within the Palestinian 
movement during these years. When discussing the PLO formula for 
a "democratic, secular state for all its citizens,” Tessler brings up the 
fact that the formula was not seen as being sincere within Israel, as 
well as by a number of analysts. The formula was a euphemism for 
the destruction of the Jewish state. Speaking more broadly on PLO 
ideology at the time, Tessler says that:
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[e]ven though some critical analyses of the PLO’s ideology may be 
persuasive, it does not follow that the Palestinians’ proposals were 
put forward with duplicity and cynicism. Like any similar 
document, the 1968 PLO charter reflected the political 
environment within in which it was drafted; and in this case the 
tensions and contradictions identified by the PLO’s critics are in 
large measure a result of the organization’s deliberate use of 
constructive ambiguity.18
The formula, in other words, should be seen as having been sincere.
In relation to the situation in Jordan, Tessler argues, Fatah was 
initially opposed to interfering in the domestic affairs of Arab states. 
But, due to the great pressure exerted on the Jordanian regime by the 
more radical groups like the PFLP and DFLP, Fatah proved to be 
either unwilling or unable not to side with these smaller groups. This 
means that at the end of the day, Fatah—contrary to its stated policy 
of non-interference in internal Arab affairs—became a partner in the 
PLO challenge to King Hussein’s rule in Jordan. Fatah was thus 
responsible to some degree at least for the violent confrontation of 
September 1970.
Contrary to perhaps the majority of sources, Tessler does not 
discuss the Palestinian international terrorism of the time period to 
any larger degree. He only mentions it in a few instances and is all in 
all quite ambiguous on the organizational affiliations of the 
perpetrators. He does however mention a few actions as having been 
carried out specifically by the PFLP. As far as the Black September 
Organization is concerned, Tessler briefly just mentions it as having 
been a secret organization that carried out a number of terrorist 
attacks. He does not go into the question of its alleged or real 
connections with Fatah.
18 Tessler 1994, p. 442.
192
Four examples
Conclusion
Compared with Martin Gilbert above, Mark TesslerJs account is more 
even-handed in how he portrays the antagonists of the conflict. There 
is a sense of moderation in quite a few instances where the Arab side 
is described. The Arabs, in other words, are not just irrationally bent 
on Israel’s destruction, but do have some political and more 
moderate goals in some cases. Likewise, Israel is not universally 
praised but also at times criticized for its actions or inactions. In this 
sense, Tessler’s book is quite a bit more even-handed than Gilbert’s. 
Another central difference between the former and the latter is that 
Tessler does not clearly assign victimhood to either of the parties, like 
Gilbert did with regard to Israel.
Benny Morris
Just like Gilbert and Tessler discussed above, Benny Morris’ 
Righteous Victims: A  History oftheZionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 
is a comprehensive study of the conflict. Beginning its story in 1881, 
which is usually said to have been when modern Jewish immigration 
to Palestine began, Morris goes through the conflict in a 
chronological manner up to the time when the book was published. 
The book in general is quite comprehensive in scope and includes a 
great deal of analysis.
Benny Morris has in later years arguably become one of the 
better-known names in the field of the history of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. He became known in the late 1980s as one of Israel’s new 
historians (see chapter one above), and his book on the Palestinian 
refugee crisis, The Birth o f the Palestinian Refugee Problem , has 
become what is perhaps a standard text (or at least required reading) 
on the topic.
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The War o f  i q 6 7
Benny Morris begins his account on the War of 1967 by discussing 
the nature of the tensions along the Syrian-Israeli border.1® He 
furthermore brings up both Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and 
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol having made threats against Syria in the 
first half of May. Morris does not go into the intricacies of the initial 
Egyptian request for the removal of UNEF from its positions; he 
rather says that between May 16-18, Egypt requested that the whole 
of UNEF be removed. It would, however, seem as if Nasser may have 
hoped that the United Nations—either through the General Assembly 
or the Security Council—would have refused Egypt’s demand, and 
thus allowed the Egyptian president a political victory with his army 
present in the Sinai but with UNEF in place to separate it from the 
Israelis.
Morris sees both the removal of UNEF as well as the closing of the 
Straits of Tiran—factors that other sources see as examples of 
Nasser’s belligerent plans for Israel—as having been politically 
motivated. The significance of the pact between Jordan and Egypt 
signed in late May is not discussed at any greater length. Morris is 
quite clear though that even if the mood indeed was gloomy in Israel 
at the time and it was seen in many quarters as if a second Holocaust 
was in the making, Israel was never in any real danger:
The armies were extremely ill-matched. Israelis, throughout their 
history, have tended to see themselves as the “weaker side,” their 
army smaller and less well armed than their Arab enemies’. The 
truth, in 1967 as at other times, was different.20
And, despite some initial Egyptian plans for a preemptive strike 
against Israel in May, captured Egyptian documents show that the 
over-arching strategy was defensive in nature. Even though Morris
These tensions included the alleged or real Syrian support for Palestinian 
guerrilla raids against Israel, the issue over the use of water from the Jordan River 
and its tributaries and the issue of farming rights in the demilitarized zone (the 
DMZ) between the two states. This section is based on Morris 1999, pp. 302-329.
20 Morris 1999, p. 311.
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argues that Israel was the strongest party from the outset, he also 
argues that the surprise air strikes carried out by Israel at the 
beginning of the war were instrumental in securing its victory.
Contraiy to Gilbert and Tessler discussed above, Morris to some 
extent discusses Israeli misconduct in the war. Some Egyptian 
prisoners of war, for instance, are said to have been killed by their 
Israeli captors, and it is also said that some Israeli commanders on 
the West Bank forced Palestinians living there to flee. This was to 
have taken place without the approval of the Israeli cabinet. Lastly, 
Morris also brings up the Israeli army systematically destroying 
houses in certain West Bank towns, as well as completely leveling 
four villages in the so-called Latrun salient close to the Tel Aviv- 
Jerusalem highway.
The time of 1067-73
Morris begins his discussion on the inter-state relations during the 
time of 1967-73 by bringing up the secret decision made by the Israeli 
cabinet shortly after the war.21 Through this decision, the Israeli 
cabinet decided that it was willing to give back the Sinai and the 
Golan Heights to Egypt and Syria respectively in exchange for full 
peace. This decision was never made public, but it was transmitted to 
both states through the United States. Both Egypt and Syria, 
however, rejected the overture.
Moving on to the resolution adopted by the Arab League in 
Khartoum in September 1967, Morris describes it as “a defiant, 
rejectionist platform that was to bedevil all peace moves in the region 
for a decade.”22 It was partly due to the harsh Arab position as well as 
due to domestic Israeli factors that the secret decision made a few 
months earlier came to lose in significance.
When President Nasser of Egypt launched the War of Attrition in 
1969, Morris argues, it was in order to induce direct pressure on
21 This section is based on Morris 1999, pp. 329-63,387-400.
22 Morris 1999, p. 345f.
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Israel—as well as indirect pressure through the superpowers—to 
withdraw from the Egyptian territory. The war, in other words, was 
launched with a political objective in mind. On the War of Attrition, 
Morris also says that the primary objective behind Israel’s decision 
for escalating the war through in-depth bombings of the Egyptian 
interior was to reach a cease-fire agreement along the Suez Canal. A 
possible secondary objective could however have been to have Nasser 
overthrown.^
Discussing the peace initiative of UN mediator Gunnar Jarring, 
Morris says that this was the first time Egypt officially declared a 
willingness to live in peace with Israel. Israel, on the other hand, 
rejected the proposal and Morris seems to be somewhat critical of 
Israel for having taken this course of action. Similarly, Morris also 
brings up the plan for an interim settlement of the conflict proposed 
by President Sadat. Israel eventually did accept some of the required 
concessions, Morris argues, but when it did was too late. Morris 
seems to convey some disappointment with Israel for not having 
acted sooner and more decisively.
War of 1973
Already from the outset when discussing the War of 1973, Morris 
makes it clear that neither Egypt nor Syria sought to destroy Israel.^  
The war was not a fight for Israel’s survival. However, the objectives 
for the war were different for Egypt and Syria. The former sought to 
capture a slice of land on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and to 
use the war to break the status quo. The war for Egypt was political 
and the real results of the war, it was anticipated, were to come after 
the war had ended. For Syria, on the other hand, the attack on Israel 
was seen as a way to capture what it had lost in 1967: the Golan 
Heights. Syria, in other words, did have larger and perhaps more
23 See chapter 3 for a discussion on the in-depth bombings. 
=4 This section is based on Morris 1999, pp. 387-441.
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aggressive goals with launching the war but as already mentioned 
above, Morris does not see the War of 1973 as anything but limited.
When the war came, it came as a complete surprise for the 
Israelis. Morris sees this as partly being the result of a general Israeli 
disdain for the Arabs:
The Arabs’ success in springing this strategic surprise—a feat that 
has taken its place in military history alongside Hitler’s invasion 
of Russia and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor—owed much 
to the Israeli perception of the Arab forces as inherently 
incompetent, weak and incapable of mounting such a deception.^
Another interesting point that Morris brings up is that it seems, he 
argues, that some senior Israeli ministers early in the war (i.e. before 
it turned to Israel’s advantage) discussed the possibility of using 
nuclear weapons. Morris transmits the view that there is a great deal 
of uncertainty regarding this episode, but that it is possible that 
Prime Minister Golda Meir and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan 
ordered the arming of missiles with nuclear warheads and that 
nuclear arms may have been loaded onto a group of Israeli 
warplanes.
As far as the broken cease-fire of October 22 is concerned, Morris 
says that it was broken by both Egypt and Israel. The main difference, 
however, is that the Egyptian non-observance of the cease-fire was 
local in nature, whereas the Israeli disregard for the UN resolution 
was officially sanctioned from the top. It is also quite clear that the 
party that benefited from the fighting continuing for three more days 
was Israel.
Morris is quite clear on the issue of which side is mostly to blame 
for why the war took place in the first place. It was Israel and its 
intransigence that ultimately led Sadat to reach the conclusion that a 
limited war was the only option to recover the Egyptian territory lost 
in 1967.
25 M orris 1 9 9 9 , p . 3 9 4 .
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The rise of the PLO
Benny Morris deals quite extensively with the rise of the PLO that 
took place after the War of 1967.26 One aspect, however, of the history 
of the PLO during this time period that he does not deal with is the 
PLO policy of a “democratic, secular state for all its citizens.” This is 
not dealt with at all in Morris5 book.
When delving upon the question of the relations between the PLO 
and King Hussein of Jordan, Morris argues that it was the Palestinian 
movement as a whole that challenged the Jordanian regime. 
Although it was the PFLP that was behind the hijackings of three 
commercial jets that came to be the catalyst that brought about the 
violent confrontation in September 1970, Morris does not 
differentiate between the various member organizations of the PLO 
in general regarding the power struggle in Jordan.
On the issue of the international terrorism carried out by 
Palestinians in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Morris does 
differentiate between the various groups. It was the more radical 
groups like the PFLP that carried out these attacks. The mainstream 
organization of Fatah was opposed to these kinds of operations.
This, however, changed with the forming of the Black September 
Organization. The BSO was a secret arm of Fatah, Morris argues, and 
was formed as a compromise between the more moderate and 
extreme forces within this organization. In fact, Morris is of the 
opinion that the moderate wing of Fatah had to accept the creation of 
the BSO in order to survive.
Rounding up his section on the rise of the PLO, Morris gives a 
fairly good insight on how he sees the significance of the Palestinian 
renaissance that began after 1967:
26 This section is based on Morris 1999, pp. 363-86.
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The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the 
crushing of the Arab armies in June 1967 reenergized the 
Palestinian people and put the Palestinian problem back on the 
international agenda. An issue dead for close to twenty years had 
suddenly come alive; it was kept alive, and the Palestinian people 
were mobilized and motivated, by dint of unremitting 
guerrilla/terrorist activities against Israel. A desperate people 
both rediscovered its identity and found a means of expressing its 
political will through violence. Palestinian guerrilla warfare across 
the Jordan River and over the Lebanese-Israeli frontier may have 
been of no more than nuisance value, militarily speaking. But it 
gave Jerusalem and the world no respite and in various ways kept 
the Arab states, generally unenthusiastic about doing battle with 
Israel, mobilized in varying degrees behind the Palestinian 
cause.2?
Conclusion
As already mentioned above, Benny Morris became known in the 
latter part of the 1980s as one of Israel’s so-called new historians. As 
such, he was said to be more critical of Israel and its actions than had 
previously been the case in Israeli historiography. In the book used in 
this thesis and discussed above, it is clear that Morris at times is quite 
critical of how Israel has acted. For instance, he seems to be quite 
firm in his view that Israel, through its intransigence, is mostly to 
blame for why there was no peaceful solution to the conflict with 
Egypt and why the War of 1973 came to be fought at all.
Nevertheless, Morris also offers some blame on the Arab side to 
the conflict when he for instance labels the Khartoum Declaration as 
having been defiant and rejectionist. He also conveys a sense of being 
somewhat suspicious, and not at all all-embracing, of the PLO. Even 
though Israel in Morris’ book does receives the lion’s share of blame, 
he does not assign victimhood to the Arab side as clearly as Gilbert 
did with regard to Israel.
27 Morris 1999, p. 385b
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Fred Khouri
Fred J. Khouris The Arab-Israeli Dilemma is perhaps somewhat 
different from the works analyzed above. Khouri’s book is more 
focused on analysis than the others, although it of course consists of a 
large amount of narrative.28 Like the other works, Khouri sets out to 
give a complete account of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the 
beginnings of Zionism and the Jewish immigration in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. The difference, however, between Khouri 
and the other sources is that Khouri has specific chapters dedicated 
to more particular questions such as the Palestinian refugees or the 
precarious nature of Jerusalem. The works of Gilbert, Tessler and 
Morris are more focused on the telling of a story.
Another difference is also that Khouri focuses more on the 
political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict—for instance with 
regard to the role of the UN—and less on the military aspects. 
Khouri’s book is the third edition of a book that was originally 
published in 1968. The second edition was published in 1976.
Fred Khouri was a professor of political science at Villanova 
University in Pennsylvania at the time of writing. He was of Lebanese 
origin, although he was born in the United States. He has written 
quite extensively on the Middle East and was also associate editor of 
the Journal o f  South Asian and Middle Eastern Affairs.
War of IQ67
Khouri devotes quite a large segment of his book to the War of 1967.29 
He first goes through the issues regarding Israeli-Syrian relations and 
the border disputes that took place prior to the war. Khouri then 
proceeds to discuss the threats that were made by Israel against Syria
28 As can be recalled from the first chapter, all sources used in this thesis need to 
have a focus on narrative as compared with analysis. As the methodology employed 
focuses on comparison, it is important that the sources used are as similar as 
possible. Hence, all sources used have more of a focus on the narrative aspects than 
the analytical.
29 This section is based on Khouri 1985, pp. 242-92.
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in the middle of May and that these threats played a part in the 
development of the crisis that would lead to the war. On May 16, after 
having deployed additional troops to the Sinai, President Nasser of 
Egypt requested that some UNEF positions be abandoned so that 
they could be taken over by the Egyptian army. Nasser, in other 
words, did not seek the full removal of UNEF. U Thant, secretary- 
general of the United Nations, refused to accept a partial removal and 
Nasser was thus faced with the choice of letting UNEF remain as a 
whole or to be completely removed. He chose the latter. Nasser’s 
motive for having UNEF removed, Khouri argues, was both due to 
internal and external pressure to do so, but also in order to effectively 
deter a possible Israeli attack on Syria. At this point, U Thant asked 
Israel to accept UNEF on its side of the border but this was declined 
by Israel.
Just like Nasser’s decision to have UNEF removed from its 
positions was political in nature, so was his closing of the Straits if 
Tiran. Nasser felt himself to be under great pressure to take this 
course of action and although it was also a way for him to reassert his 
position as a leader of the Arab world, he did not seek to go to war 
against Israel.
The pact that was signed between Egypt and Jordan at the end of 
May did not present Israel with a great threat, as it would have been 
necessary for months of coordination and cooperation to pass for the 
pact to be effective from a military point of view. Israel’s position was 
not dire prior to the war and the fact that Israel refused to accept 
UNEF on its side of the border indicates that the Israeli leadership 
did not see the situation in this light either. Israel was the strongest 
party militarily all along, and that is why it won the war:
There were many factors which contributed to Israel’s swift and 
conclusive victoiy. As in earlier wars, the Israelis started out with 
excellent military intelligence, supply, and communication 
services; well-trained and disciplined soldiers had great fighting 
spirit and the skill to make full use of modern military equipment
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and techniques; highly competent military leaders who had 
effectively coordinated air and ground units into a single, mobile 
striking force had devised a daring, offensive strategy and a 
unified command; and benefited from short lines of 
communications .30
All in all, Khouri is quite clear regarding which side he believes to be 
more responsible for the war. The most important factor for why the 
Arab side could be said to share some of the blame for the war, 
Khouri argues, is due to its use of inflammatory and bellicose 
language during the crisis leading up to the war. This did not calm 
the situation—quite the reverse—but the largest part of the blame on 
the war lies with Israel for acting aggressively and seemingly not 
wanting to solve the crisis through peaceful means.
The time of 1067-73
Khouri deals really quite extensively with the time period following 
the War of 1967, and then mostly from an analytical point of view .31  
He does not discuss the secret decision made by the Israeli cabinet 
right after the war, but as can be recalled from the discussion in 
chapter three this is not to be construed as being inherently pro- 
Arab. The theme regarding the secret decision, as can be recalled, was 
rejected on the grounds that it could not be assumed that eveiyone 
was aware of it having been made. Khouri, on the contrary however, 
does say that by the end of the summer of 1967, Prime Minister 
Eshkol, as well as other prominent Israelis, was referring to a Greater 
Israel that would have the natural borders of the Suez Canal and the 
Jordan River.
When discussing the declaration agreed upon by the members of 
the Arab League in Khartoum in September 1967, Khouri says that 
the terminology of the three noes was included mostly as a matter of 
form as this kind of language was popular with the Arab masses. The 
essence of the declaration in Khartoum was its emphasis on working
30 K h ou ri 1 9 8 5 , p . 2 6 o f .
31 This section is based on Khouri 1985, pp. 308-70.
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on the international and diplomatic levels to regain the lost Arab 
territories. There was no talk in the declaration of destroying Israel, 
and in fact the declaration cleared the way for the Arab moderates in 
that they could pursue a political solution and offer Israel everything 
short of formal recognition and peace.
When Nasser launched the War of Attrition in 1969, the plan, 
Khouri argues, was to inflict heavy losses in personnel and also to 
disrupt the Israeli economy. The aim of the war was political in 
nature, as the objective was to show Israel as well as the rest of the 
world that Egypt did not accept the Suez Canal becoming the de facto  
border between the two states.
Writing on the initiative launched by Gunnar Jarring, the UN 
mediator, in early 1971, Khouri says that Egypt accepted it and hence 
declared itself willing to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. 
Israel, on the other hand, declared that it would not return to the 
borders that were in place prior to 1967, and hence came to reject the 
Jarring initiative. Khouri goes on to say that Egypt received a fair 
amount of praise for its acceptance, whereas Israel was criticized for 
not responding more favorably.
Likewise, with regard to the plan for an interim agreement 
launched by President Sadat in 1971, Israel also rejected the plan by 
being unwilling to make the necessary concessions. In general, 
Khouri transmits a view throughout of being critical of what he sees 
as Israeli intransigence. The following quote illustrates this view:
Distrustful of Arab intentions and convinced that time was on 
their side and they could maintain military superiority 
indefinitely, that Israel had more to gain than lose from 
prolonging the status quo, and that any attempt to seek a detailed 
Israeli peace program would cause the downfall of the delicately 
balanced government coalition which was deeply divided on 
territorial and other issues, Israeli officials refused, despite the 
urgings of some American officials and some Israelis, to take any 
serious peace initiative and decided to sit tight politically and to
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wait for the Arabs to become “realistic” to the point where they 
would make the first move.s2
War of 1 Q7 3
Khouri is quite brief in how he deals with the War of 1973, and the 
details of the actual war are only given about a page of t e x t . 3 3  The war, 
in Khouri’s view, was launched by Egypt and Syria for strictly 
political reasons. The purpose was to launch a limited war that was to 
break the political stalemate. The war was to be followed by a 
political process with the aim of recovering the Egyptian and Syrian 
territories lost in 1967. The war was clearly not launched for strictly 
aggressive reasons.
When discussing the broken cease-fire, Khouri does not say 
anything of it having been broken by Egyptian forces. It was only 
Israel that broke the cease-fire, Khouri seems to say, and this was 
done in order to destroy the almost completely surrounded Egyptian 
Third Army. This army, as can be recalled from chapter four, was 
trapped on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, but it still had open 
supply lines with the rear at the time of the October 22 cease-fire. 
When the fighting finally ended on October 25, however, the Third 
Army was completely encircled by Israeli troops. This is what Khouri 
is referring to when he says that Israel sought to destroy the army 
group.
Khouri is quite clear which side is to blame for why the war was 
fought in the first place:
Fully convinced now that all paths to a peaceful return of 
occupied Arab lands had been blocked by Israeli intransigence 
and American and Soviet unwillingness to act, the leaders of 
Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia concluded that they were left with 
no alternative to war.34
32 Khouri 1985, p. 365.
33 This section is based on Khouri 1985, pp. 356-72.
34 Khouri 1985, p. 369f.
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Although the Egypt and Syria, with Saudi backing, fired the first shot, 
the blame clearly rests on the shoulders of Israel. The war would not 
have taken place had the Arab states felt that there was a viable and 
realistic way of getting their lost territories back. And, the chief 
reason for why there was no perceived option for the Arab states to 
peacefully regain their lost lands was Israeli intransigence.
The rise of the PLO
The rise of the PLO in the late 1960s and early 1970s does not receive 
a great deal of attention from K houri.35 Despite that, however, Khouri 
gives a fairly comprehensive rundown of the events and processes 
pertaining to this organization during the time period in question. On 
the policy of a “democratic, secular state for all its citizens” he says 
that the common and accepted goal of all member groups of the PLO 
was to dismantle the Zionist state of Israel, and to replace it with a 
secular and democratic state for both Jews and Palestinians. This 
policy, Khouri seems to argue, was a sincere attempt to settle the 
conflict.
When Khouri discusses the Palestinian use of international 
terrorism, he says that it was the more radical groups like the PFLP 
that embarked on this strategy. The more moderate Palestinians as 
well as moderate Arabs in general came to strongly criticize these 
actions as they were seen to discredit the Palestinian and Arab causes 
in the eyes of the rest of the world. Although Khouri does not say so 
specifically, he seems to agree with this view. Khouri furthermore 
does not mention the Black September Organization at all in his 
book.
Contrary to the view discussed above on international terrorism 
having been undertaken by the more radical groups like the PFLP, 
when discussing the confrontation that took place in Jordan in 1970 
Khouri does not make any distinction between the various member
35 This section is based on Khouri 1985, pp. 356-61.
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groups of the PLO. Instead, he describes it as the guerrilla movement 
gaining so much in influence and power as to more or less becoming 
a state within the state. The violent confrontation that eventually 
took place is then portrayed as having been virtually inevitable.
Conclusion
If Martin Gilbert is to be said to have been mostly pro-Israeli in his 
outlook, then Khouri’s perspective is equally visibly pro-Arab. The 
War of 1967 is presented as mostly being Israel’s fault. Likewise, 
Israel is also to blame for why there was no peaceful settlement in the 
interwar years and for why the War of 1973 broke out. The 
Palestinian aspect of the conflict, although only discussed briefly by 
Khouri, is also presented from a pro-Arab perspective.
Just like Gilbert assigns the status of victims to the Israelis, so 
does Khouri when he views the Arab side as being the victim in the 
conflict. One major difference, however, is that whereas Gilbert 
portrays the Israelis as being the victims of Arab aggression and non- 
acceptance of Israel as a whole, Khouri paints a picture of the Arabs 
being the victims—not so much of sheer naked Israeli aggression— 
but rather of Israeli arrogance and narrow-mindedness. In a sense, 
Khouri’s designation of victimhood is quite a bit softer than that of 
Gilbert.
Conclusion
From the overview above, it is quite clear that how the author 
positions him- or herself in relation to the main themes has great 
bearing on how the different actors in the conflict are portrayed. 
There is a distinct difference between Gilbert and Khouri, but also 
between, for example, Khouri and Morris. What the above overview 
perhaps shows most clearly is that although all the sources above are
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biased in the sense that they in the majority of cases position 
themselves in relation to the main themes, they are also individual 
works that are quite different.
That Gilbert and Khouri quite clearly are pro-Israeli and pro-Arab 
respectively is more or less clear from above. But what about Tessler 
and Morris? Are they pro-Arab or pro-Israeli? These two sources are 
harder to pin down conclusively how they are to be deemed, as they 
have both pro-Israeli and pro-Arab attributes as seen through the use 
of the methodology of themes. In that sense, they are more even- 
handed than Gilbert and Khouri, but that is not to say that they 
necessarily are more objective. Whether even-handedness, or not 
clearly being either pro-Israeli or pro-Arab, is to be construed as 
being objective, or at least more objective than clearly taking sides, is 
discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis. And, this is where 
we now turn.
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Almost anyone even vaguely familiar with the Arab-Israeli conflict 
would probably agree with the statement that the conflict is very 
current—and has been so for a long time—and that it is also 
politicized to a large degree. Besides those directly involved in the 
conflict, whose interest is self-evident, the conflict also has its 
adversaries in places not directly affected by it. There are many in 
both Europe as well as in the United States who have strong feelings 
regarding the conflict and in a lot of cases for or against its 
antagonists. And, besides the fact that the conflict generates much 
emotion, it also generates a great amount of reporting and interest 
due to it being so ever-present.
Besides generating a vast amount of reporting and commentary, 
the Arab-Israeli conflict has also resulted in a substantial amount of 
historical studies: both regarding more specific events and aspects as 
well as more general surveys. However, though, there has only been a 
small amount of studies written on the historiography of the conflict, 
and a more thorough study on the question of bias with regard to this 
highly politicized conflict has never been published.
As discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, there are 
some major questions that are to be discussed in this thesis:
(1) Is the methodology used reliable and useful for detecting bias?
(2) What is the nature of the established bias? What kinds of 
classifications can be made? How can bias be seen in the 
sources analyzed?
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(3) What is to be considered propaganda, and what is to be 
considered more as differences of opinion?
(4) Is it possible to write objectively on a highly politicized topic 
such as the Arab-Israeli conflict?
These questions are all dealt with below, in addition to some 
concluding remarks on possible future research. We first, however, 
turn to the question of methodology.
Evaluating the methodology
Part of this undertaking in examining the nature of bias in relation to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict was the development of a methodology 
suited for this task. Compared with other disciplines, the study of 
history in general would at first sight perhaps come off as not being 
too concerned with issues of methodology. This is true in some 
respects, but in some it is not. Ever since the rise of the more 
scientific approach to the study of history in the nineteenth centuiy, 
historians have been more critical and analytical regarding the use of 
sources. Is the source authentic? Who wrote it and why? How reliable 
is this source? This critical approach to sources is not only crucial in 
the writing of histoiy, but it has also become so commonplace that its 
use is usually not problematized.
In some more specialized forms of history, there are indeed really 
quite clear-cut methodologies. Economic or social history, for 
instance, which often rely on different numerical results frequently 
use various statistical and quantitative methods.
Studying historiography, or the writing of histoiy, has become 
more and more popular in the last decade or so. Here, the 
methodology used is most often quite commonsensical and 
frequently not delved into. The methodology used is often part of the
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major question. If, for instance, you are looking at how the area of 
Kosovo is described in Serbian historiography over time, what you 
would have to do is basically to decide which sources to use and then 
see how Kosovo is dealt with. Maybe you would want to make 
different classifications/subdivisions depending on the subject 
matter—for example the role of the Turks and Islam, or the nature of 
the Serbian claim to the area—but the methodology is still guided by 
the major question at hand. Studying historiography, as compared 
with other branches of histoiy, is probably the specialization that 
involves the most back-and-forth play between the historian and the 
sources he or she uses. Studying historiography, in other words, is 
arguably the most subjective of all specializations in the field of 
history.
Looking at what has previously been written on the historiography of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict (see the introductory chapter), it is quite 
clear that there is a need for moving away from just reading the 
sources and giving your view on them. Especially when it comes to 
examining the question of bias, when it is probably easy for almost 
anyone to fall into the trap of “I know it when I see it.” And, as the 
major question in this thesis was to examine bias, it was decided 
quite early on that there was a need for a more forthright 
methodology.
The methodology that has been used throughout is based on 
controversy: when there is significant disagreement in the sources 
how a certain event or situation is described or interpreted this is 
labeled a main theme. This initial labeling is done through the use of 
sampling, where a number of sources are used to establish these 
major differences. The themes are then analyzed and the different 
views classified as being either pro-Israeli or pro-Arab, depending on 
how they depict the adversaries. Outlooks where either Israel is 
described in positive terms or the Arab side described in a negative 
light are deemed pro-Israeli and vice versa. A major aspect in helping
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to decide whether or not a particular view is to be considered pro- 
Arab or pro-Israeli is looking at which side is mostly blamed for 
escalating or perpetuating the conflict in the various instances.
Before we can evaluate the usefulness of this methodology in 
more general terms, it is first necessary to delve into the difficulties 
with using said methodology that have surfaced throughout this 
investigation.
Difficulties with the methodology
One problem that became apparent was when there clearly were 
different views on an aspect of the conflict, but where the meaning of 
these views was not as clear. In the chapter on the rise of the PLO, a 
theme was identified which dealt with the battle at the Jordanian 
town of Karameh. In most instances, the battle is described as an 
Israeli defeat and, as can be recalled, there are two different views for 
why that was the case: (l) that it was the Palestinians that beat off the 
Israelis; and (2) that the battle was won by the Jordanian army, 
which came to the assistance of the Palestinians. These different 
outlooks presented themselves quite clearly in the sources. The 
problem, however, is that the two views do not clearly situate 
themselves on the pro-Israeli/pro-Arab axis. Is it to be construed as 
pro-Arab to say that it was the Palestinians who made the Israeli 
army retreat, or is it the other way around? This is not possible to say 
and this was the reason for why this theme was not used further in 
the analysis.
A reason for why it was not possible to determine bias in relation 
to the different outlooks vis-a-vis the battle of Karameh is that it is 
not possible to say that either view clearly assigns blame or vindicate 
either party. It was argued in the introduction to this thesis that an 
important part of bias in relation to conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is the question of blame and innocence.
The theme regarding the battle of Karameh does however 
illustrate a limitation with the methodology used in this thesis. Or
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perhaps not even a limitation, but rather an aspect that needs to be 
taken into consideration; namely that the individual themes need to 
be studied thoroughly to see which are just academic differences of 
opinion and which are instances of bias.
Another issue regarding the use of the methodology as employed in 
this thesis is with regard to the themes where it is said that ignoring a 
certain aspect is to be construed as bias. In the chapter on the time 
period of 1967-73, there was a theme regarding the secret Israeli 
cabinet decision made just after the War of 1967. This decision, as 
described above, stated that Israel was willing to return the Sinai and 
the Golan Heights to Egypt and Syria respectively in return for full 
peace. As discussing this decision does paint Israel in a positive 
light—especially considering it was made barely a week after the 
war—it was initially decided in the sampling phase that to mention 
the decision was to be construed as pro-Israeli. Conversely, not 
mentioning the decision was deemed to be the pro-Arab view.
A problem with this initial judgment call was that it assumed that 
the authors who did not discuss the decision were aware of its 
existence, but chose not to include any mention of it. This judgment 
call, however, proved to be more tenuous than initially foreseen. The 
decision was after all made in secret and it is only certain that it was 
transmitted to the United States (it is in other words not clear 
whether or not Egypt and Syria were made privy to the decision). The 
decision is furthermore only mentioned in a few primary sources.1 
Due to these factors, the assumption was made that it could not be 
expected that everyone writing on this time period would be aware of 
the secret decision and that failing to mention it would be a clear 
instance of bias.
In the same chapter, the initiatives of UN mediator Gunnar 
Jarring and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt were also discussed.
1 See chapter three.
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Here, on the other hand, it was decided that not including any 
mention of either of these plans was to be construed as pro-Israeli. 
The reason for this was that the two plans in a number of instances 
are described as being both viable and that they could possibly have 
led to peace between Israel and Egypt. As it is claimed in a number of 
sources that the plans were rejected by Israel, not mentioning the 
plans could be said to not paint Israel in as bad of a light as 
discussing the initiatives.2
In this instance, in contrast to the secret Israeli cabinet decision, 
it was decided that not including mention of the two plans was to be 
construed as bias. The difference between these two themes and the 
theme regarding the secret cabinet decision is that it has been 
assumed that anyone writing on the time period would at least be 
aware of the two plans. So, in other words, two judgment calls were 
made: one regarding the secret cabinet decision, where it was decided 
that it should not be construed as common knowledge, and one 
regarding the Jarring and Sadat plans, where it was decided that not 
mentioning the plans are to be considered bias.
Even if these judgment calls arguably should not to be seen as 
instances of “I know it when I see it,” they still are not objective and 
scientific in the strictest sense of the word. Using the methodology 
employed in this thesis does necessitate making judgment calls, but 
this is in all likelihood the case with any method of examining the 
question of bias.
The last main issue regarding the methodology used in this thesis is 
the problem of classification that surfaced with regard to the theme 
on Arab war aims in the War of 1973. The specific difficulties 
surrounding this theme are evaluated in chapter four above, but the 
crux of the matter was the problem presented by the fact that the two 
Arab states in question (Egypt and Syria) in a number of cases were
2 See chapter three for a more comprehensive discussion regarding both the Jarring 
initiative and the Sadat plan.
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described as having different goals with the war. It was at this point 
decided that the binary designation of pro-Israeli/pro-Arab was not 
sufficient in this particular instance. In addition, an intermediate 
pro-Arab position had to be established with regard to this theme. 
There were in other words two distinct views—one pro-Israeli and 
one pro-Arab—that had to be complemented by a third.
The difficulties relating to this theme illustrate that the binary 
designation used throughout this thesis in some cases need to be 
further expanded to include more than two perspectives. This is 
perhaps also true in other cases than the issue with the Arab war 
aims in 1973, but this was the only case where it was decided to add 
another classifications In the other cases where other designations 
beside the familiar pro-Israeli/pro-Arab pair could have been added, 
it was decided against for the simple reason that it is important when 
using this methodology not to emphasize individual differences 
between the sources under scrutiny. All sources used are of course 
individual works with individual outlooks in a number of cases, but 
when using the methodology employed in this thesis it is crucial not 
to emphasize the more minor differences. As is always the case when 
dealing with a greater number of data or sources, it is necessary to 
find the right balance between generalization and detail.
3 For example, theme five in the chapter on the rise of the PLO could have been 
classified in a number of manners. This theme, as discussed in chapter five above, 
deals with the organizational affiliation of the Black September Organization (or 
the BSO). In some accounts, the BSO is said to have been completely independent 
from the mainstream organization of Fatah and in some accounts it is said to have 
been a clandestine arm of this organization. The middle road, so to say, or 
intermediate position could have been the sources that argued that there was a 
Fatah-BSO connection on the highest levels, but that Arafat and the circle around 
him are in the clear. In chapter five above, this view was presented as being pro- 
Israeli, but could easily have been termed a more intermediate pro-Israeli view. 
Intermediate in the sense that it is not as damning of Fatah as simply saying that 
there was a Fatah-BSO connection but also because it still cannot be regarded as 
painting Fatah in a particularly good light. This of course is in contrast to the pro- 
Arab view where it is said that there was no connection between the two 
organizations.
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Evaluating the methodology: conclusion
The methodology used in this thesis is an attempt to move away from 
the “I know it when I see it”-approach that has traditionally been 
used when looking at the question of bias in historiography. Bias is a 
difficult topic to evaluate, and the most difficult thing when analyzing 
bias is to not letting your own biases and outlooks shine through. No 
one, I am quite certain, is completely free from opinion.
So, when finding a method for analyzing bias it is important to 
find one that involves as few judgment calls as possible. Or, putting it 
more correctly, finding a methodology where the judgment calls that 
inevitably have to be made are more practical in nature as compared 
to judgment calls that are biased vis-a-vis either the authors whose 
works are being analyzed or the parties involved (e.g. Israel or Syria).
All in all—and the difficulties discussed above notwithstanding— 
the methodology used in this thesis works well when it comes to the 
issue at hand: finding a more neutral or detached way of establishing 
bias. The methodology used here is perhaps not as, so to say, 
scientific as using some of the methods used in the natural sciences 
but at the same time, it does present us with some solid and tangible 
results.
Of course, it could be argued that the methodology only produces 
results that are tangible and real under its own premises. If, for 
instance, one does not accept the premise that Israel facing a mortal 
danger prior to the outbreak of war in 1967 is a more pro-Israeli 
perspective than saying the opposite, then the methodology is indeed 
not particularly useful. Studying bias does involve making judgment 
calls and as such they are always open to discussion. The main 
difference, however, between the methodology used here and the 
more laidback “I know it when I see it”-approach is that it is here 
possible to evaluate the ways the decisions regarding how to position 
the sources have been made.
A large part of academia and scholarship in general is of course 
the evaluating, re-evaluating and re-evaluating again of the same
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material, theory, etc. This is how knowledge is gained and improved. 
In order to facilitate this, however, it is imperative that the process is 
as transparent as possible so that the reasoning and techniques of 
one’s predecessors can be seen as clearly as possible.
Nature and classification of main themes
The basic premise of this thesis—as it was discussed in the 
introductory chapter—is that bias is here not looked upon as being 
deviations from a supposedly objective center, but rather as 
differences in outlook as compared with others. Saying, for instance, 
that Ronald Reagan was the greatest American president of the 
twentieth century is not biased in the sense that it expresses an 
opinion that is not objective, but because it differs from the view that 
Reagan was a poor president.
In this thesis, a number of main themes (or instances of bias) 
have been identified, discussed and classified. These are the different 
classifications, and they are dealt with below:
(1) Themes where a certain event or aspect does not paint a 
favorable picture of one of the actors, and is hence left out in a 
number of sources;
(2) Themes where the intentions of a certain actor or actors are 
under dispute;
(3) Themes where the meaning and implications of a certain 
policy or declaration is disputed;
(4) Themes where a larger historical event or process is 
interpreted in different manners;
(5) Themes where the actual historical reality is disputed;
(6) Themes where the same historical reality can be described in 
different ways and with different results.
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In the chapter on the War of 1967, two themes (number 1 and 4) were 
identified as being instances of where a certain aspect was left out in 
a number of sources. These two aspects were the Israeli threats made 
against Syria prior to the war and the Israeli non-acceptance of the 
United Nations peacekeepers (UNEF) on its side of the border with 
Egypt. These two aspects were said to have painted Israel in an 
unfavorable light and their exclusion to have been an instance of pro- 
Israeli bias. What this means, in other words, is that mentioning 
Israel having made threats towards Syria and having rejected UNEF 
on its territory is a more negative manner in which to describe Israel 
than leaving out mention of these aspects altogether. Furthermore, 
these two themes have also been said to arguably be closer to being 
propaganda than other themes analyzed in this thesis (see below).
In both the chapter on the War of 1967 (themes 3 and 5) as well as 
in the chapter on the time between 1967-73 (theme 3), the intentions 
of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser are under dispute. The 
instances relate to Nasser’s reasons for having UNEF removed, for 
closing the Straits of Tiran in 1967 and for starting the so-called War 
of Attrition in 1969. The intentions and objectives of Egypt and Syria 
for waging war in 1973 are also delved into (theme 1 in the chapter on 
the War of 1973). In all these instances, there are different views on 
why the actors chose the course of action they did and these views 
paint the participants in different lights.
In general, one can say that the pro-Israeli view in relation to the 
above classification of themes would be an emphasis on Arab hostile 
intentions. The objective for choosing the course of action that was 
undertaken was aggressive in nature. Conversely, the pro-Arab view 
in relation to the above classification in general would be to highlight 
the political aspects of said action.
How to interpret a certain policy or declaration is disputed in the 
chapter on the time period of 1967-73 (theme 2) and in the chapter 
on the rise of the PLO (theme 1). In the former chapter, the dispute is
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how to look upon the declaration of the Arab League in Khartoum 
1967, and in the latter chapter the dispute is how to relate oneself to 
the PLO policy of a "democratic, secular state for all its citizens” that 
was formulated in the late 1960s. The various outlooks on these 
policies and declarations present the actors in either positive or 
negative manners. With regard to the Khartoum Declaration, the pro- 
Israeli view sees it as being aggressive and inflexible in nature 
whereas the pro-Arab side sees it as in fact being moderate. On the 
PLO policy of a "democratic, secular state for all its citizens,” the pro- 
Arab view sees it as a sincere attempt at solving the conflict 
peacefully, whereas the pro-Israeli outlook is that it is to be seen as 
having been a euphemism for the destruction of Israel.
Histoiy is made up of both small and large events and processes. In 
relation to classifying the themes that have been identified, there are 
some that deal with quite small events (for instance, the nature of 
Egypt’s initial demand for having UNEF removed from its territory) 
and some that deal with larger events. There are three themes in 
relation to the War of 1967 (themes 6, 7 and 8) that deal with how to 
interpret a larger historical event, two in relation to the time period 
of 1967-73 (themes 4 and 5) and one in relation to the War of 1973 
(theme 3). The themes concerned with the War of 1967 deal with the 
situation for Israel after the Jordanian-Egyptian mutual defense pact 
that was signed prior to the war, the general nature of Israel’s 
situation at the outset of the war and the reasons for Israel’s quick 
and decisive victory.
In the chapter on the time between the 1967-73, the two themes 
that deal with how to interpret a larger historical event deal with the 
peace initiatives of United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring and 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Here, the question is not only how 
the initiatives are presented and the question of why they did not 
produce any results discussed, but also to what degree these 
initiatives are emphasized.
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In relation to the War of 1973, the larger historical event under 
dispute deals with the reasons for why this war was fought in the first 
place, and which side is to be regarded as being ultimately 
responsible (although there is no dispute that Egypt and Syria fired 
the first shots). What these themes all have in common is that they 
deal with aspects that are more difficult to pin down precisely, but 
where there are nevertheless clearly quite different outlooks and 
interpretations present in the sources. How you interpret these 
events, in other words, has definite results on how the adversaries are 
portrayed.
In addition to the various ways in which to interpret a certain 
historical event, there are also themes where the dispute is 
concerning what actually happened on a more empirical level. In the 
chapter on the War of 1967 (theme 2), both the view that Nasser 
initially sought the complete withdrawal of UNEF from Egyptian soil 
and the view that he initially only wanted a limited removal are 
present in sources. Likewise, in the chapter on the War of 1973 
(theme 2), there are two contesting views on the broken cease-fire: 
one that sees it has having been broken by both warring parties, and 
one that sees it as having been broken primarily and deliberately by 
Israel. There is also a theme in the chapter on the rise of the PLO 
(theme 5) where the empirical historical reality is under dispute. Was 
or was not the Black September Organization a part of Fatah? These 
themes are all similar in the sense that the historical reality they 
describe differently could, in theory at least, be settled conclusively. 
The empirical historical reality may never be decisively decided upon, 
of course, but it is clear that the different outlooks on what actually 
happened has different implications on how the antagonists in the 
conflict are portrayed.
Lastly, there are two themes present in the chapter on the rise of 
the PLO (themes 3 and 4) where the historical reality is not in 
dispute. The dispute is rather how this historical reality is presented.
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In the first of these themes, the difference in outlook is whether or 
not it can be said that the PLO was behind the international terror 
committed by Palestinians in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
issue at hand is that it seems to be the almost universal consensus 
that it was the smaller groups of the PLO (like the PFLP), but not the 
mainstream Fatah, that were behind these plane hijackings and the 
like. But, the crux of the matter is that these groups were members of 
the PLO, which is an umbrella organization. It would be correct, in 
other words, to describe the Palestinian terrorism of the late 
i96os/early 1970s as having been undertaken either by the smaller 
groups or by the PLO in general. Both ways of presenting the issue 
are to some degree accurate. They do, however, have quite different 
implications for how the PLO and the Palestinian cause are 
described. The same goes for the other similar theme in the chapter 
on the rise of the PLO: here, the issue at hand is whether one can say 
that it was the smaller, more radical groups that challenged the 
authority of Jordan’s King Hussein or whether it was the PLO at 
large.
With the exception of the first category of themes—the categoiy of 
themes where it is said to be biased to exclude mention of a certain 
aspect—all other themes are quite clear examples of differences of 
opinion. When it comes to the question of bias and propaganda as the 
terms are used in this thesis, the two themes belonging to the first 
category consist of views that lean more towards being propaganda. 
That, of course, makes the assumption that the events in question 
were known to the authors but that they chose to ignore them as they 
painted one of the parties to the conflict in an unfavorable light.
Going back to the example of Ronald Reagan will illustrate the 
point I am trying to make: writing a biography over the former 
president without mentioning the controversial Iran-Contra affair 
would probably teeter the line of being propaganda, whereas writing 
a work where it is argued that Reagan had nothing to do with that
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chain of events would not be. Arguing about Reagan’s role in relation 
to the Iran-Contra affair, from either a sympathetic or unsympathetic 
perspective, would in the framework of this thesis be construed as 
bias, as it involves some kind of value judgment. It is lastly up to the 
reader to decide for him- or herself what he or she believes Reagan’s 
role to have been. Excluding any mention, however, of the affair 
would be propaganda of sorts as the reader is not even given the 
option of evaluating the event.4
Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the majority of 
different views as expressed through the main themes analyzed in 
this thesis are not to be considered examples of propaganda. 
Although some of the authors have quite staunchly held views, the 
themes and their different views have more of the characteristics of 
differences of opinion than anything else. But, of course, the majority 
of sources in the majority of instances do situate themselves 
according to one or the other views on the pro-Arab/pro-Israeli axis. 
They are not objective in the sense that they do not deviate from a 
supposedly objective center. They are biased in the sense the term 
has been used throughout this thesis—that they align themselves vis- 
a-vis one of the adversaries of the conflict—but at the same time they 
are not examples of propaganda.
4 Simply stating, however, either that Reagan was or was not involved in the affair 
without delving into the intricacies of the whole issue would not constitute 
propaganda as the term is used in this thesis. For an opinion to be tantamount to 
propaganda in this framework it has to constitute a willful manipulation of a 
documented historical reality (i.e. in this instance not mentioning that the affair 
took place at all.) The discussion surrounding the Iran-Contra affair is not whether 
or not it took place (it did), whether or not it was to play a large part in Reagan’s 
presidency (it did) or whether or not Reagan himself was accused in some quarters 
of being guilty of breaking the law (he was). The issue at hand in this context is the 
issue of culpability and not the historical reality of the affair. So, in other words, 
plainly stating that Reagan did or did not have anything to do with the Iran-Contra 
affair without any sort of evidence in support of your view is arguably an example 
of poor scholarship/debating skills, but it is in the context of this thesis to be 
construed as nothing but an opinion (i.e. bias).
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The nature of bias in the sources
It has already been mentioned above that the majority of sources in 
the majority of instances do position themselves in relation to either 
a pro-Arab or pro-Israeli perspective. Sometimes, sources may be 
considered ambiguous in relation to individual themes, and this is 
either due to the source in question not dealing with the subject 
matter in the first place or simply because it does not position itself. 
Nevertheless, however, in most instances the sources do position 
themselves.
Placing a source on the pro-Arab/pro-Israeli axis in relation to a 
particular theme can be looked upon as deeming that same source to 
be biased. One of the two sides is described in a more flattering (or 
not as unfavorable) manner. So, in the majority of cases the majority 
of sources are indeed biased. This is an important and tangible result 
of this thesis. But, if the sources in most cases do “take sides” as far as 
the individual themes are concerned, is the same the case when 
looking at each source as a unit? Is it, in other words, possible to 
establish whether an individual source is to be looked at as being pro- 
Israeli or pro-Arab?
As already discussed in the chapters above, and also illustrated 
through the examples in the previous chapter, a perhaps surprising 
result of this thesis has been the fact that there are not as many so- 
called standard narratives as one would perhaps expect. A standard 
narrative, in this framework, would be telling and interpreting the 
story along very clearly discernable pro-Arab or pro-Israeli lines. 
Examples of how these standard narratives would look have been 
given in the chapters above.
It was halfway assumed that there would be a preponderance of 
sources that were quite clearly pro-Israeli or vice versa. But, as can 
be seen in the results as discussed in the chapters above and shown in 
appendix 1, the distribution of views is more spread out than that. 
There are of course sources that clearly are pro-Israeli or pro-Arab in
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almost every respect (like Martin Gilbert and Fred Khouri discussed 
in the previous chapter). This is to be expected given the politicized 
debate surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is, however, 
surprising that there are not more sources like this.
One plausible explanation for why there are not more standard 
narratives could be that the authors are not as ideologically 
motivated as one would perhaps assume. The authors, in other 
words, do not initially position themselves in the typical pro- 
Arab/pro-Israeli mold. They are so to say more free how they 
position themselves vis-a-vis each individual theme. In the works 
where there are more standard narratives, on the other hand, it could 
be said that the authors are more guided in how to position 
themselves. Writing, for instance, from a clear pro-Israeli perspective 
in some ways “forces” the author to position him- or herself in a pro- 
Israeli manner in relation to each theme. This point brings us to the 
next section in this concluding chapter: namely the whole issue of 
what is propaganda and what is not.
Bias and propaganda
In the introduction, an article in a journal specializing on the Middle 
East was mentioned and briefly discussed.s The main reason why it 
was introduced was its title, where the question the author (Neill 
Lochery) posed was whether works on the Arab-Israeli conflict were 
to be considered scholarship or propaganda. This is an interesting 
question and of course to some degree at the core of this thesis.
Propaganda is a negative word, and implied in its use is the 
attempt to manipulate its recipients (often through not painting the
s Neill Lochery, "Scholarship or Propaganda: Works on Israel and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 2001,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37 No. 4 (2001),
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whole picture). Scholarship, on the other hand, is a word with 
positive connotations, which indicates an open and transparent 
pursuit of an objective truth. Both words are value-laden and by 
asking the question of whether works on the conflict are to be 
considered propaganda or scholarship, the article’s author indicates 
that he wants to evaluate upon the value of said works.
In the present analysis, one of the major results has been that 
outright propaganda is not particularly frequent. It is only with 
regard to two main themes (see discussion above) that the case has 
been made that there could be instances of propaganda. That is not to 
say that there are no instances of bias. On the contrary, the majority 
of sources in the majority of instances show examples of bias. But 
they are not propaganda in the strictest sense of the word, as they do 
not clearly and overtly attempt to manipulate their readers.
Or, perhaps putting it more accurately, of course authors of every 
stripe and color want their readers to take whatever they write to 
heart or at least give it a fair amount of consideration. That is more or 
less self-evident and probably one of the greatest motivators for 
writing in the first place. What this thesis has shown, however, is that 
it is not possible to say conclusively that there are that many 
instances of willful manipulation. Nevertheless, it can safely be 
assumed that there are authors who would very much like their 
readers to adopt the same positions they have.
So, if it cannot be said that the analyzed works are to be looked upon 
as propaganda, can they be said to be scholarship? In all actuality not 
in the sense Lochery probably sees it: as objective and absolutely 
non-biased accounts. Most works do position themselves in relation 
to most main themes. And, as positioning a work in relation to a 
certain main theme positions the same work in relation to the actors 
in the conflict, most works are biased in the majority of instances.
But does a work being biased preclude it from being scholarship 
in the larger sense of the word? Here, every individual source
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probably needs to be looked upon separately, but it is safe to say that 
there are many of the works analyzed that are to be regarded as 
scholarly (or objective which is the term used in this thesis). 
Objective in the sense that they represent an open and transparent 
search for an empirical and attestable historical truth, but not in the 
sense that they are free of bias and opinion. This question is now 
delved into further as we go into the perhaps more abstract question 
of whether it is indeed possible to write an objective history of a 
conflict that is politicized to as large a degree as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.
Objective accounts on the Arab-Israeli conflict?
In answering this question, it is almost necessary to define more 
precisely what it means to say that an account is objective. It could 
mean an account that is completely free of bias or it could mean an 
account that, although it does consist of bias, is open-ended enough 
to be construed as an sincere attempt to further our knowledge.
If one speaks of accounts that are completely free of bias, then it is 
probably not possible to write objective accounts. The reason for this 
is quite obvious: in order to fully give an account of the conflict it is in 
a number of instances necessary to interpret and evaluate particular 
events or aspects. And, as has been shown in this thesis, many of 
these interpretations and evaluations are in fact value judgments of 
sorts, as choosing one interpretation over another often positions the 
source on the pro-Arab/pro-Israeli axis.
The reason why it is often essential to give an interpretation is 
because that is what the writing of history is all about. Without 
interpretation, a historical account is just a collection of facts. It is 
certainly quite possible to simply write that the War of 1967 began on 
June 5 that year, but what the reader ultimately wants to know—and
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this is why anyone writing more extensively on this has to deal with 
the question in one way or another—is why the war broke out.
That histoiy to a large degree means interpretation is nothing new 
and it has been brought up by E.H. Carr and those following in his 
footsteps for decades.6 The postmodern approach to the study of 
history is in some ways just taking this approach one step further. 
What the results in this thesis have shown is the degree of how much 
interpretation also means bias. Interpretation is of course always 
bias, as choosing one interpretation over another is biased. What this 
thesis has shown, however, is that at least with regard to a politicized 
and “hot” conflict such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
interpretations employed are to a large degree biased in the 
traditional sense of the word. The interpretations used, in other 
words, often clearly position the source as being either pro-Arab or 
pro-Israeli in the relation to the issue at hand.
One could here bring up the example of the rejected theme on the 
battle of Karameh discussed above. As can be recalled, the issue at 
stake with reference to this event is how the Israeli defeat is to be 
interpreted: as a result of Palestinian valor, or as a result of the 
Jordanian army coming to the assistance of the Palestinian fighters. 
Here, there are clearly two different interpretations present in the 
sources but, in contrast to the main themes discussed in this thesis, 
the two interpretations do not represent a clear pro-Israeli or pro- 
Arab perspective. This is perhaps how differences in interpretation 
usually manifest themselves in the histories of less delicate historical 
processes, but not when it comes to a heavily contested issue such as 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. In relation to the history of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, interpretation often, or even typically, means taking sides.
So, if it is perhaps not possible to write an objective account of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the sense that it is completely free of bias, is it
6 See the section on theory in chapter one.
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possible to write an account that is objective in the sense that is an 
attempt to be objective? Once again going back to the discussion 
presented in the introductory chapter, it is clear that the more radical 
postmodern perspective on the writing of history makes even the 
attempt at writing objectively a waste of effort. The concept of an 
objective truth is an unattainable pipedream. Again according to 
Carr, and this is perhaps the view many or most historians today 
would agree with, a totally objective history is perhaps not possible, 
but it definitely can be attempted.
In view of the results of this thesis, I would have to agree with this 
notion. The majority of main themes in this thesis where bias was 
frequently detected are, as already discussed above, judgment calls. 
Did Israel face a mortal danger in June 1967? Were the peace 
initiatives presented by Gunnar Jarring and Anwar Sadat viable or 
not? Did Egypt and Syria have maximalist and exclusively militaiy 
goals in the War of 1973? Was the PLO policy of a “democratic, 
secular state for all its citizens” a sincere attempt at solving the 
conflict or was it just a euphemism for the destruction of Israel? 
These questions could in theory at least be answered with the same 
objective certainty as, for example, the question of whether there was 
snow on the ground at noon local time on Trafalgar Square in 
London on Januaiy 1, 1900. This question could be answered with 
certainty and without a shadow of a doubt, and the same could be 
argued goes for the examples above. The difference, however, with 
answering the questions of snow on Trafalgar Square as compared to 
Israel’s situation in 1967 is of course that the latter is most likely 
never going to be settled in the same manner as is possible with the 
former. The question regarding the War of 1967 is in all actuality 
probably too complex and the available sources too vague.
Not ever being able to answer questions conclusively and without 
any doubt or ambiguity is an inevitable and self-evident part of doing 
history. As a matter of fact, it seems to be almost universal that one of 
the first things taught to undergraduate histoiy students is that there
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is almost always more than one perspective or answer to any 
historical problem. Studying history not only gives students another 
perspective on the world that surrounds them, but it also makes them 
more critical and skeptical when presented with various views. There 
is almost always more than one view of everything, and this has to be 
taken into consideration when attempting to answer a question more 
conclusively
So, in light of the question of whether it is possible to write 
objectively on the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict even though it is 
not possible to write without bias, I would have to say that to some 
degree it is. If one makes an honest attempt that by weighing the 
different views that others have presented prior to yours and by 
critically going through the relevant sources to reach an independent 
and empirical truth, then this could be construed as being a more 
objective account. 7 Even, of course, if the end-result consists of bias 
in the sense as problematized in this thesis. In all actuality, whatever 
the possibly unattainable end-all-be-all answer may be in each case, 
it will be biased in the sense of the word as used in this thesis: for, at 
the end of the day, Israel either did face a mortal threat to its 
existence prior to the war in 1967 or it did not.
7 Going back to the discussion on the Iran-Contra affair above in relation to this, it 
is possible to say that an account where it is simply said that Ronald Reagan did not 
have anything to do with the whole thing and then leaving it at that would be less 
objective than an account where Reagan’s innocence is maintained, but only after 
discussing factors A, B and C that would seem to exonerate him even due to the 
incriminating nature of factors X, Y and Z. Both accounts would be biased as the 
term is used in this thesis as they “choose sides”, but the latter source could be said 
to be more objective as it is more open-ended and, seemingly at least, more genuine 
in its attempt at examining the question of Reagan’s role in the affair.
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Conclusion
As already mentioned previously in this work, this is probably the 
first attempt made to look upon the issues of bias and objectivity in 
relation to the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict from a more 
analytical point of view. The previous works written on the topic of 
the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict have largely been 
characterized by a “I know it when I see itM-approach when it comes 
to the question of bias. In order to move away from this tendency, a 
methodology has been introduced to make the task of establishing 
and evaluating bias more easily performed and the results more 
reliable. This method has been shown to work well, but its greatest 
appeal is probably the fact that it is transparent. It is in other words 
possible for anyone to go back and see how it has been used and what 
judgment calls have been made. Looking at a potentially touchy 
subject such as bias, and especially with regard to something as 
delicate as the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is essential that the 
methodology employed is as transparent as possible.
By using the methodology discussed above, it has been shown 
clearly that the majority of sources indeed are biased in the majority 
of cases. It needs to be pointed out, however, that although they are 
biased in the majority of cases, the majority of sources are not clearly 
pro-Israeli or pro-Arab. What this means is that there is a great gray 
area in-between the two ends of the spectrum, and that there are 
many possible manners in which to present the same events. It also 
needs to be pointed out here that the majority of cases of bias as 
presented in this work are not to be considered propaganda, but 
rather more differences of opinion or value judgments. Propaganda, 
within the framework of this thesis, is the conscious act of actively 
trying to deceive one’s readers by for instance excluding mention of 
an attestable historical fact that paints one of the protagonists in an 
unfavorable light.
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What this means is that the traditional view of accounts on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as being riddled with bias needs to be altered. 
The tangible and solid results of this undertaking have shown the 
picture to be more complex than that. Yes, bias is of course very 
prevalent, but more often than not more in the shape of differences of 
opinion than inflexible and staunchly held views. The results of this 
investigation make the case that works on the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
most cases are not as ideologically motivated as they are usually 
made out to be, and that their authors in many cases display a fair 
amount of integrity and independence from the standard pro-Israeli 
or pro-Arabs ways of representation. To further complicate the 
matter, however, there are also a number of authors who are 
ideologically guided in how they see the conflict and how they want 
the conflict to be looked upon.
Furthermore, what this work has shown is that it is in all 
likelihood not possible to write a more comprehensive account on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict that is absolutely objective. A major result of this 
thesis is that E.H. Carr’s belief that history means interpretation and 
that interpretation often means bias has been shown to be correct (or 
at least within the framework of this investigation). Most of the 
different views on certain aspects of the conflict usually have a clear 
view on which side it portrays in a favorable or unfavorable light. 
Most interpretations are in other words biased. When it comes to a 
delicate subject matter like that of the Arab-Israeli conflict, what in 
other cases are simply scholarly differences of opinion are here 
biased in the sense that using different interpretations in most cases 
means “choosing sides.”
Even though it may not be possible to write a history of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict that is objective and free of bias—as that has been 
shown to be an inevitable component—it is possible to try to be as 
objective as possible. By being as open as possible to other 
interpretations and how you have come to reach your conclusions, it 
is possible to write an account that is more objective. More objective,
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that is, in the sense of being a more sincere and genuine attempt at 
furthering our knowledge—not more objective in the sense of being 
free of bias.
Further research
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze the question of bias in 
relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict over the years 1967-74. As a large 
part of the methodology focused on comparison, it was necessary that 
the themes identified were as similar as possible, in addition to 
dealing with a more narrow time period. As such, the themes 
identified were more narrative in nature. It is, however, quite 
possible to focus on more analytical themes instead, that possibly 
deal with a longer or less defined time period.
The historical accounts of the Arab-Israeli not only deal with 
events in the strictest sense of the word, but also with more analytical 
questions. Evaluating Zionism, for instance, or analyzing the nature 
of Palestinian national identity are more analytical questions that 
most likely present equally biased views. So is looking upon the tough 
questions of the right of return for the Palestinian refugees, or indeed 
attempting to judge which side has the most valid claim to the land.
These more analytical questions, which there are more of than the 
examples given above, would probably be interesting to analyze from 
the same point of view as presented in this thesis.
Another perspective looking at the question of bias in relation to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict would be to track changes over time. The conflict 
has been ongoing for a long period of time, and it is probably possible 
to see a shift in the debate from being more pro-Israeli to becoming 
more pro-Arab or vice versa. In the introductory chapter—where the 
previous literature on the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict
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was analyzed—it was argued in a number of texts that the debate 
surrounding the conflict had shifted over time.
As this thesis focused on a particular time period, where most 
works were published around the time of the events in question, it 
was not possible to detect any particular trends over time. If one is to 
look at changes over time, it is crucial that (l) one is analyzing 
enough works to be able to draw definite conclusions; and (2) that 
the works under scrutiny are distributed fairly evenly over time when 
they were published. Due to the focus on a specific time period, it was 
not possible to conduct this kind of study.
But, nevertheless, analyzing changes over time is most likely an 
interesting undertaking. If at all possible, it would be intriguing to see 
to what degree the different stages and events the conflict itself has 
gone through has led to changes in outlook vis-a-vis the actors. It has 
been said, for example, by some of Israel’s so-called new historians 
that one of the aspects that led them to approach Israeli histoiy with 
more critical eyes was the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (see 
chapter one). It would also be interesting (if this is indeed possible) 
to analyze how societal changes in general has influenced the writing 
of the histoiy of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Needless to say, our society 
has changed immensely since the beginnings of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict a hundred or so years ago.
The historian never works in a vacuum and what happens in his or 
her own time obviously colors the way he or she writes history. That 
is self-evident and of course one of the more intriguing aspects in the 
study of historiography. Sometimes, however, the historian writing 
on a particular topic finds him- or herself caught in the makings of 
history.
The day after I registered for the PhD program that this thesis is a 
part of—on September 28, 2000—Israeli politician Ariel Sharon, who 
at the time was in opposition, made a publicized visit to the Temple 
Mount in Jerusalem. To what degree or not this directly led to the
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violence that soon erupted or whether Sharon’s visit simply was the 
spark that lit a flame that had been smoldering for some time, but 
would have been lit anyway, is difficult to say and is not dealt with 
here. It is sufficient to say that the violence that began on the West 
Bank and Gaza in September 2000 proved to be quite enduring and 
arguably spelt the end (or at least suspension) of the Israeli- 
Palestinian peace process that begun in the early 1990s. At the time 
of writing (winter 2006), the prospects of resolving the conflict 
peacefully still seem quite bleak.
Not even a year later, on September 11, 2001, another series of 
events took place that came to have great repercussions. The terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington DC have had large ramifications on global affairs 
generally and it is quite possible to speak of a pre-September 11 world 
as well as a post-September 11 global environment.
These two events, the second Intifada that begun in 2000 and the 
September 11 attacks, have had great effects on both the debate over 
the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as regarding the Middle East, or even 
the Muslim world, in general. Why did the peace process between the 
Israelis and Palestinians brake down? Who is to blame? Why did the 
September 11 attacks take place? Could they have been prevented? 
How does one prevent attacks like that from happening in the future? 
Is the world facing something like a clash of civilizations?
These are some of the questions raised by academics, politicians, 
journalists and so on in the last few years. And, as the possible 
answers to these questions have quite different outcomes, the views 
presented are in a number of instances rather entrenched. The debate 
over present Israeli-Palestinian relations or the September 11 attacks 
is often very partisan and conducted in perhaps a more aggressive 
manner than other debates.
One example of the increasingly harsh debating environment that 
has received a fair bit of attention is the American organization
233
Conclusion
known as Campus Watch. This organization has declared that it aims 
to review and critique Middle Eastern studies in the US and to 
improve them. However, the organization has been charged to be 
pursuing its own brand of McCarthyism by a number of participants 
in the debate. The charge is that Campus Watch desperately wants to 
impose its own right-wing agenda on the debate and to silence its 
opponents. Campus Watch, on the other hand, has defended itself by 
saying that it welcomes an open debate and freedom of speech, and 
that it only wants to move the debate away from the extreme left- 
wing views that currently hold sway amongst American scholars of 
the Middle East.
What is happening in the debate surrounding the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the Middle East presently is perhaps frightening in that it 
seems as if the different sides of the debate are becoming more 
entrenched in their positions. This is a process that is presently 
taking place. Besides the perhaps greater affinity with theory and 
statistics of the former, one major difference between political 
scientists and historians is that the former mostly deal with the 
present, whereas that latter deals with the past. Due to this, political 
scientists and historians often have different perspectives on things 
but the most crucial difference is of course that political scientists 
often have an effect on the topic of their inquiry. The so-called 
Sovietologists, for instance, who analyzed the USSR during the Cold 
War obviously had an influence on US policy which in turn had a 
result on the Soviet Union; the object of research for the 
Sovietologists. Historians never influence their objects of inquiry in 
this manner, although they of course often influence the way their 
objects of inquiry are looked upon. There always has to be a certain 
amount of distance in time for an inquiry to be called historical 
research.
But, when enough time has passed for the debate that is presently 
taking place to be studied as an historical event, the results will most
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likely be intriguing. The current debate will most likely prove to be an 
instance where actual events influence how a debate unfolds, but 
perhaps also how a debate influences real events. A public debate 
never exists in a vacuum and—although it sometimes would seem 
otherwise—academics, journalists, intellectuals and the like often do 
have a real influence over policy and actual events.
Whenever the time is ready to look upon the current events 
through the eyes of an historian, one of the more interesting 
questions will be to see how the debate has taken place in view of the 
question of bias vis-a-vis the various actors; be they the Israelis and 
Palestinians or the United States and the Islamist movement. 
Hopefully, the methodology and general framework as presented in 
this thesis will then be of some use.
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Appendix I: Distribution of views as present in the sources
In this appendix, the tabulated results of the research for this thesis 
are presented. This is done in accordance with the different chapters 
above (i.e. the War of 1967, the time of 1967-73, the War of 1973 and 
the rise of the PLO), and through the classification of specific and 
general sources.
In order for this appendix not to be longer than necessary, the 
results are presented according to the surname of the author(s) of the 
book in question and the year of its publication. As the bibliography 
is organized in roughly the same manner, it should be easy enough to 
locate a specific book. Following the name of the author is a list of the 
themes as they are presented in the chapters above. And, next to the 
number of the theme in question is one of the three following 
symbols: ?, & and C*. The question mark is to indicate that the source 
in question has been deemed to be ambiguous with regard to that 
specific theme. The Star of David ($ ) is to indicate that the source is 
pro-Israeli in this instance, whereas the crescent and star (G) is to 
signify that the work in question has been deemed pro-Arab with 
regard to that specific theme.
Using the Star of David to illustrate a source being pro-Israeli is 
not particularly problematic, as it is a part of the Israeli flag and a 
well-known symbol of the Jewish people. Using the crescent and star, 
on the other hand, is a bit more problematic. This symbol is of course 
Muslim in nature and although many Arabs are Muslims, there are
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many that are not. Nevertheless, the symbol is present in the flags of 
a number of Arab states and due to the lack of a more clear Arab 
symbol it is here used. It could have been possible, of course, to use a 
letters (A for pro-Arab and I for pro-Israeli) instead of symbols, but 
the use of symbols was decided upon for the simple reason that it is 
visually much more unambiguous and clear-cut than using letters.
The numbers in parenthesis following the symbol chosen refer to 
the page numbers where the view as indicated through the symbol is 
found. In some instances, there are no references to page numbers 
present, and this is either due to the view excluding the usefulness of 
specific references (e.g. when the point of a certain view is to exclude 
mention of something) or when it is not possible to pin down a 
specific page or pages where a particular view is transmitted. Where 
it is possible, however, specific references have been included.
The following example shows how the results in this appendix are 
to be interpreted:
Badeau 1968
(1) C* (106)
Here, the source written by Badeau [John S Badeau., “The Arabs, 
1967,” in Majdia D. Khadduri (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Impasse: 
Expressions o f Moderate Viewpoints on the Arab-Israeli Conflict by 
Well Known Western Writers (Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce, 
1968), pp. 97-113] has been said to convey a pro-Arab perspective in 
relation to theme 1. One could find where Badeau commits himself to 
this view on page 106 in the book.
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1067: Specific works
Badeau 1968
(1) C* (106)
(2) $  (108)
(3 )0
(4)?
(5 )0
(6)?
(7)?
(8)?
Bashan 1967
(1) $
(2) £  (9f.)
(3 )« (9 ff.)
(4 )*
(5 )$
(6) <■ (17)
(7) $
(8)?
Byford-Jones 1967
(1) S
(2) G (l8ff.)
(3) G (l8ff.)
(4 )^
(5 )0
(6) «
(7 )  $
(8) «
Dayan 1967
(1) $
(2) & (7)
(3) *  (7)
(4 )«
(5) $  (7)
(6) (8f.)
(7) $  (3-12)
(8) O (13 iff.)
Bar-Zohar 1970
(1) C* (I2f.)
(2) G (32ff.)
(3)G(3lff.)
(4) G (102)
(5)?
(6) S (155)
( 7 ) ?
(8)?
Bleaney & Lawless 1990
(1) O (42f.)
(2) G (43)
(3 )0
(4) O (44)
(5) O (44)
(6) G (45)
(7) o
(8)?
Churchill & Churchill 1967
(1) C* (29)
(2) G
(3) O (29)
(4 )«
(5) G (Ch. 2)
(6) <■ (52f.)
(7) $  (66f.)
(8) $  (177)
Draper 1968
(1) $
(2) C* (59)
(3)?
(4) $
(5) $  (26)
(6) $  (97)
( 7 ) ?
(8)?
2 3 8
Appendices
Fuldheim 1967 Gruber 1968
(1) $ (1) «
(2)? (2) 0  (47)
(3)? (3) *  (47)
(4 )$ (4) «
(5)? (5) *  (47)
(6) 4- (6 )«
(7) 4> (22) (7) $
(8) 4* (42,61) (8) 4* (l93ff-)
Hammel 1992 Howard & Hunter
(1) O (27) (1) O (l4f.)
(2) C* (3 of.) (2) (18)
(3)C*(29ff.) (3) O (17)
(4) $ (4 )$
(5) O (33f.) (5) 0  (lTff.)
(6) 0 (38) (6)?
(7) O (153) (7)?
(8 )0 (139 ,383) (8 )»  (27ft)
Kimche & Bawly 1968 Kosut 1968
(1) O (88) (1) O (4of.)
(2) O (93) (2) S (45L)
(3) O (92) (3)?
(4) ^ (4) 0 (46)
(5) $  &78f.) (5)?
(6) *  ( i53ff-) (6)?
(7)? (7) «
(8 )0 (8)?
Landau 1968 Laqueur1968
(1)? (1) O (72ff.)
(2)? (2) 4> (8sff-)
(3)? (3) 0  (23if.)
(4)? (4) $
(5)? (5) O (231I)
(6)? (6) 4- (231L)
(7)? (7) *
(8)? (8 )0 (2 2 8 )
239
Appendices
MacLeish 1967
(1) $
(2) C* (21)
(3 ) C* (5 5 )
(4)$
(5)  0  ( 55f-)
(6) $  (6lff.)
(7 )  0  ( l 30f .)
(8)?
Mutawi 1987
(1) G (92f.)
(2 )0  (93)
(3)C*(93f.)
(4) O (99)
(5)  C* ( 93f-)
(6) G (loiff.)
( 7 )  G
(8) G (88f.)
Rabinovich 1987
(1) C* (6)
(2) if (7)
(3) G (25)
(4 ) 0
(5)?
(6)?
(7) 0  (25)
(8) 4- (324b)
Schleifer 1972
(1) G (99ff-)
(2) G (i07ff.)
(3) G (107)
(4) G (113)
(5) G (ii3ff.)
(6 ) 0
(7) G (114,12lff.)
(8)G
Moskin 1982
(1) $
(2) if (32)
(3)?
(4) #
(5)?
(6) if (44f.)
(7) $
(8)?
O’Ballance 1972
(1) G (23)
(2) G (24)
(3)?
(4) G (25)
(5)?
(6)?
(7 ) 0
(8) G (l65ff., 220ff., 257f., 
278)
Rosensaft 1969
(1 ) 0 (22f.)
(2) 0 (26 )
(3 ) (26f.)
(4 )0
(5) 0 (26f.)
(6) 0 (4 8 )
(7 ) 0 (48f.)
(8)?
Sharabi1970
(1 )0 (49f-)
(2 )0 (51)
(3 )0 (52ff.)
(4 )0
(5 )0 (52ff.)
(6 )0 (63 )
(7 )0
(8 )0 (55)
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Yost 1968
(1) C* (74f.)
(2)?
(3)C*(8lf.)
(4) C* (81)
(5) C* (82)
(6)?
(7)?
(8)?
1067: General works
Bailey 1990
(1) C* (190)
(2)?
(3) C* (i9if.)
(4) G (195)
(5) $  (I98f.)
(6)?
(7)?
(8)?
Bickerton & Klausner 1991
(1) $
(2) G (150)
(3)?
(4 ) $
(5)?
(6) $  (150)
(7) 0  (150k)
(8 )0  (15 if.)
Bregman 2000
(1 ) G (42f.)
(2)G (46)
(3)?
(4) $
(5)  0 (470
(6 )0 (5 1 )
(7) 0 (59)
(8)?
Young 1967
(1) G (77)
(2 )0  (77)
(3) G (77)
(4) $
(5) 0  (141)
(6) G (80)
(7)?
(8) G
Bard 1999
(1) 0
(2) 0  (225)
(3) 0  (225)
(4) $
(5) 0  (226)
(6) 0  (226)
(7) 0  (226)
(8) *  (226f.)
Blumberg 1998
(1) 0
(2) 0  (105)
(3)?
(4) #
(5 ) 0  (105)
(6)?
(7)?
(8)?
Bregman & El-Tahri 1998
(1) G ( 6 4 )
( 2 ) G ( 6 6 )
(3)  G ( 6 6 )
(4)C* ( 6 8 )
C5)■> ( 67f .)
( 6 ) ?
(7) ?
( 8 ) 0
V©00
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Davis & Decter 1982
(1) $
(2) $  (31)
(3 ) * (3 1)
(4 )#
(5) $ (3 0 )
(6) *  (33)
(7) $  (33fO
(8)?
Fraser 1995
(1)$
(2) C* (82f.)
(3) C* (82)
(4) $
(5) $  (83)
(6)?
(7)C*
(8 )«  (84f.)
Gerner 1994
(1) *
(2) G (ill)
(3) C* (112)
(4) $
(5) 0 (112)
(6)?
(7) O(113)
(8)?
Khouri 1985
(0  0 (244)
(2)G (246)
(3 ) 0 (245b)
(4 ) 0 (246,282)
(5 ) 0 (246f.)
(6)0 (249, 281)
(7 ) 0 (28lf.)
(8)0 (26of., 282)
Dolan 1 9 9 1
(1) $
( 2 )  $  (1 2 9 )
(3)  $  (1 2 9 )
(4) *
(5 )  «  (1 2 8 )
( 6 )  #  ( l 2 9 f . )
(7 )  3  (1 2 9 )
( 8 )  *  (1 3 0 )
Gainsborough 1 9 8 6
(1) G (1 3 0 )
( 2 )  $  (1 3 1 )
( 3 )  O  (1 3 3 )
( 4 )  G ( l 4 6 f . )
(5) G ( i 2 6 f . ,  I 3 2 f .)
(6)?
(7)?
(8)?
Gilbert 1 9 9 8
(1) $
( 2 )  ( 3 6 6 )
(3) ■> ( 3 6 6 )
(4)$
(5) *  ( 3 6 8 )
( 6 )  $  (3 7 7 )
( 7) $
(8)<■ (384ff.) 
Lesch & Tschirgi 1 9 9 8
( 2 )  G ( 2 0 )
( 3 )  G ( 2 0 )
(4) «
(5)?
(6)?
(7) ?
(8)?
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Morris 1999
(1) C* (304)
(2) *  (3 0 5 f.)
(3) O (3° 5f-)
(4 )0
(5) O (306)
(6)?
(7) C* (311)
(8) O (311,318)
Quigley 1990
(1) G (158)
(2) G (159)
(3) G (162)
(4) G (160)
(5) G (162)
(6)?
(7) G (l64f.)
(8)?
Samuel 1989
(1) 0
(2) 0  (121)
(3) O (121)
(4) *
(5) 0  (121)
(6) 0  (121)
(7) #
(8) 0  (122)
Shlaim 2000
(1) O (236Q
(2) $ (2 3 7 )
(3 ) G (2 3 7 )
(4 ) $
(5 ) G (2 3 7 )
(6) ?
(7 ) G
(8) $ (241)
O’Brien 1986
(1) O
(2) 0  (409f.)
(3) O (409f  )
(4) $
(5)?
(6)?
(7 ) *  (413)
(8)?
Sachar 1996
(1) G (622)
(2 )0 (6 2 3 )
(3 )0  (623f.)
(4) G (625)
(5) *  (626)
(6) O (633)
(7) *  (638)
(8) 0  (635f.)
Schulze 1999
(1) O
(2 )0 (3 6 )
(3) 0 (36)
(4) 0 (36)
(5) O (36)
(6)?
(7)?
(8) 0 (37®.)
Smith 1992
(D O (195)
(2)?
(3 ) 0 (196)
(4 ) 0 (196)
(5 )0 (196)
(6 )0 (197)
(7 ) 0
(8 )0 (198)
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Tessler 1994 Thomas 1999
(1) G (382,387) (1) G (155)
(2) G (391) (2) G (159)
(3) o  (3 8 9 0 (3) O (159)
(4 )0 (3 8 9 ) (4 ) O (159)
(5 ) $  (3 9 iff-) (5) G (l6of.)
(6) «  (394) (6)?
(7 ) $  (3 9 4 ) (7 )?
(8 )*  (3 9 7 ) (8 )S  (173)
Viorst 1987
(1) $
(2)?
(3) C* (191)
(4 ) *
(5 ) #  (191)
(6 )£  (193)
(7 ) (9 9 )
(8)?
1067-7'-!: Specific works
Bailey 1985
(2) C* (174)
(3 )?
(4) G (181)
(5) $
Bentwich 1970
(2)?
(3 ) ?
(4 ) ?
(5 ) ?
Gazit 1983
(2)?
(3 ) ?
(4) #  (66f., 72f., 124)
(5 ) $  (9 4 f-)
O’Ballance 1974
(2)?
(3 ) $  (5 7 )
(4 ) ?
(5 ) ?
Bar-Siman-Tov 1980
(2)?
(3 )C*(4 7 ff.,5 6 ff.)
(4 ) ?
(5 ) ?
Gawiych 2000
(2) $  (100)
(3 ) *  (107. n o )
(4 ) «
(5) £  (i29f.)
Korn 1992
(2) S (71)
(3 )« (108)
(4) c* (273)
(5) C* (274)
Quandt 1978
(2)?
(3 ) ?
(4) O (17)
(5) C* (18)
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Whetten 1974
(2) C* (49f.)
(3 ) C* (82)
(4) C* (l46ff.)
(5) G (l46ff.)
io(S7-7q: General works
Bailey 1990
(2) G (26lf.)
(3) C* (288)
(4) G (291)
(5) G (292)
Bickerton & Klausner 1991
(2) *  (163)
(3 ) (163)
(4 ) $
(5 ) $  (1 7 4 )
Bregman 2000
(2)?
(3) G (62)
(4 ) $
(5) G (68)
Davis & Decter 1982
(2)«(37)
(3 ) G (42)
(4 ) $  (4 4 )
(5 ) $  (4 4 )
Fraser 1995
(2) G (88)
(3 ) (9 2 )
(4) «  (89)
(5 ) $
Gerner 1994
(2)?
(3 ) ?
(4) #  (ii4f.)
(5) $
Bard 1999
(2) (232)
(3 ) $  (237)
(4) $
(5 ) #
Blumberg 1998
(2) «(115)
(3) *  (117)
(4 ) $
(5) $
Bregman & El-Tahri 1998
(2)?
(3 ) ?
(4 ) #
(5) G (108)
Dolan 1991
(2) $  (131)
(3) $  (132)
(4 ) $
(5 ) $
Gainsborough 1986
(2)?
(3) G (181)
(4) $  (181)
(5) S (l84f.)
Gilbert 1998
(2) #  (402)
(3 ) $  (4 1 0 )
(4 ) $
(5 ) *
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Khouri 1985
(2) C* (3i3f.)
(3) C* (363)
(4) C* (366)
(5) G (366)
Morris 1999
(2) *  (3 4 5 f.)
(3) G (348)
(4 ) C* (389)
(5) G (390)
Quigley 1990
(2)?
(3 ) ?
(4 ) ?
(5 ) ?
Samuel 1989
(2) «  (123)
(3 ) $  (123)
(4 ) $
(5 ) $
Shlaim 2000
(2) G (258)
(3) C* (289)
(4) G (300f.)
(5) G feoSf.)
Tessler 1994
(2) G (409!)
(3 ) G (4 4 5 )
(4) «  (422)
(5 ) $
Viorst 1987
(2) C* (io5f.)
(3 ) ?
(4) S  (142)
(5 ) *  (142)
Lesch & Tschirgi 1998
(2) G (22)
(3) C* (24)
(4) ^
(5) G (24)
O’Brien 1986
(2) $  (4 7 7 ; 4 9 if-)
(3 )?
(4 ) $  (5 0 5 )
(5) G (510)
Sachar 1996
(2) G (676)
(3 ) G (690f.)
(4 ) #  (6 9 5 f-)
(5 ) (696)
Schulze 1999
(2) «  (40)
(3) G (42)
(4 ) $
(5 ) C* (45)
Smith 1992
(2) G (211)
(3) C* (218)
(4) G (226)
(5 ) $
Thomas 1999
(2) ?
(3 ) C* (1 9 3 )
(4 ) G (196)
(5 ) G (1 9 5 )
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W ar o f  1Q71: H p ed fic  w o rk s
Aker 1985
(1) $  (19)
(2) §  (120)
(3)?
Allen 1982
(1) C* (interm.) (20f., 83)
(2) $  (224,228f.)
(3 ) $
Barker 1974
(1) *  (6,97)
(2) «  (137)
(3 ) *
Handel 1976
(1) S
(2)?
(3) $  (52)
Neff 1988
(1) C* (306)
(2) C* (271-77)
(3)?
Sela 2000
(1) C* (56)
(2)?
(3 ) 0
Sobel 1974
(D?
(2) $  (I12f.)
(3)?
War of 1Q71: General works
Bailey 1990
(1) G (interm.) (310)
(2) £  (328f.)
(3)?
Bickerton & Klausner 1991
(1) G (interm.) (l75f.)
(2) $  (178)
(3)?
al-Ayoubi 1975
(1) G (84)
(2) G (96)
(3 ) G ( 6 5ff.)
Asher & Hammel 1987
(1) G (interm.) (lgf.)
(2)?
(3) «(21)
Eshel 1978
(1) G (5)
(2) $  (74Q
(3 ) «
Laqueur 1974
(1) G (127)
(2) G (112,197)
(3) G (254f.)
O’Ballance 1978
(1) C* (41)
(2) C* (256f.)
(3 ) G (13)
Sid-Ahmed 1976
(1) G (27f.)
(2)?
( 3 ) 0
Bard 1999
(1) (246)
(2) $  (253)
(3) *  (246)
Blumberg 1998
(1) #  (l20ff.)
(2)
(3 )«  (l20ff.)
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Bregman 2000
(1) C* (interm.) (71,83)
(2 )0 (9 2 )
(3) C* (68)
Davis & Decter 1982
(1) $
(2)?
(3) $  (45®-)
Fraser 1995
(1) G (looff.)
(2) G (103)
(3)?
Gerner 1994
(1) G (116)
(2) G (116)
(3) G (115)
Khouri 1985
(1) G (370)
(2) G (370)
(3) G (364Q
Morris 1999
(1) G (387)
(2) G (430 ,435f-)
(3) G (388ff.)
Quigley 1990
(1) ?
(2)?
(3)?
Samuel 1989
(1) S
(2) $  (l38ff.)
(3)?
Shlaim 2000
(1) G (3 igf.)
(2)?
(3) G (309-19)
Bregman & El-Tahri 1998
(1) G (interm.) (ii4ff.)
( 2 )$
(3 ) 0
Dolan 1991
(1) $  (132)
(2)?
(3 ) $  (132)
Gainsborough 1986
(1) 9
(2) G (182)
(3) G (183)
Gilbert 1998
(1) G (460)
(2) $  (458)
(3 )?
Lesch &Tschirgi 1998
(1) $  (25)
(2) $  (26)
(3) G (25)
O’Brien 1986
(1) G (512-21)
(2) G (528)
(3 ) G (505-10)
Sachar 1996
(1) $  (748)
(2) *  (781)
(3 )?
Schulze 1999
(1) O (interm.) (45f.)
(2) $  (4 9 )
(3 )?
Smith 1992
(1) G (229)
(2) G (231)
(3 ) 0
2 4 8
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Tessler 1994
(1) C* (479f.)
(2) A (476f.)
(3 )?
Viorst 1987
(1) G (170)
(2) G (166)
(3) G (i6of.)
The rise of PLO: Specific works 
Aburish 1998
(1) G (9 7 ff.)
(3) C* (98)
(4) G (io3ff.)
(5 ) *  ( i2 3 f-)
Becker 1984 
(1) $  (82)
(3 ) (85)
(4 ) #  (7 5 f-)
(5) (77.107)
Cobban 1984
(D?
(3) C* (145ft)
(4) C* (48f.)
(5 ) $  (5 4 f-)
Gresh 1988 
(1) G (51)
(3 )?
(4)C*(il)
(5) C* (111)
Jureidini & Hazen 1976
(1) C* (98)
(3 ) C* (88)
(4 ) 0 (5 1 )
(5) O (84)
Nassar 1991 
(1) G (i98f.)
(3) G (88)
(4) C* (131)
(5 ) O (9 7 f.)
Thomas 1999
(1) C* (interm.) (198)
(2) C* (202)
(3) O (198)
Amos 1980
(1)?
(3) G (76ft)
(4)?
(5) O (64,221)
Brynen 1990 
(1)?
(3) G (42f.)
(4 ) *
(5 )?
Gowers & Walker 1990 
(1)?
(3) O (84)
(4) G (75ft)
(5 ) $  (92 ,9 7 )
Hart 1989 
(1) C* (275)
(3) G (286)
(4) C* (284,306!)
(5) 0  (337)
Livingstone & Halevy 1991
(D?
(3) *  (100ft)
(4) *  (81,103)
(5 ) $  (103ft)
O’Neill 1978 
(1) 0  (22lf.)
(3) «  (110)
(4) G (165ft)
(5 ) $  (87, n o , 151, i88ffi)
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Rubin 1994 
(1) «( 4 0 )
(3) c* (24,32)
(4 ) $  (34f., 141)
(5) $  (38)
Wallach 1990 
(1) *  (233f.)
(3) G (166, 232)
(4) C* (167,312,470)
(5) $  (169,328,384)
Th e rise of the PLO: General works
Bailey 1990 
(1) ?
(3 ) $  (2 9 5 ,3 0 1 ,3 4 3 )
(4) «  (290)
(5 )?
Bickerton & Klausner 1991 
(1) $  (165)
(3) O (168)
(4) *  (i68f.)
(5 ) $  (169)
Bregman 2000
(D ?
(3)?
(4)?
(5 ) ?
Davis & Decter 1982 
(1) $  (101)
(3 ) $  (9 9 ff0
(4)?
(5 ) $  (9 9 )
Fraser 1995 
(D ?
(3) c* (91)
(4) «  (9 iff.)
(5 ) $  (9 5 )
Sayigh 1997 
0 0 ?
(3) G (2l3ff.)
(4) G (244!, 258)
(5) O (307®.)
Yodfat & Amon-Ohanna 1981 
(1) $  (5 7 )
(3) C* (26)
(4 ) C* (30)
(5 ) $  (3 3 )
Bard 1999
(1)?
(3) $  (238ff., 244)
(4) $  (2 4 of.)
(5) $  (2 4 iff.)
Blumberg 1998
(1)?
(3 ) $  (1 1 3 )
(4) «  (113)
(5 ) $  (119)
Bregman & El-Tahri 1998 
(1)?
(3) G (142)
(4) G (142, l46f.)
(5 )?
Dolan 1991
(D ?
(3 ) ?
(4 )?
(5 )?
Gainsborough 1986
(1) ?
(3 )?
(4 )?
(5 )?
2 5 0
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Gerner 1994 
(1) C* (8gf.)
(3) C* (86ff.)
(4 )?
(5) G (90)
Khouri 1985 
(1 ) G (358)
(3) G (359)
(4 ) *  (3 5 9 )
(5 )?
Morris 1999
a ) ?
(3) G (376ff.)
(4 ) *  (3 7 3 f-)
(5 ) *  (3 7 8 f., 386)
Quigley 1990 
(1) G (228)
(3 ) G (195)
(4 ) ?
(5) G (198) 
Samuel 1989
(1)?
(3 ) $  (130)
(4) $  (142)
(5 ) $  (1 3 0 )
Shlaim 2000 
« ?
(3 )?
(4 ) ?
(5 ) ?
Tessler 1994
(1) G (4 3 7 f-» 442)
(3 ) ?
(4 ) (46of.)
(5 ) G (4 6 3 f.)
Viorst 1987 
(1) ?
(3 ) $  (I3 5 f-)
(4 ) <■ (1 3 5 )
(5 )?
Gilbert 1998
(1)?
(3) $  (4 i 7 ff.)
(4) (4 1 7 )
(5 )?
Lesch & Tschirgi 1998
(1)?
(3 ) G (75)
(4) G (23)
(5 )?
O’Brien 1986
(Q?
(3) G (481)
(4) G (480)
(5 ) (4 8 if.)
Sachar1996 
(1) >9 (810)
(3) G (699ft)
(4) $  (685)
(5 ) *  (701)
Schulze 1999
(1)?
(3 ) ?
(4 ) *  (4 4 )
(5 )?
Smith 1992 
(1)?
(3) G (225)
(4) G (223)
(5) $  (225)
Thomas 1999 
(1) G (i9lf.)
(3) G (197)
(4) G (195)
(5 ) (1 9 7 )
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Appendix II: UN Security Council Resolution no, 242 
(1967) of 22 November 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in 
the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory 
by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which 
eveiy State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further  that all Member States in their acceptance 
of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment 
to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which 
should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and 
respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of every State 
in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and 
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further  the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through 
international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political 
independence of every State in the area, through measures including 
the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special 
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and 
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote
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agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted 
settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this 
resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security 
Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as 
soon as possible.
Source: United Nations website.
URL: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/i967/scres67.htm
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Appendix III: The Khartoum Resolution (September i,
1967)
1. The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of 
joint action and the need for coordination and for the elimination of 
all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the other 
Arab Heads of State at the conference have affirmed their countries' 
stand by and implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter which 
was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.
2. The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to 
eliminate the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied 
lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands 
falls on all the Arab States.
3. The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts 
at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the 
aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli 
forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the 
aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the 
main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace 
with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and 
insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own 
country.
4. The conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil 
recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in 
the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the 
summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping 
can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource 
which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States 
directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to
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stand firm in the battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to 
resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that 
can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the 
efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the 
aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and 
eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing States have, 
in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the 
aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.
5 . The participants in the conference have approved the plan 
proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab Economic and Social 
Development Fund on the basis of the recommendation of the 
Baghdad conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.
6 . The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary 
measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities.
7 . The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign 
bases in the Arab States.
Source: Avalon Project at Yale Law School
URL: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/khartoum.htm
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